Opinion
24-CV-5013 (LTS)
10-28-2024
RONALD THOMPSON, JR. ALSO KNOWN AS CURTIS JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW V. GREICO BRONX BOOKING JUDGE; CARMEN A. GREICO BRONX BOOKING JUDGE; EUGENE D. BOWEN BRONX BOOKING JUDGE; YADHIRA TAYLOR GONZALEZ BRONX BOOKING JUDGE, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff, who currently is incarcerated at Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federally protected rights. By order dated July 2, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
BACKGROUND
The filed this complaint against four state-court “booking judges.” (ECF 1.) The complaint contains the following allegations:
The Court quotes verbatim from Plaintiff's complaint. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise.
After my arrest and on several priors I Curtis Jackson/Ronald Thompson Jr. made a verbal claim of ownership to numerous Buiseness establishments of which management is unaware of or ignorrent to the fact. A Doctoral pager is in order yet I have been mentally evaluated for over ninety days. There were ROR adjournments and yet no investigation on behalf of my claim.(Id. V.) With respect to the relief Plaintiff seeks, he states, “stander or agreed upon.” (Id. ¶ VI.)
DISCUSSION
Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation ....” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” his judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendants acted beyond the scope of their judicial responsibilities or outside their jurisdiction. See Mireles, 509 U.S. at 11-12. Because Plaintiff sues judges for “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before” them, they are immune from suit for such claims for damages. Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210.
By contrast, “a judge is not absolutely immune ....from a suit for prospective injunctive relief.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 10, n.1 (citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 536-543 (1984)); Shtrauch v. Dowd, 651 Fed.Appx. 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[J]udicial immunity does not bar a claim for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.”) (summary order). Nevertheless, a court's ability to award injunctive relief against a judicial officer under Section 1983 is strictly limited. As amended in 1996, Section 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “A plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to satisfy the injury requirement but must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the future.” Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1998); Shtrauch, 651 Fed.Appx. at 74 (affirming that plaintiff was not entitled to declaratory relief against judicial officer where plaintiff “alleges only past conduct and does not seek to prevent an ongoing or future violation of federal law”).
Plaintiff makes no argument that a declaratory decree was violated, that an appeal from any of the judges's orders was unavailable, or that he is entitled to declaratory relief based on some prospective future harm. See, e.g., Davis v. Campbell, No. 3:13-CV-0693, 2014 WL 234722, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014) (“[D]eclaratory relief against a judge for actions taken within his or her judicial capacity is ordinarily available by appealing the judge's order.”); Brik v. Brodie, No. 23-CV-4330, 2023 WL 4373557, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2023) (dismissing plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief against judge, inter alia, because plaintiff “does not seek to remedy a harm that is truly prospective, [and plaintiff] does show any entitlement to declaratory relief” based on the judge's past conduct). Accordingly, injunctive relief against the judges named as defendants cannot be granted in an action against them under Section 1983.
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are therefore dismissed in their entirety, based on absolute juridical immunity as to the claims for damages, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and because, on the facts presented, Plaintiff cannot obtain injunctive relief.
LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, and in an abundance of caution, the Court grants him 30 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), with 30 days' leave to replead. An Amended Complaint Form is attached.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered.
SO ORDERED.