Opinion
No. 98 C 50020
April 23, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On January 11, 2000, a jury returned a verdict in Thomas' favor, finding the RHA had intentionally discriminated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The jury awarded Thomas $1,434.20 in lost wages and $0 for pain and suffering and emotional distress, despite her request for $45,000. Currently before the court is Thomas' request for attorney's fees, filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54, LR54.3, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k), and the RHA's objections to Thomas' petition. In her petition, Thomas requests $49,305 in attorney's fees and $1,753.25 in costs.
Under Title VII, a prevailing plaintiff can recover a reasonable attorney's fee from a defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k). The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Excluded from the calculation are hours that were not reasonably expended. Id. at 434. Here, the RHA has challenged neither the number of hours expended nor the claimed hourly rate.
The RHA, however, challenges Thomas' asserted attorney's fees as excessively high in light of the results obtained at trial. The RHA is correct in that other considerations may lead a court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including the important factor of the results obtained. Id. In evaluating the results obtained, the court looks at whether the plaintiff achieved a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award. Id. In other words, even if a plaintiff is a prevailing party, attorney's tees may be denied on the ground that no amount of fees would be reasonable, if the plaintiff's recovery is merely technical or de minimis. Fisher v. Kelly, 105 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1997). In determining whether the relief obtained is technical or de minimis, the court considers: (1) the difference between the judgment recovered and the recovery sought; (2) the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed; and, (3) the public purpose served by the litigation. Id. at 353.
Centering on the first factor, the RHA argues Thomas is entitled to no fees because of the disparity between the relief sought (approximately $46,000) and the amount recovered at trial ($1,434.20). The requested attorney's fees, according to the RHA, are approximately 35 times the jury award. (Def. Obj., p. 4) While the court agrees with the RHA that the attorney's fees sought are excessively high when compared to the amount actually recovered, this does not mean the reasonable fee should be zero. See Cole v. Wodziak, 169 F.3d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1999). On the contrary, the second factor is in Thomas' favor. The jury returned a finding of intentional discrimination in her favor and awarded her all she had been seeking in actual damages. She recovered more than a pittance. See Id. The third factor favors Thomas, but only slightly. Although the vindication of civil rights is always of paramount importance, this was a simple race discrimination case, involving one plaintiff with one claim against the RHA. See Cooke v. Stefani Mgmt. Serv., Inc., No. 98 C 7604, 2000 WL 1029165, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2000).
In ordinary private litigation, a fee exceeding the damages usually is not "reasonable," Cole, 169 F.3d at 488, but an attorney's fee award is not unreasonable simply because it exceeds by some multiple the amount recovered by the plaintiff. Connally v. National Sch. Bus Serv., Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1999); Tuf Racing Prod., Inc. v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 223 F.3d 585 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming award of almost $400,000 in attorney's fees in case in which jury awarded $137,000 in damages, despite plaintiff's request for $1.2 million) . The RHA argues its offer of $5,000 to settle the case (unfortunately for the RHA, not an offer of judgment under Rule 68) was 3.5 times her lost wage claim, and that Thomas aimed high and fell short in her attempt to recover more. See Tuf, 223 F.3d at 592 (permissible to penalize a plaintiff for putting a defendant to the bother of defending against a much larger claim than plaintiff can prove). It is not uncommon for a plaintiff to be awarded emotional distress damages. The case the RHA relies on in making this argument, Hyde v. Small, 123 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 1997), actually supports Thomas; the trial only lasted three days, and Thomas proved intentional discrimination. The court finds Thomas did not value her claim extravagantly just because she rejected the RHA's settlement offer and ultimately failed to convince the jury to award her damages for emotional distress.
Nevertheless, it stands to reason that if the Seventh Circuit has found a fee 19 times the damages as being "off the map," Connolly, 177 F.3d at 597, a fee 35 times the damages would land even farther off the map. The court finds reducing the attorney's fees sought by 50%, to $24,652.50, more accurately reflects the relief obtained in this case and its limited public value. See id. at 597-98 (affirming district court's 50% reduction of attorney's fees due to limited success of case); Cooke, 2000 WL 1029165, at *3 (reducing attorney's fees by 50%).
The RHA also challenges $300 in "reporting time" Thomas seeks as expenses. The court agrees with the RHA. While 28 U.S.C. § 1920 allows for fees of a court reporter for transcripts, no provision is made for "reporting time." As for the $1,000 expert witness fee, the Civil Rights Act allows expert fees as part of costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k); Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092, 1100 n. 3 (7th Cir.),cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 64 (2000). However, this is within the court's discretion. Here, the court finds the expert witness' testimony added nothing to the case and, therefore, disallows this expense. The court also disallows the $150 filing fee, as the RHA has already paid it. Thus, the RHA is ordered to pay $24,652.50 in attorney's fees and $403.25 in additional costs, totaling $25,055.75.