Hughes argues that although the trial court lacked discretion regarding the length of his sentence, and, pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (c), he was not eligible for parole, the trial court "nonetheless had complete discretion to consider probating any or all [of] that sentence" under OCGA § 17-10-7 (a). See Thompson v. State, 358 Ga.App. 553, 558-559 (2) (b) (855 S.E.2d 756) (2021) (finding that "although OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) prohibits parole, that Code section does not take away the trial court's discretion to probate or suspend part of a sentence under OCGA § 17-10-7 (a)[,]" so long as the punishment mandated by the statute governing the underlying crime does not prohibit suspension or probation). We agree that the trial court had discretion to probate the sentences associated with Hughes' crimes. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (2011) (aggravated assault); OCGA §§ 16-4-1 (criminal attempt), 16-8-41 (armed robbery); OCGA § 16-11-106 (possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime); and OCGA § 16-11-131 (2012) (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon).

Id. Boone claims the trial court's differing-views jury instruction is similar to one this Court disproved of in Byrd v Medical Center of Central Georgia, Inc, 258 Ga App 286, 574 S E 2d 326 (2002) But even if that were arguably true, we are nevertheless bound by our Supreme Court’s decision in Condra See Thompson v State, 358 Ga App 553, 557 (1), 855 S E 2d 756 (2021)("Although [the appellant] argues that this well settled authority should no longer be followed in Georgia, we are bound by the opinions of the Supreme Court"), Whorton v State, 321 Ga App 335, 339 (1), 741 S E 2d 653 (2013) (noting that "vertical stare decisis dictates that we faithfully adhere to the precedents established by the Supreme Court of Georgia")

The State contends this point of law should be revisited because if an offense occurred on different occasions, it logically follows that they were separate offenses. But as the State rightly acknowledges, we are bound by cases of our Supreme Court affirming the current law on this issue, See Thompson v. State, 358 Ga. App. 553, 557 (1), 855 S.E.2d 756 (2021) ("Although [the appellant] argues that this well settled authority should no longer be followed in Georgia, we are bound by the opinions of the Supreme Court."); Whortonv.State, 321 Ga. App. 335, 339, 741 S.E.2d 653 (2013) (noting that "vertical stare decisis dictates that we faithfully adhere to the precedents established by the Supreme Court of Georgia").

Long-standing precedent in this Court and in the Supreme Court does not permit us to abridge a defendant's double jeopardy protections. See Thompson v. State , 358 Ga. App. 553, 557 (1), 855 S.E.2d 756 (2021) ("Although Thompson argues that this well settled authority should no longer be followed in Georgia, we are bound by the opinions of the Supreme Court.").

Although the indictment charged Holley with reckless driving by "fail[ing] to yield the right of way and us[ing] a mobile device to the point that she was distracted" (emphasis supplied), the State was required to prove only that the offense was committed in either of the separate ways listed in the indictment. Thompson v. State , 358 Ga. App. 553, 556 (1), 855 S.E.2d 756 (2021) ; accord Chynoweth v. State , 331 Ga. App. 123, 125 (1), 768 S.E.2d 536 (2015) ("It is sufficient for the State to show that a crime was committed in any one of the separate ways listed in the indictment, even if the indictment uses the conjunctive rather than disjunctive form.") (citation and punctuation omitted). Turning to the accident defense, OCGA § 16-2-2 provides that "[a] person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence."

(b) The State also argues that, because the felony murder offense in this case is predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude and the fleeing and attempting to elude statute provides that sentences under that statute cannot be served concurrently with any other offense, see OCGA § 40-6-395 (d), the trial court erred in ordering that the sentences for Counts 4, 10-13, and 16 be served concurrently with the felony murder sentence. See Thompson v. State, 358 Ga. App. 553, 855 S.E.2d 756 (2021) (because former OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) (B) (which is now found in OCGA § 40-6-395 (d)) prevents "any portion of a sentence for felony fleeing or eluding from … being served concurrently with any other offense," the trial court "was required to sentence [the appellant] to five years to serve on each of the four felony fleeing or eluding convictions, and that these sentences could not run concurrently with each other or the sentences imposed on [the appellant’s] other convictions"). Starks counters that this argument has no support because the discretion whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences "reside[s] entirely and solely within the breast of the trial judge[.]" Keys v. State, 365 Ga. App. 284, 285 (1), 878 S.E.2d 133 (2022).

See OCGA §§ 40-5-121 (a) (driving without a license constitutes a misdemeanor), 40-6-1 (a) (violations of the uniform rules of the road, unless otherwise specified, constitute misdemeanors), 40-6-390 (b) (reckless driving constitutes a misdemeanor). Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the verdict, see Thompson v. State , 358 Ga. App. 553, 553, 855 S.E.2d 756 (2021), the evidence shows that on February 17, 2019, a Lamar County officer monitoring traffic saw a car with heavily tinted windows pass his vehicle. The officer attempted to initiate a traffic stop, but the vehicle fled, and a chase ensued.