Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:18-cv-17
04-03-2018
JAMES E. THOMPSON, Plaintiff, v. JACKIE JOHNSON, Glynn County District Attorney; and GEORGE BARNHILL, Glynn County Assistant District Attorney, Defendants.
ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is currently housed at the Glynn County Detention Center in Brunswick, Georgia, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain events occurring in Glynn County, Georgia. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 2.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion. For these same reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint based on his failure to state a claim, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.
BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts he was arrested on March 3, 2017, for making a terroristic threat and simple battery. (Doc. 1-1, p. 2.) Plaintiff contends he was later indicted on these charges. (Id. at p. 3.) At a later time, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Barnhill objected to Plaintiff being provided a bond. (Id. at p. 5.) Plaintiff asserts his bond was revoked without any participation on his part at the hearing. Plaintiff maintains Defendant Barnhill and the judge had an "ex parte (tête-à-tête)" to determine Plaintiff's mother would not testify at this hearing. (Id. at p. 8.) However, Plaintiff contends Judge Lane reversed his decision and once again granted Plaintiff bond, but the appropriate paperwork has not been sent to the Detention Center, ensuring Plaintiff cannot be released on bond.
On October 3, 2017, Plaintiff asserts his mother provided a statement that he made terroristic threats against her, even though she was not mentioned as a victim of his alleged actions of March 3, 2017. (Id. at p. 11.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants were embarrassed about Judge Lane granting Plaintiff a bond, which resulted in a second indictment against Plaintiff. (Id. at p. 12.)
Plaintiff maintains Defendants' actions resulted in the violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at p. 13.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against Defendants, the entry of a declaratory judgment that Defendants are prosecuting him in bad faith, and compensatory damages. (Id. at pp. 14-15.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets, shows an inability to pay the filing fee, and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Court looks to the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when reviewing a complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) "if it is 'without arguable merit either in law or fact.'" Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App'x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also "accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys . . . .") (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff's unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("We have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.").
DISCUSSION
I. Dismissal Under Younger Abstention
Insofar as Plaintiff is asking this Court to intervene in the state case's ongoing proceedings, the Younger abstention doctrine bars Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief. Under the Younger abstention doctrine, a federal court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a case where there is an ongoing state action. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). While Younger involved a federal suit for injunctive relief of the ongoing state proceedings, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also indicated that the Younger abstention doctrine extends to cases involving Section 1983 claims for monetary damages. See Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405, 1405-06 (11th Cir. 1985) (requiring Younger abstention where plaintiff raised Fourth Amendment Section 1983 damages claims related to ongoing state criminal proceedings); see also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 133 (2004) (intervention in ongoing state court proceedings is not appropriate as a Section 1983 cause of action when there is ample opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in those state court proceedings).
Here, because the status of Plaintiff's indictment is ongoing, any ruling by this Court as to the constitutionality of Defendants' actions could substantially interfere with the results reached in the state court proceeding. See 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting the importance of "whether the federal proceeding will interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding" in determining whether Younger abstention is appropriate). Moreover, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the lack of adequate remedy at law regarding his claims because he is free to allege the same violations or inaction by Defendants in his state criminal proceedings. See Boyd v. Georgia, No. CV 112-042, 2012 WL 2862157, at *2 (S.D. Ga. May 14, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 2862123 (S.D. Ga. July 11, 2012), aff'd, 512 F. App'x 915 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law with respect to constitutional claims that he could bring in his pending state criminal case). In addition, Plaintiff's allegations provide no indication of irreparable injury, and the hardships associated with having to defend against a criminal prosecution do not establish it as a matter of law. Younger, 401 U.S. at 47 ("Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered 'irreparable' in the special legal sense of that term.").
For this reason, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief.
II. Plaintiff's Malicious Prosecution Claims
Plaintiff's contentions against Defendants appear to seek damages for malicious prosecution. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals "unequivocally has identified malicious prosecution to be a constitutional tort that is cognizable under § 1983." Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (11th Cir. 1998). "To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures in addition to the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution." Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). The common law elements in Georgia are: (1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused's favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused. Id. at 881-82.
Here, Plaintiff fails to assert that his criminal prosecution has terminated in his favor. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution, and the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff's monetary damages claims on this basis.
The Eleventh Circuit noted in an unpublished case that a district court errs by dismissing a complaint under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), in the absence of "an extant conviction[.]" Leonard v. FBI, 405 F. App'x 386, 388 (11th Cir. 2010). In Leonard, the Eleventh Circuit observed a "malicious prosecution claim ripens only if the state-court proceeding is terminated in [the plaintiff's] favor." Id. (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 484 ("One element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.")).
III. Prosecutorial Immunity
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated that Section 1983 did not abrogate the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. See, e.g., Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009). "Today, absolute prosecutorial immunity extends to 'acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State.'" Favors-Morrell v. United States, No. CV 214-164, 2015 WL 3766853, at *3 (S.D. Ga. June 15, 2015) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)); see also Rivera v. Leal, 359 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2004) ("A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from suit for all actions he takes while performing his function as an advocate for the government."). This absolute immunity renders prosecutors "completely immune from liability, even when their conduct is wrongful or malicious prosecution." Hart v.Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Plaintiff's putative claims against Defendants pertain to their actions as advocates for the State of Georgia and concern prosecutorial functions that are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the prosecution. See Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342 (citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127, 130 (1997)). Thus, the Court may also DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendants under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. IV. Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though Plaintiff has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these issues in the Court's order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal is not taken in good faith "before or after the notice of appeal is filed").
A certificate of appealability is not required in this Section 1983 action.
An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. County of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is frivolous, and thus, not brought in good faith, if it is "without arguable merit either in law or fact." Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1-2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis of Plaintiff's action, there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 2.) In addition, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 3rd day of April, 2018.
/s/_________
R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA