Opinion
Civil No. 02-1682 (DWF/SRN)
November 13, 2003
Howard I. Bass, Esq., Meshbesher Spence, Minneapolis, Minnesota, of Counsel for Plaintiff
Barbara A. Burke, Esq., Cousineau McQuire Anderson, Minneapolis, Minnesota for Defendant Drover's Inn Associates, d/b/a Drover's Inn Restaurant, Inc. (Best Western)
Michelle D. Mitchell, Esq., Cousineau McQuire Anderson, Minneapolis, Minnesota for Defendant Drover's Inn Associates, d/b/a Drover's Inn Restaurant, Inc. (Best Western)
James M. Mahoney, Esq., Mahoney Dougherty Mahoney, Minneapolis, Minnesota for Defendant Dakota County Receiving Center, Inc.
Pierre N. Regnier, Esq., Jardine Logan O'Brien, Lake Elmo, Minnesota for Defendants City of South Saint Paul and Michael P. Smith
Susan S. Tice, Esq., Jardine Logan O'Brien, Lake Elmo, Minnesota for Defendants City of South Saint Paul and Michael P. Smith
and Joseph E. Flynn, Esq., Jardine Logan O'Brien, Lake Elmo, Minnesota for Defendants City of South Saint Paul and Michael P. Smith
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
The above-entitled matter was brought before the undersigned United States District Judge on October 3, 2003, pursuant to Defendants Dakota County Receiving Center, Inc. ("DCRC"), City of South Saint Paul ("the City"), and Michael P. Smith's ("Smith") motions for summary judgment and Defendant Drover's Inn Associates' ("Drover's" or "the hotel") motion for partial summary judgment. In Plaintiff Lawrence Thomas's ("Thomas") complaint, Thomas alleges a state tort claim of false arrest against Drovers, the City, and Smith; a state tort claim of false imprisonment against the City, Smith, and DCRC; a state tort claim of assault and battery against Drover's; a claim of racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) against Drover's; and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City, Smith, Drover's, and DCRC. For the reasons set forth below, DCRC, the City, and Smith's motions for summary judgment are granted Defendant Drovers' motion for partial summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
Background
In June 2000, Plaintiff Lawrence Thomas, a telecommunications engineer of African-American descent, traveled from his home in Chicago, Illinois, to Minnesota to install telephone systems on behalf of his employer, Telesource Corporation. (See Affidavit of Howard Bass (hereinafter "Bass Aff"), ¶ 1, Ex. 1 ("Thomas Dep.") at 48-49, 51.) Thomas and his coworkers arrived in Minnesota on June 22, 2000, and rented four rooms at the Drover's Inn in South St. Paul. (See id. at 50.)
On June 24, 2000, Thomas finished his work at approximately 6:00 p.m. (See id. at 58.) After completing some paperwork and responding to business e-mail, Thomas changed into his jogging clothes and sat by the hotel swimming pool for about an hour and a half. (See id. at 58-59.) At that time, Thomas decided to venture into the hotel restaurant to order a meal; however, the restaurant was no longer serving food at that hour, so Thomas ordered a beer. (See id. at 59-61.) Shortly after consuming the beer, Thomas asserts he left the hotel and began a ten-mile jog. (See id. at 62-68.) Approximately three hours later, Thomas returned to Drovers. (See Thomas Dep. at 66.) Thomas asserts that he was dehydrated from his run, so he immediately made his way to the complimentary juice machine in the hotel lobby. (See id. at 69-70, 150.)
The events that followed form the basis of Thomas's complaint and are matters of dispute among the parties. While walking through the lobby, Thomas asserts that he heard the desk clerk say, "Well, there's one of them now, a homeless person," but Thomas ignored the comment (See id. at 70-72.) Moments later, Thomas heard someone speaking to him who he could not identify. (See id. at 72.) Thomas contends that he responded by saying "I'll be with you in a minute." (Id.)
As Thomas began to fill a cup with juice, he was knocked down from behind by Matt Bair ("Bair"), a security guard working for Drover's. (See id. at 73-74.) Bair brought Thomas back to his feet and Thomas contends that Bair told Thomas that Thomas did not belong in the hotel. (See Thomas Dep. at 81.) Thomas asserts that he told Bair that he had four rooms at Drover's. (See id.) Thomas alleges that Bair responded to this statement by saying, "No, you're a homeless person." (Id. at 81, 83.) Bair then handcuffed Thomas and seated him on the floor of the hotel lobby. (See id. at 87.)
Bair asserts that he initially saw Thomas struggling with the hotel's doors while attempting to enter Drover's. (See Affidavit of Pierre Regnier (hereinafter "Regnier Aff"), ¶ 9, Ex. H ("Bair Dep.") at 30.) Bair alleges that once Thomas entered the hotel, Thomas stumbled towards the hotel's juice machine. (See id. at 31-32.) Bair asserts that the desk clerk at Drover's noticed Thomas entering the hotel and asked Bair to ask Thomas for identification because the desk clerk was not familiar with Thomas and did not believe that Thomas was a guest of the hotel. (See id. at 29 and 32.) Bair contends that he approached Thomas and asked Thomas whether Thomas had a room at the hotel. (See id. at 34.) Bair alleges that Thomas turned to Bair and told Bair to stop harassing him. (See id. at 34-35.) Bair then alleges that he took Thomas by the arm and began escorting Thomas from the hotel lobby to the front of the hotel. (See id. at 37-38.) As this happened, Bair alleges that Thomas threw coffee from his glass either at Bair or in Bair's general direction. (See Bair Dep. at 33, 34, 38 and 58.) At that time, Bair pushed Thomas to the ground and handcuffed him. (See id. at 38-39.) Bair then asked the front desk clerk to call the police. (See id. at 40.)
The South Saint Paul Police Department (the "Police") were called to Drover's to respond to a call from dispatch that an unruly man needed to be removed from the premises. (See Regnier Aff., ¶ 1, Ex. B ("Smith Dep.") at 11.) Officer Michael Smith ("Smith") responded to the call from dispatch. (See id.) After arriving at Drover's, Smith alleges that he spoke with Bair and the desk clerk and was advised that Thomas had been disruptive, unruly, loud, and drunk in the hotel's lobby. (See id. at 18, 21-22.) Bair and the desk clerk also asked the Police to remove Thomas from the hotel. (See id.)
Smith believed Thomas was intoxicated because he noticed that Thomas had slurred speech, swaying movements, bloodshot eyes, and smelled strongly of alcohol. (See id. at 30-31.) Smith asserts that Thomas was non-cooperative, refused to answer questions, and repeatedly stated that he was being treated unfairly because of his race. (See id. at 21.) Officer Thomas Kreager ("Kreager"), Smith's supervisor, arrived shortly thereafter and also observed Thomas being loud, disruptive, and in an intoxicated state. (See Regnier Aff., ¶ 1, Ex. C ("Kreager Dep.") at 22-23.) Based on Kreager's observations and the information provided to him by the Drover's employees, Kreager placed Thomas in a squad car and transported him to the Dakota County Receiving Center, a detoxification center. (Id.) Kreager then admitted Thomas to DCRC pursuant to the Minnesota Civil Commitment Act (Minn. Stat. § 253B.05). (See id. at 24.)
Minn. Stat. § 253B.05 states that a peace officer may take a person into custody, who is believed to be, or is, intoxicated in public, and transport the person to a treatment facility so long as the peace officer provides a written application for admission to the treatment facility specifying the reasons and circumstances under which the person was taken into custody. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.05, subd. 2. Further, once an individual is properly admitted to a treatment facility, the individual has a right to leave after (72) hours, with a medical examination within forty-eight (48) hours of their arrival. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.05, subd. 3.
Upon arrival at DCRC, Kreager presented DCRC personnel with a detoxification pick-up form completed by Smith that stated that Thomas was taken to DCRC because he was a public nuisance. (See Regnier Aff., ¶ 8, Ex. G ("Detoxification Pick-Up Form").) Smith indicated the Mowing observations as to Thomas's behavior on the detoxification form: swaying, blood shot eyes, strong alcohol odor, and slurred speech. (Id.) Smith listed Thomas as obviously drunk; however, Smith did indicate on the pick-up form that Thomas was cooperative. (Id.) Thomas initially complied with requests for information from DCRC employees, but later became uncooperative, and would not agree to give requested information, attend group sessions, or provide any information related to his usage of alcohol. (See Regnier Aff, ¶ 8, Ex. G ("DCRC Admission Data," "DCRC Receiving Questionnaire," "Patient Flow Sheet Progress Notes," and "Counselor's Notes").) R. King ("King"), an LPN employed by DCRC, observed Thomas and recorded the following regarding his physical condition and behavior: "Eyes bloodshot, speech slurred. Noncooperative with admission. Is incomplete [sic]. Patient is agitated yelling out at staff." (See id. ("Patient Flow Sheet").) DCRC's Patient Flow Chart Progress Notes also stated that Thomas's speech was slurred and that he had an odor of alcohol about him. (See id.)
After much pleading with DCRC personnel to reexamine his story, an employee examined Thomas's fanny pack and found a Drover's room key. (See Thomas Dep. 132-135.) Upon discovering the room key, the DCRC employee promised to release Thomas within the hour. (See id. at 132.) Thomas was released shortly thereafter. (See id. at 133.) Thomas had been detained for approximately fifty-six (56) hours by the time of his release.
Discussion
1. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must view the evidence and the inference that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank of Missouri, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957.
2. Drover's Inn Associates
A. False Arrest
Drover's asserts that Thomas's false arrest claim was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Drover's argues that such a claim must fail because Drover's is not a state actor and does not have any unconstitutional policies or customs in place. Thomas acknowledges that a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Drover's would fail based on the facts of this case, but Thomas argues that none of that is relevant, because the false arrest claim he brought against Drovers was brought merely as a state tort claim. In rebuttal, Drover's asserts that Thomas's complaint did not plead or provide notice of a state tort claim of false arrest. The Court finds that Thomas provided Drovers with sufficient notice of a state tort claim of false arrest. Having found the existence of a state tort claim for false arrest in the pleadings, the Court finds that Drovers is entitled to summary judgment on any § 1983 claim that may have been asserted against it.
Count One of Thomas's complaint is titled "False Arrest Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."
Even though the Court finds that Thomas pled a state tort claim of false arrest, the Court finds that Thomas's complaint in this case barely satisfies the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and warns subsequent plaintiffs not to follow this method of pleading.
In order to maintain a cause of action for false arrest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant performed an arrest and that the arrest was unlawful. See Lundeen v. Renteria, 224 N.W.2d 132, 135 (Minn. 1974). "[I]f an arrest is made without proper legal authority, it is a false arrest." Id. at 135 (quoting Prosser, Torts (4 ed.)s 11). Drovers asserts that this claim must fail because Thomas was never placed under arrest by Bair. Thomas argues that the discovery record reveals the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding the lawfulness of his detention, namely the lack of inappropriate conduct on his part. The Court finds that fact issues remain as to Thomas's conduct and condition at the time of the incident and thus as to whether this arrest was lawful. Therefore, the Court denies Drovers' motion for partial summary judgment with regard to the state tort claim of false arrest.
B. § 2000(a) Claim of Racial Discrimination
The only relief available under a 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) racial discrimination claim is injunctive relief. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Company, 398 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1970); Battle v. Dayton-Hudson Corporation, 399 F. Supp. 900, 905 (Minn. 1975). Thomas's complaint fails to request injunctive relief and Thomas's counsel represented during arguments that Thomas did not plan on amending the complaint to seek such damages. Thus, the Court grants Drovers' motion for summary judgment on the § 2000(a) racial discrimination claim.
3. City of South Saint Paul and Officer Michael P. Smith
A. Constitutional Violations
As a preliminary matter, the Court is asked to determine whether Thomas has sued Smith in his individual capacity. In order for an official to be sued in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings or it will be assumed that the defendant is sued only in an official capacity. See Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999). Thomas's complaint uses the language "independent capacity" and "individual capacity" in reference to Smith, but both usages are qualified by language stating that Smith was acting in his capacity as a police officer or as an agent for the City. (Compl. ¶ 1 and 4.) Thus, the Court finds that Thomas has sued Smith only in Smith's official capacity.
If an official is not sued in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must establish municipal liability for the official's actions. To establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that an actual deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights was caused by a municipality's formal policy or informal custom. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see also Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff must prove that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation). A municipal policy is a "deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority regarding such matters." Mettler, 165 F.3d at 1204. A plaintiff must satisfy three requirements to demonstrate a municipal custom exists. Id. First, a plaintiff must prove the "existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees." Id. Second, a plaintiff must show a "deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity's policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct." Third, a plaintiff must show that the custom was the basis of the constitutional violation See id. (quoting Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 1998).
Thomas has not satisfied the requirements for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he has not demonstrated that Smith acted in violation of Thomas's rights based on an unconstitutional municipal custom or policy. Thomas argues that the failure to administer standardized field sobriety tests to citizens before placing them on detoxification holds is an unconstitutional municipal policy and caused Smith to violate Thomas's constitutional protection against unreasonable seizures. However, Thomas can point to no constitutional provision that requires the administration of field sobriety tests, preliminary breath tests, or intoxilyzer tests prior to transporting someone to a detoxification facility. Further, Thomas has not pointed to any case law that interprets the United States Constitution to require such tests. Thus, the Court finds Thomas has failed to adequately provide a legal basis for the Court to conclude that the City had an unconstitutional policy or custom in transporting intoxicated persons to detoxification facilities without first performing a sobriety test. Summary judgment on Thomas's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims is granted for the City and Smith.
B. False Arrest and False Imprisonment
False imprisonment is any restraint subsequent to a false arrest. See Lundeen, 224 N.W.2d at 135. As noted above, false arrest occurs if a person performed an arrest that was unlawful. Id. The common law regarding false imprisonment states that an individual may not, without legal justification, be confined against his or her will. See Gleason v. Metropolitan Council Transit Operations, 309 N.W.2d 309, 319 (Minn.Ct.App. 1997); see also Kleidon v. Glascock, 10 N.W.2d 394, 397 (1943) (false imprisonment is any imprisonment that is not legally justifiable).
Under Minnesota law, public officials are automatically entitled to official immunity from state law claims such as false arrest and false imprisonment when their duties require the exercise of discretion, so long as the officer is not guilty of a willful or malicious wrong. See Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41-42 (Minn. 1990); Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1998). Thus, to determine whether official immunity is available in any given context requires a determination of whether the alleged acts were discretionary or ministerial and whether the alleged acts were malicious or willful. See Davis v. County of Hennepin, 559 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Minn.Ct.App. 1997).
Malice, in the official immunity context, means intentionally committing an act that the official has reason to believe is legally prohibited This is an objective inquiry that examines the legal reasonableness of an official's actions. See State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. 1994). An officer does not commit a willful and malicious wrong unless the officer relies on information that the officer knows to be false. See Johnson v. County of Dakota, 510 N.W.2d 236, 240 (Minn.Ct.App. 1994). To overcome a defense based on official immunity, a plaintiff cannot rely on "bare allegations of malice"; rather, plaintiff must present specific facts evidencing bad faith. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817.
The parties do not dispute, and the Court agrees, that Smith was performing duties that required the exercise of his discretion in deciding whether to transport Thomas to DCRC. Thus, the Court must determine if Smith's actions were malicious or willful. Smith alleges that he believed that Thomas was intoxicated based on both information provided to him by Drovers' staff and his own personal observations. Smith alleges that he spoke with Bair and the desk clerk at Drover's and was advised that Thomas had been disruptive, unruly, loud, and drunk in the hotel's lobby. (See Smith Dep. at 18, 21-22.) Smith asserts that Thomas had a strong odor of alcohol, slurred speech, swaying movements, and bloodshot eyes. (See id. at 30-31.) Thomas admits his physical condition could have been consistent with Smith's observations. Thomas admits that he was extremely upset when the police arrived. (See Thomas Dep. 104.) He admits that an earlier facial injury could have slurred his speech. (See id. at 113.) Finally, he admits that Smith could have observed his eyes to be bloodshot and his body to be swaying. (See id. at 171.) In light of Thomas's admissions regarding his own physical condition, the Court finds that Smith's actions were not malicious, willful, or unreasonable under the circumstances, nor did Smith rely on information that he knew was false. Therefore, the Court finds Smith and the City are entitled to official immunity from the state tort claims. Because the Court finds that the City and Smith are entitled to official immunity, the Court need not engage in an extensive discussion of the "good faith" protections provided by Minn. Stat. § 253.23, subd. 4. Nonetheless, the Court notes that even in the absence of official immunity, the Court would find such protections to be applicable to these defendants. The City and Smith are entitled to summary judgment on Thomas's state tort claims.
4. Dakota County Receiving Center, Inc.
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and False Imprisonment
Thomas alleges that DCRC, acting under color of state law, falsely imprisoned Thomas in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Section 1983 prohibits a person acting under color of state law from depriving another person of his or her "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. . . ." There is no dispute that DCRC was acting under color of state law when Thomas was held at DCRC's treatment facility.
Qualified immunity shields government officials as well as private individuals from civil liability under § 1983. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999). A defendant is shielded from civil liability if it is shown that his or her "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court employs a three-part test to determine whether qualified immunity exists. See Goff v. Bise, 173 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1996)). First, the plaintiff must assert a violation of a constitutional right. See id. Second, the alleged right must be clearly established. See id. Third, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there must be no genuine issues of material fact as to whether a reasonable official would have known that the alleged action violated the plaintiff's clearly established rights. See id.
For qualified immunity purposes, the inquiry into Thomas's false imprisonment claim focuses on whether a reasonable treatment facility employee would have known that there was no reasonably lawful basis to detain Thomas. DCRC argues that in addition to being presented with a proper application for admission, DCRC conducted its own independent examination of Thomas that indicated intoxication. Because Thomas refused to cooperate with DCRC personnel during this assessment, DCRC personnel were unable to fully assess Thomas's condition. Thomas, on the other hand, asserts that no reasonable detoxification facility personnel would have detained a person for at least fifty-six hours when that individual exhibited no signs of intoxication or inappropriate behavior.
The Court finds that DCRC's personnel acted reasonably in detaining Thomas. DCRC admitted Thomas pursuant to an application for admission completed by a police officer. DCRC also independently evaluated Thomas's condition and DCRC personnel indicated Thomas showed indicia of intoxication including bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. As previously mentioned, Thomas admits that he may have exhibited these signs of intoxication following the incident at the hotel. Because DCRC personnel admitted Thomas based on an application for admission signed by a police officer and conducted an independent evaluation of Thomas prior to admission, the Court finds that DCRC is entitled to qualified immunity from Thomas's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and grants summary judgment for DCRC on this claim. Similarly, DCRC is not subject to liability for Thomas's state tort claim of false imprisonment, because DCRC complied with the applicable provisions of Minn. Stat. § 253B.05 and Thomas failed to show bad faith on the part of DCRC personnel. For the reasons stated above, the Court grants summary judgment on all claims pending against DCRC.
Conclusion
Despite the Court's dismissal of certain pending claims against Drovers, the Court finds that Drovers' conduct with or without an established policy or custom in place regarding the treatment of individuals its employees perceive as homeless was the basis for setting this chain of events in motion. Therefore, the Court believes it is in the best interests of the parties to negotiate a resolution of this dispute. As the parties may already be aware, Magistrate Judge Susan Richard Nelson is available to assist in the negotiation of a settlement should the parties find such services to be helpful. If the Court may be of assistance in this matter, the parties should contact Lowell Lindquist, Calendar Clerk for Judge Donovan Frank, at 651-848-1296, or Beverly Riches, Calendar Clerk for Magistrate Judge Susan Richard Nelson, at 651-848-1200.
For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendant Drover's Inn Associates' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 38) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows:
a. Defendant Drover's Inn Associates' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED on Count Four of the complaint; and
b. Defendant Drover's Inn Associates' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED on Count One of the complaint.
2. Defendants City of South Saint Paul and Michael P. Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 34) is GRANTED.
3. Defendant Dakota County Receiving Center, Inc.' s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 30) is GRANTED.