Summary
In Thomson v. Deans, 59 N.C. 22, where the agreement was to "abide by such lines" as the arbitrators might decide upon, the court decreed specific performance by the execution of deeds of release up to such lines.
Summary of this case from Pass v. CritcherOpinion
(December Term, 1860.)
Where a dispute existed between the owners of contiguous lands as to their dividing lines, and it was agreed in writing to submit the matters to arbitration and to stand to and abide by such lines as should be made and laid down by the referees, and the arbitrators made an award designating dividing lines between the parties, which the recusant party failed to show were erroneous, it was Held, a proper case for the court to decree a specific performance.
CAUSE removed from the Court of Equity of NASH.
This was a bill to compel a specific performance of an award. John Mathis, Alfred Thompson, one of the plaintiffs, and the defendant, owned contiguous lands, and a disagreement having arisen among the three as to the dividing lines between them, they entered into a penal obligation, dated 19 April, 1851, conditioned as follows: "Whereas, there is a dispute between the said John Deans, Alfred Thompson (23) and John Mathis in regard to the dividing lines of their lands and the said parties have referred the said dispute to Exum L. Curl, Jesse Beal and A. B. Baines, to make lines and settle the said dispute; now, therefore, if the above bounden John Deans, Alfred Thompson and John Mathis, their heirs, executors and assigns, shall stand to and abide by the said lines, as they shall be made and laid down by the said referees, and let each peaceably enjoy the same as allotted to him by the said referees, then the above obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect." Signed and sealed by the parties mentioned. The arbitrators met on the day the submission bond was signed, and having all the parties present, went upon the premises and surveyed such lines of the several tracts as at all concerned the controversy, and examined such deeds and living witnesses as were produced. The matters in controversy may be illustrated by the following diagram:
, SEE 59 N.C. 29.]
The defendant had insisted that the true boundary of his land was as represented by the letters G, F, D, whereas, the plaintiffs said it was G, E, C, so that the land in dispute is that embraced in (24) the area E, F, D, C, of which the spaces A, B, H, and E, F, A, B, were claimed by Thompson, and the rest of it by Mathis.
After examining into the matter, the arbitrators made up and delivered to the parties the following award: "Know all men by these presents, that we, the undersigned referees, having been called on by John Deans, Alfred Thompson and John Mathis to settle a dispute in regard to the lines of land between them, and having met on said lands on 19 April, 1851, do agree to the following boundaries, viz., beginning at a lightwood pine (G), Dean's corner in A. Thompson's line, then east 130 poles to a stake, Dean's corner in Thompson's line (F), then north to the original Thomas Horne line (A), then along the said line west to a stake on the west side of the Great Branch, Thompson's corner in Dean's line (B), thence north a line of marked trees to a stake, Dean's corner in Mathis' line (C)."
By which award it will be seen that Deans obtained of Thompson the area E, F, A, B, which is about seven acres, and Thompson and Mathis obtained of the land claimed by Deans the space B, A, D, C, about forty acres. It appears from the testimony that on the delivery of this award, each party took possession according to the lines fixed upon by the arbitrators, and in that manner continued to hold until some time after the death of John Mathis, when the defendant entered upon the territory embraced in the figure B, A, D, C, and still holds the same in his possession. Also, that he continues in possession of the land E, F, A, B, surrendered to him by the award. The suit was brought by Thompson, who offered to make title to the part taken from his claim, and by the children and heirs-at-law of Mathis, and the prayer is for a specific performance of the award by making deeds, etc., and for an injunction. The defendant, in his answer, insists that there is a palpable mistake in the award of the arbitrators, and that it would be hard and unconscionable for the plaintiffs to have a specific (25) execution of it. The proofs taken in the case are voluminous and contradictory, but it seems that the arbitrators based their judgment chiefly on the fact that the lines adopted by them were old marked lines, corresponding in date with the deeds of the parties, and there were no marks on the lines rejected by them. The cause was heard upon bill, answer, proofs and exhibits.
B. F. Moore and Dortch, for the plaintiffs.
Miller, Fowle and Rogers, for the defendant.
The bill is to enforce an award by compelling a specific execution. The submission appears to be by agreement in pais, and by reference to it, it is found the arbitrators are authorized to make lines and settle the dispute then existing between the parties in regard to their dividing lines; and they bind themselves to abide by such lines as shall be made and laid down by such referees, and to allow each other peaceably to enjoy the same as allotted. The referees laid down a line of division, and the parties thereupon adjusted their respective possessions in conformity with the same.
After two or three years acquiescence by all concerned, the defendant, Deans, took possession again of a parcel of the land which he had abandoned under the award, and this bill is brought to compel him to abide by the lines established, and to allow each peaceably to enjoy the part allotted to him.
We do not perceive why this object may not be accomplished by the bill. By the submission, the parties contract to do what the arbitrators might direct. When the latter, therefore, made their decision, the submission and award, together, amounted to an agreement; and as this agreement is plainly executory in its nature, it is, in substance, the case of an executory agreement under a penalty. The enforcement of such an agreement, specifically, is a familiar subject of equity jurisdiction. In Russell on Arbitrators, 525, it is said, a bill will lie to enforce a specific performance of an award whenever the matter directed by it is such that it would be enforced by the Court as an agreement or contract — especially when the award be to do anything in respect (26) to lands. This is confirmatory of our view.
The award, it will be seen, does not specially require the parties to release or convey to each other, but this, we think, follows from the making of the line by the arbitrators, taken in connection with the terms of the submission. The parties agree to end all disputes by abiding by the line to be made, and allowing each other to enjoy quietly in conformity with the line. It is a private submission, and we think it clear, by the terms of it, that the arbitrament is conclusive as to the rights of the parties to the land in controversy between them; and, as the award does not convey the title, it would seem to be manifestly intended that their rights should be made effectual by conveyances, and that thus all dispute might be ended. In Carter v. Sams, 20 N.C. 321, the arbitrators agreed that defendant should pay all costs, and they assessed plaintiff's damages to $100. It was held that the award was entitled to a liberal construction, and that it should be intended that the defendant was to pay the $100 to the plaintiff. The cases are similar. In neither can the declared rights of the parties be made effectual, except by a construction according to a reasonable intendment.
This is what is called "certainty to a common intent," in the definitions given of the degrees of certainty required in law proceedings; and this degree is all that is required in an award; according to what is said in Carter v. Sams, above referred to.
The only other enquiry which arises upon the pleadings and proofs in the cause, is whether the award be such as the Court will enforce specifically. The parties recite in their submission bond that a dispute existed between them as to the division lines of their lands, and they refer it to the arbitrators to make lines. Upon examination of the proofs in connection with the terms of this submission, the propriety of the plenary power given the arbitrators is apparent. The boundaries are left in great doubt, after the voluminous proofs now on file (27) are all considered; so far, therefore, from it being hard, unconscientious or fraudulent, the arbitrament, at the time and upon the terms agreed on, was a measure of wisdom for all parties. There is nothing brought forward in the proofs which, regarding the award as of no higher obligation than a contract, would prevent a Court of Equity from ordering its specific execution.
A decree may be drawn directing the parties to execute deeds of release to each other for the parcels of land awarded to each by the division lines established by the arbitrators.
PER CURIAM. Decree accordingly.
Cited: Crawford v. Orr, 84 N.C. 251; Metcalf v. Guthrie, 94 N.C. 450; Pass v. Critcher, 112 N.C. 407.