Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:18-3140-TMC-KFM
11-26-2018
Gary Thomas, Ferris Harvley, SMT, SS, and LB, Plaintiffs, v. South Carolina Department of Social Services, Porcha Moore, Hannah Purnell, Gail Henson, Patricia Agger, Patience Johnson, Avery Martin, Susan Alford, Pam Bryant, Katie Whaley, Rosemerry Felder-Commander, Mindy Zimmerman, Matthew P. Turner, and Joan Meacham Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on the pro se plaintiffs' Motion For Emergency Injunctive Relief (doc. 4). Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs allege that the South Carolina Department of Social Services ("DSS") and certain DSS employees wrongfully removed their children from their home and placed them in protective custody. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged the removal of their children in the South Carolina Family Court, and have now brought this action in federal court seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief, namely the return of their children. The plaintiffs have also named as defendants others involved in the removal proceedings, including Family Court judges. In summary, the plaintiffs allege that DSS removed their children without lawful authority, that the children (and the parents) have suffered harm while in DSS custody, and that the Family Court judges wrongfully ruled in favor of DSS and against them. Per the allegations, the children were removed in May or June 2018, and the Family Court held hearings and issued orders upholding the removal, the last such ruling by Judge Turner on November 9, 2018 (doc. 1).
The pro se plaintiffs Gary Thomas and Ferris Harvely allege in their Complaint that they are the parents of three minor children, also listed as plaintiffs and identified by initials SMT, SS, and LB. As addressed in the Proper Form Order filed herewith, pro se plaintiffs may not represent their children in federal court. The court will hereafter reference only Thomas and Harvley as plaintiffs. --------
APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
The plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief, which this court considers akin to a temporary restraining order ("TRO"). A TRO is a drastic remedy that serves an exceedingly narrow purpose. It exists only to preserve the status quo until a preliminary injunction hearing can be held. Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 422 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda Cty., 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974)). The standard for granting a request for a TRO and entering a preliminary injunction are identical. See, e.g., Sauer-Danfoss (US) Co. v. Nianzhu Luo, C.A. No. 8:12-3435-HMH, 2012 WL 6042831, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec. 5, 2012) (citing Commonwealth of Virginia v. Kelly, 29 F.3d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying preliminary injunction standard to a request for TRO)). In order for such injunctive relief to be granted, the movant must establish that "he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). All four requirements must be satisfied. Real Truth About Obama, Inc., v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010), reinstated in relevant part on remand, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010).
The first Winter factor is dispositive here, as the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the merits. To the extent that the plaintiffs are attempting to appeal or set aside the state Family Court's orders, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to sit in appellate review of judicial determinations made in state courts. See District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). See also Brown & Root. Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir.2000) (stating the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the plaintiff "from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights") (citation omitted). In any event, the plaintiffs do not show that they have subsequently challenged the rulings of the Family Court by appealing within the state system. Indeed, they allege that Judge Turner issued an unfavorable ruling just this month, so it is clear that the plaintiffs have not exhausted their state appellate efforts for the relief they seek here. While the plaintiffs recite statutes and cases, which they contend support their position, these are matters of state law and should be considered by state courts, rather than this federal court.
As for the remaining Winter factors, while the plaintiffs have presented allegations that they will suffer irreparable harm with the continued removal of their children, they have not shown that the balance of the equities tip in their favor, nor that a TRO for their individual case is in the public interest. DSS has proven to the satisfaction of the state family court that removal was in the best interest of the children. Per the plaintiffs' own allegations, at least three different family court judges have considered the case, and all have ruled in favor of removal. Nothing presented by the plaintiffs here changes that result. As such, the equities here favor the defendants. Moreover, despite the plaintiffs' allegations of conspiracy and impropriety, their case was indeed considered by the Family Court. The public has a right to rely on the orderly enforcement of state child welfare laws, to include proper review by state appellate courts. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have failed to show that an injunction in their particular case is in the public interest.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiffs' Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief (doc. 4) should be denied.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge November 26, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina