Opinion
C. A. 3:23-5696-CMC-PJG
11-30-2023
Tori Keon Thompson, Plaintiff, v. Department of Social Services Director Michael Leach; Child Support Services Director Tim Mose; Tony Cantone; Gayle Watson; Lakesha Jeffries; Jeannette McBride; County of Richland; Department of Motor Vehicles Director Kevin Shwedo, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Tori Keon Thompson, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes this case should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff brings this action challenging the constitutionality of South Carolina's child support laws, SC Code Ann. §§ 63-17-10 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that in 2011, the Richland County Family Court ordered him to make child support payments. C/A No. 2011-DR-40-39690. Plaintiff claims that the child support payments violate four provisions of the United States Constitution. First, he argues the payments violate the Fifth Amendment because the payments are a “taking” without just compensation. Second, he argues the payments violate his constitutional “right to travel.” Third, Plaintiff argues the payments violate family privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fourth, he argues the payments violate the separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches. In this action, Plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages, to have a lien filing authenticated, to relieve Plaintiff from future family court actions, to reinstate Plaintiff's driver's license and clear Plaintiff's driving record, to remove some of the defendants from their public offices, and to order the defendants to cease and desist actions against Plaintiff.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The court concludes that this case should be summarily dismissed because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Initially, the court construes Plaintiff's claims for damages as being raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Plaintiff claims that his constitutional rights have been violated. A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
But here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts about the named defendants that would show that they had any involvement in the purported constitutional violations related to his child support obligations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be ‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.' ”) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)). Plaintiff provides no facts about the individual defendants. Because Plaintiff does not explain how the named defendants were involved in the purported violations of Plaintiff's rights, Plaintiff fails to meet the federal pleading standards. See generally Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 126 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e do not require a complaint to contain detailed factual allegations. But we do require sufficient facts to allow the court to infer liability as to each defendant. This is baked into Rule 8's requirement that the complaint ‘show' the plaintiff is entitled to relief.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for damages upon which relief can be granted against the defendants.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks relief from an order of the South Carolina Family Court, Plaintiff's claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See generally Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court. We regard the doctrine as jurisdictional.”); Friedman's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts may not consider either issues actually presented to and decided by a state court or constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Sallis v. Child Support Div., C/A No. 7:19-0320-TMC-JDA, 2019 WL 8953164, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2019) (collecting cases finding challenges to child support orders cannot be challenged in federal court under Rooker-Feldman), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 995125 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2020). Therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to Plaintiff's 2011 child support order.
Further, to the extent Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of South Carolina's child support laws, he fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation. Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing a plausible Takings Clause violation because he does not allege that his property was taken for public use. See U.S. Const. Amend. 5 (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing a plausible violation of his “right to travel” because he does not allege that he has been impeded from traveling to another state or that he has been treated differently as a non-resident of another state. See generally Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (“The ‘right to travel' . . . protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.”). Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible violation of his right to family privacy because child support payments ordered by a family court do not interfere with an identifiable right to family privacy under the Due Process Clause. See generally Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 163-64 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The maxim of familial privacy is neither absolute nor unqualified, and may be outweighed by a legitimate governmental interest.”). Finally, the separation of powers principles under the United States Constitution do not apply to South Carolina agencies and courts, which are subject to the constraints of its state constitution. See generally Patchak v. Zinke, 583 U.S. 244, 244 (2018) (outlining the separation of powers among branches of the federal government). Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a violation of constitutional right upon which relief can be granted.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that this case be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Consequently, Plaintiff's “motion to stay” his family court obligations (ECF No. 5), which the court construes as a motion for a preliminary injunction, is denied because he fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits. See generally Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).