Opinion
No. 6-019 / 05-0574
Filed March 1, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Gary D. McKenrick, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals a district court ruling granting defendant's motion for directed verdict in a personal injury action. AFFIRMED.
Robert S. Gallagher of Gallagher, Millage Gallagher, P.L.C., Davenport, for appellant.
Terry J. Abernathy and Thad J. Collins of Pickens, Barnes Abernathy, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Kristin Thompson appeals from the district court's ruling granting Sharla Fox-Jones's motion for directed verdict in a personal injury action. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On September 12, 1996, Kristin Thompson, then a ten-year-old fifth grader, was injured when a minivan driven by Sharla Fox-Jones ran over her leg. Just prior to the accident, Fox-Jones picked up her kindergartener and two other young children from Ridgeview Elementary School in Pleasant Valley, Iowa. By the time she left the parking lot, the buses were gone, and the usual rush of cars had dispersed. Fox-Jones turned left onto Davenport Street and traveled west. Due to road construction, the westbound lane in which Fox-Jones was traveling was the only lane of traffic on Davenport Street.
Thompson was walking with one of two clusters of children Fox-Jones saw ahead of her as she traveled west on Davenport Street. The children were walking in the area where the eastbound lane had been blocked off as part of the road construction. Fox-Jones had driven in the area frequently and was aware of the construction. She had seen children walking in the eastbound lane on previous occasions.
Fox-Jones drove five to ten miles per hour as she approached the children. The road became very narrow because of the construction barricades. She saw the children goofing off and grabbing at each other, and worried that one of them might come into the path of her vehicle. The children were about two feet away from the minivan as Fox-Jones attempted to pass them. She was braking as she approached the children.
Just as the minivan was passing the children, Thompson turned and dashed toward her sister on the other side of the street. She did not look before running into the roadway. As she entered the street, she noticed the minivan two feet away and attempted to stop. She slid on the gravel, lost her footing and ran into the side of the minivan. Thompson's foot and lower leg slid under the minivan. Fox-Jones, who was braking when Thompson ran into the minivan, stopped on Thompson's leg. When Fox-Jones exited her vehicle and saw the tire was resting on Thompson's leg, she got back in the minivan and backed it up. Thompson suffered a compound fracture of her left fibula and tibia.
Thompson's mother, Margaret Thompson, filed a negligence action against Fox-Jones in September 2003. The petition was later amended to substitute Kristen Thompson as plaintiff. The case proceeded to jury trial in March 2005. At the close of Thompson's case, Fox-Jones moved for a directed verdict. The district court granted the motion, concluding (1) no rational trier of fact could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that Fox-Jones breached any duty to Thompson and (2) even if Fox-Jones did breach a duty, any such negligence was not a proximate cause of injury to Thompson. Thompson appeals, arguing the district court erred in granting Fox-Jones's motion for directed verdict.
II. Standard of Review
A directed verdict for the defendant was required only if there was no substantial evidence to support the elements of plaintiff's claim. Bellville v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 702 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Iowa 2005). Substantial evidence means "evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to reach a conclusion." Id. at 473 (citation omitted). To determine whether substantial evidence was offered, the district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "`regardless of whether it was contradicted.'" Id. (quoting Reuter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Inc., 469 N.W.2d 250, 251 (Iowa 1991)). The court must also draw every legitimate inference from this evidence in support of the plaintiff. Id. We review the district court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict for correction of errors at law. Anderson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 2005).
III. Discussion
To prove negligence, Thompson was required to establish "existence of a duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect others, failure to conform to that standard, proximate cause, and damages." Hartig v. Francois, 562 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Iowa 1997). Not surprisingly, Thompson points to several duties which she argues a rational trier of fact could find Fox-Jones breached, including the duty to maintain a proper lookout, to drive at a reasonable and proper speed for conditions, to drive at a speed that permits stopping within an assured clear distance ahead, to keep her vehicle under control, and to exercise due care to avoid colliding with a pedestrian. She also contends a rational trier of fact could find Fox-Jones's negligence was a proximate cause of injury to Thompson.
Thompson failed to present substantial evidence to support her negligence claim against Fox-Jones. Thompson admitted running into the path of the minivan without looking and testified this was the only reason the accident happened. She conceded that if she had stopped and looked, there would not have been an accident. Thompson could not tell the jury what Fox-Jones could have done to prevent the accident.
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that Fox-Jones was not paying attention, was driving too fast, or was not in control of her vehicle. To the contrary, the evidence at trial revealed she was traveling at a very slow speed and was paying close attention to what was going on around her at the time of the accident. She was braking even before Thompson ran into the vehicle, and was able to stop so quickly the minivan came to rest on Thompson's lower leg. Thompson's suggestion that a "lazy eye" condition in Fox-Jones's left eye may have affected her lookout is not supported by the record. Fox-Jones specifically stated the condition had no effect on her peripheral vision.
The district court correctly granted defendant's motion for directed verdict. Our conclusion renders it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by Thompson or Fox-Jones on appeal.