Opinion
No. 00-74196
April 18, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the constitutional rights of the two Plaintiffs. Currently before the court is the summary judgment motion of Defendant R. Demers, filed January 22, 2002. Plaintiff filed a response on February 27, 2002, Demers filed a reply on April 3, 2002, and Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply on April 11, 2002. Also before the court is Plaintiff's motion to stay proceedings, filed March 26, 2002. Demers filed a response objecting to a stay on April 2, 2002.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiffs Christopher Thomas ("Thomas") and Gary Lazar, unknown to each other until the events in question here, were both in the area of the old Tiger Stadium in Detroit on the day of the last game there, September 27, 1999. Thomas was in Casey's Bar on Michigan Ave. with his brother, Anthony Thomas ("Anthony"). There was a crush of people in the bar that day, and many Detroit police officers, both uniformed and plain-clothed, were in the area. Inside the bar, Anthony became involved in a commotion or fight with another patron, and Thomas rushed to this commotion, he says, to break it up. Thomas claims that when he went to break up the fight, several Detroit police officers dragged him outside onto the sidewalk, shoved him down onto the ground, and beat him with their hands, feet, and clubs. Thomas states that he did nothing to resist the police or this abuse.
Plaintiff Lazar is an attorney, and he was on Michigan Ave. with his camera for the last game at Tiger Stadium. When he saw what was happening outside of Casey's Bar, he began taking pictures of it. He says that he saw several uniformed officers (one of whom Plaintiffs apparently allege was Defendant Officer R. Demers) beating Thomas. Lazar says that while he was taking pictures of the beating, a large African-American woman whom Plaintiffs identify as Defendant Officer Elizabeth Cotton came up to him and told him to stop taking photos. When he refused, another officer "ripped the camera off the strap" around his neck, broke its lens, and exposed the film in it. Lazar was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a squad car.
Thomas was arrested for disorderly conduct, handcuffed, and also put into a squad car. Both Plaintiffs were transported to the 3rd Precinct for processing. When the police attempted to remove the handcuffs from Thomas, the key broke in the lock, and the Fire Department had to use bolt cutters to cut them off. Thomas alleges that the handcuffs were on so tightly and for so long that they injured his wrists and hands. Lazar's handcuffs came off without incident.
Defendant Demers issued Thomas a citation for disorderly conduct. Thomas was released from the precinct house very quickly, and the citation against him was dismissed when no officers appeared at a court date. Lazar was issued a citation for interfering in a police investigation, though it is not clear by what officer. He was also quickly released, and his citation was similarly dismissed. Both Plaintiffs allege that they suffered physical injuries from the beating (Thomas only), handcuffing, and arrest, but the extent of the injuries is not relevant to the instant motions.
In September 2000, the two Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit against Defendant Demers and "Various Other Unknown Detroit Police Officers." The original complaint alleged violation of § 1983; assault and battery; false arrest and imprisonment; malicious prosecution; and gross negligence. This court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the four state law counts on March 6, 2001. A parallel state court proceeding was then instituted in Wayne County Circuit Court. On August 3, 2001, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added more Defendants but is not relevant to these motions.
Defendant Demers only has now moved for summary judgment on the § 1983 count against him, and Plaintiffs would like this case stayed while the state court case proceeds.
II. DEMERS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment will be granted if the pleadings and all supporting documentation show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of all genuine issues of material fact. Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1995). However, the moving party need not produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Rather, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The court must view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant as well as draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (6th Cir. 1984). Once the moving party discharges its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a genuine triable issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Talley, 61 F.3d at 1245. To create a genuine issue of material fact, however, the nonmovant must do more than present some evidence on a disputed issue; he must produce evidence of "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS
The only remaining count alleges violation of § 1983 through violation of the First Amendment (stopping Lazar's picture-taking) and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (arrest without probable cause and excessive force against both Plaintiffs).
Defendant Demers argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity underHarlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The qualified immunity analysis is a three-step test:
First, we determine whether a constitutional violation occurred; second, we determine whether the right that was violated was a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known; finally, we determine whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts, and supported the allegations by specific evidence, to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights.Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) ( en banc). "Qualified immunity is not a defense to liability; where it is applicable, its purpose is to shield the official from suit altogether, saving him or her from the burdens of discovery and costs of trial."Klein v. Long, 275 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2001).
For this motion, Demers does not contest Plaintiffs' assertion that Thomas was beaten on September 27, 1999, or even that this beating was done by Detroit police officers. What he argues is that there is no evidence he participated in the beating, and that his other acts of arresting Thomas and issuing a citation to him are clearly discretionary acts that are objectively reasonable under applicable legal standards and therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
So what evidence can Plaintiffs put forward that Officer Demers was involved in the alleged beating? Thomas himself has stated that he cannot identify who was attacking him, since his "face was smashed into the ground." (C. Thomas Dep. at 21.) Anthony Thomas stated in his deposition that he cannot identify any of the people who were allegedly beating his brother, but that he only remembers seeing African-American officers on the scene. (A. Thomas Dep. at 14-15.) Defendant Demers is white. Anthony further indicated that since the people he alleges were police were in plain clothes, he does not really know whether they were police or bar bouncers or other security. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff Lazar also claims to have seen the beating, and he describes the officers doing the assaulting as five or six officers in uniform — all black, with possibly one white officer, also in uniform, involved. (Lazar Dep. at 17-18.) That could not have been Officer Demers, since he was in plain clothes that day. (Demers Dep. at 18, ln. 10-11.) Lazar further describes a situation that was really a melee, with "people everywhere," and "yells and screams." (Id. at 18-19.) Thus, Plaintiffs have put forward no evidence that it was actually Defendant Officer Demers who was in any way involved in the physical assault on Thomas. Demers will therefore be granted summary judgment on the charge of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment excessive force since there is not a genuine issue of fact as to whether he was involved in the incident.
Further, Plaintiffs both argue that they were arrested without probable cause. "Probable cause to make an arrest exists if, at the moment of the arrest, `the facts and circumstances within [the officers] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [arrestee] had committed or was committing an offense.'" Klein v. Long, 275 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). As to Plaintiff Thomas, he admits that he joined the fight in which his brother was involved, even if it was just to break up the fight. That clearly shows that Demers had information sufficient to believe that Thomas was committing an offense, and thus arrest and citation were appropriate. As to Plaintiff Lazar, his contention that he was arrested because he refused to stop taking pictures on a public street may be enough to state a constitutional violation. However, there is no allegation that it was Officer Demers who was the one who told him to stop taking pictures, arrested him, or wrote him the citation. Plaintiffs admit this in their sur-reply, which names only Defendant Officers Cotton and Dion Triplet as involved in the arrest of Lazar. Thus, summary judgment in favor of Defendant Officer Demers is also appropriate on the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment charge of arrest without probable cause, since the arrest of Thomas was appropriate and legal and the arrest of Lazar was done by someone else.
Finally, Plaintiff Thomas seems to allege that Demers is responsible for the too tight handcuffs on him. Demers admits that he ordered that Thomas be handcuffed, but Plaintiffs do not allege that Demers ordered them to be so tight. Further, the incident of the key breaking in the lock of Thomas' cuffs appears to be nothing other than an accident. Plaintiffs produce no evidence to prove otherwise, and the police did call in the Fire Department with bolt cutters to remedy the situation, which was clearly a reasonable response. There is also no constitutional violation here.
Thus, Plaintiffs have not presented enough evidence to create a material issue of fact as to Officer Deniers' involvement in the beating of Thomas or arrest of Lazar or as to the constitutionality of Thomas' arrest. Without a violation of the Constitutional provisions alleged, there can be no § 1983 liability, and Defendant Demers' motion for summary judgment is granted.
III. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STAY
The parallel state case before Judge James Rashid is of course proceeding on its own schedule. Judge Rashid has a summary judgment motion pending before him, and he has scheduled the trial for June 10. The instant case's trial is currently on the July 2002 trailing docket, and the final pre-trial conference is set for June 19.
Plaintiffs argue that "based on the policy of judicial economy," the instant case should be stayed so that the state court case can either go to trial or settle before this case reaches trial or even the pre-trial conference. Defendant Demers objects to this proposed stay. This court finds that a stay would promote the efficient disposition of both cases between these parties, and that Demers' concerns have been met because his motion has already been granted. Granting his motion, which was filed before the motion to stay, is appropriate in light of the purposes of qualified immunity. The rest of this case, against the other Defendants, will be stayed during the pendency of the state court case.
ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Demers' motion for summary judgment on all remaining counts against him is GRANTED. Further, Plaintiff's motion to stay this case during the pendency of the parallel state court action is GRANTED as to the case against the other Defendants.