This Court applies a highly deferential standard of review to decisions of the familycourt regarding parental rights and responsibilities. Thompson v. Pafundi, 2010 VT 80, ¶ 11, 188 Vt. 605, 8 A.3d 476 (mem.). “[W]e do not disturb findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and we uphold the court's legal conclusions if they are supported by the findings.” DeSantis v. Pegues, 2011 VT 114, ¶ 26, 190 Vt. 457, 35 A.3d 152. “We view the findings in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and only reverse if the court exercised its discretion upon unfounded considerations or to an extent clearly unreasonable upon the facts presented.

Furthermore, we afford the trial court broad latitude in determining the child's best interests. Thompson v. Pafundi, 2010 VT 80, ¶ 11, 188 Vt. ___, 8 A.3d 476 (mem.). ¶ 12. Father's first argument focuses on instances of mother interfering with his relationship with his daughter as evidence that she is unfit to act as a custodial parent.

Camara v. Camara, 2010 VT 53 , ¶ 18, 188 Vt. 566 , 998 A.2d 1058 (mem.). The purpose of the temporary order is “consistent with the general law that temporary maintenance orders merge into, and are superseded by, the final order.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); see Thompson v. Pafundi, 2010 VT 80 , ¶ 17, 188 Vt. 605 , 8 A.3d 476 (mem.) (“[T]he temporary order . . . was just that: temporary.” (citing Porcaro v. Drop, 175 Vt. 13 , 14, 816 A.2d 1280 , 1282 (2002)))

Here, we conclude that the trial court impermissibly relied on evidence drawn from outside the court proceeding, and we view such reliance as an abuse of discretion. See Thompson v. Pafundi, 2010 VT 80, ¶ 16, 188 Vt. 605, 8 A.3d 476 (mem.) (reviewing factual support for court's legal conclusion for abuse of discretion).

This record indicates that mother did not have reasonable notice of the court's intention to hold a final hearing. Cf. Thompson v. Pafundi, 2010 VT 80, ¶ 10, 188 Vt. 605 (mem.) (holding that court did not violate mother's due process rights by converting hearing on modification of parent-child contact into final hearing on parental rights and responsibilities because record showed mother was clearly on notice and waived any objection by agreeing to expedited review of that issue).

(quotation omitted)). Because "the record as a whole" indicated that the court considered and applied all the statutory best-interests factors with regard to parent-child contact, Thompson v. Pafundi, 2010 VT 80, ¶ 12, 188 Vt. 605 (mem.), and its PCC award demonstrated "reasoned judgment in light of the record evidence," Lee, 2018 VT 96, ¶ 11 (quotation omitted), we affirm the trial court's order.

To modify a temporary order made pending a final hearing, the court need not engage in a changed-circumstances analysis because the temporary order by its terms is meant to cease at the time of a final order. Thompson v. Pafundi, 2010 VT 80, ¶ 17, 188 Vt. 605 (mem.). However, once an order is final, prior to modifying it, the court must find a real, substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances.

However, this is not a relocation case; "[i]t is a final determination of parental rights and responsibilities following a temporary order." Thompson v. Pafundi, 2010 VT 80, ¶ 17, 188 Vt. 605. The family court did not err by "proceed[ing] directly to a statutory best-interests analysis in crafting a final order because the temporary order in place up until then was just that: temporary." Id. (citing Porcaro v. Drop, 175 Vt. 13, 14 (2002)).

The trial court has "broad latitude in determining a child's best interests." Thompson v. Pafundi, 2010 VT 80, ¶ 11, 188 Vt. 605. We will uphold its findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and its decision will stand absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.

Taxpayer and the City argued below, and continue to dispute on appeal, the assistant city attorney's role at the abatement hearing; taxpayer argues that it was fundamentally adversarial—in the nature of a prosecutor—while the City maintains that he served as the Board's attorney in an advisory capacity. It is, of course, fundamentally improper for an advocate to engage in off-the-record communications with a judge, or for the judge to consider matters not in the record. State v. Gokey, 2010 VT 80, ¶¶ 14-21, 188 Vt. 500. In evaluating taxpayer's claim that the assistant city attorney engaged in improper ex parte communications with the Board, the trial court implicitly accepted taxpayer's characterization of the assistant city attorney's role, but found no impropriety. For purposes of resolving the claims on appeal, we adopt the same approach.