Opinion
Case No. 6:98-CV-63
January 21, 2003
ORDER
The Court presently has pending before it Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Class Certification. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion and denies both motions by Defendant.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in 1998, alleging that Defendant City of Thomasville School District ("the District") operates and maintains a racially segregated school system that deprives students in the District of their constitutional right to equal protection, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). It is undisputed that the District operated a de jure segregated school system at the time that Brown was decided in 1954. It is also undisputed that prior to the filing of the above-captioned action, no litigation had ever been instituted pursuant to Brown and its progeny challenging the alleged segregation in the District. Consequently, there has been no opportunity for a United States District Court to determine whether the District has achieved unitary status by eliminating the vestiges of de jure segregation.
The District strongly disputes Plaintiffs' contention that it presently engages in purposeful discrimination resulting in racial segregation. The District also maintains that it has eliminated the vestiges of de jure segregation and that any racial disparities and/or imbalances that currently exist within the District are caused by external forces, such as demographic shifts, which are not the result of intentional segregation and are beyond the District's control. Finally, the District argues that although it was never subjected to a desegregation order or subsequent court proceedings declaring that the District had achieved unitary status, it did in fact become unitary years ago by complying with all requirements mandated by the federal government.
Specifically, the District points to its alleged compliance with the requirements of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1975. See Letter from Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Civil Rights, to Superintendent, Thomasville City Schools of 11/17/75 at 2 (finding District in compliance with Title VII as to assignment of students and faculty to schools). The Court notes, however, that only a federal district court can determine that a school system has achieved unitary status and that student and faculty assignment are only two of the factors to be considered in such a decision under Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
In their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs contend that as a matter of law any current racial imbalances and disparities within the District are presumed to be the result of the District's previous de jure segregated system. Such intentional segregation was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court almost fifty years ago. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. In response to Plaintiffs' motion and in support of its own Motion for Summary Judgment, the District contends that no presumption should be used in determining whether Plaintiffs' constitutional rights have been violated. The District further argues that it has achieved unitary status as a matter of law, and that any racial imbalances and/or disparities are the result of external forces beyond its control and not the result of intentional discrimination by the District or vestiges of the previous de jure segregated system.
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
The only issue presented by Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is whether, in evaluating Plaintiffs' claims, the Court is required to presume that any racial imbalances and disparities that currently exist in the District are the result of the de jure segregated system operated by the District at the time Brown was decided in 1954. The Court concludes that under the law of this Circuit this rebuttable presumption is still recognized notwithstanding the amount of time that may have passed since the time that de jure school segregation was declared unconstitutional. As stated recently by the Eleventh Circuit, when a school board has operated de jure segregated schools in the past, "there is a presumption that any current racial disparities . . . are the result of its past unlawful conduct." NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 966 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973)); see also Manning v. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 927, 942 (11th Cir. 2001) ("once a plaintiff shows de jure segregation . . . a presumption arises that all racial imbalances in a school district are the result of the de jure segregation"). This Circuit has placed no statute of repose upon this presumption in school desegregation cases. Consequently, this Court, duty bound to follow the precedent in this Circuit, finds that this rebuttable presumption shall apply in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted. B. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
The Court recognizes that some have questioned the continued validity of a presumption that requires a legal conclusion, albeit rebuttable, based upon an underlying factual premise that occurred almost fifty years ago. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 505-07 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). Although the passage of time alone cannot be found to cleanse a school district of all vestiges of previous de jure racial segregation, it would appear that the validity of a legal presumption is by definition grounded upon a close connection between the underlying factual premise and the ultimate presumed legal conclusion. To completely disregard the passage of time between the presumption's underlying foundation and the resulting legal conclusion ignores important factors that may be more persuasive than the facts giving rise to the presumption. For example, under Plaintiffs' argument, which the Court recognizes follows the law of this Circuit, this presumption would apply under the following hypothetical. A responsible school system in 1954, upon learning of the Brown decision, moved forward voluntarily to dismantle its de jure segregated system by eliminating racial discrimination "root and branch." Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). Since the school system voluntarily complied with Brown and its progeny, no lawsuit was ever filed, no desegregation order ever entered, and thus no declaration of unitary status ever made by a federal court. Assume further that for thirty years, this system did in fact maintain a unitary system. Then due to demographic changes, racial imbalances occurred within the system. A group of concerned citizens, who were not even alive when Brown was decided and the hypothetical school system voluntarily desegregated, filed suit challenging the current system's alleged re-segregation. Under the Court's understanding of the present state of the law, the Court would be required to presume that any current racial imbalances were the result of the de jure segregated system, a system that was justifiably killed forty-five years earlier only to be resurrected by a legal presumption.
The Court at this time declines to declare as a matter of law that this presumption shall only apply to the six areas outlined in Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). In Green, the Court explained that for a district court to evaluate whether a school district has eliminated the vestiges of de jure segregation to the extent practicable, the court must examine the following six areas: student assignments, facilities, faculty, staff, transportation, and extracurricular activities. Therefore, at the trial of the case at bar, the District should be prepared to bear the burden of showing that any racial imbalances in these six areas, as well as racial imbalances that do not fit neatly into one of these six areas, are the result of something other than intentional discrimination and are not traceable, in a proximate way, to the previous de jure segregated system. See NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 966 (11th Cir. 2001).
In its cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the District contends that no evidence exists supporting Plaintiffs' contention that any current racial imbalances and disparities in the District are the result of purposeful discrimination or vestiges of the District's previous de jure segregated system. In light of the Court's ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that the racial imbalances and disparities that currently exist in the District are presumed to be vestiges of the de jure segregated system, the District has the burden of overcoming that presumption by showing that external factors, which are not the result of intentional segregation and are beyond the District's control, have substantially caused any current racial imbalances in its schools. If the District makes this showing, "it overcomes the presumption that segregative intent is the cause, and there is no constitutional violation." NAACP, Jacksonville Branch, 273 F.3d at 966. Given the presumption applicable to this case, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist to be tried as to whether the District can overcome this presumption. Accordingly, summary judgment is not appropriate and Defendant's motion must be denied. C. Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Conditionally-Certified Class
Defendant also moves the Court to reconsider Judge Sands' previous order conditionally granting class certification. Defendant asserts three arguments in support of its motion. First, it argues that Plaintiffs failed to obey a court order regarding supplementation of mandatory interrogatory responses. Second, the District contends that some Plaintiffs no longer have children in the school system, and therefore, their claims are moot. Third, the District contests the standing of the NAACP as a party. As explained below, the Court finds that these arguments lack merit and that all of the prerequisites for class certification continue to be satisfied.
This case was originally assigned to Honorable Louis Sands. When the undersigned joined the federal bench, this case, along with others, was reassigned to him.
On August 4, 1999, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification. This Order stipulated that the class was certified conditioned upon Plaintiffs supplementing their response to the Court's Mandatory Interrogatories. Plaintiffs filed their supplemental response approximately one month after the entry of this Order. Defendant now maintains Plaintiff's supplemental response was insufficient and therefore asks the Court to reverse its earlier decision certifying a class in this case. Upon review of Plaintiffs' supplemental response, the Court rejects Defendant's argument that the class should be decertified based upon Plaintiffs' supplemental responses, which the Court finds are sufficient.
Defendant also contends that because some of the children of the named Plaintiffs have graduated or their claims have otherwise become moot since the date a class was certified in this case, the case cannot continue as a class action. It is well-established that once a class is properly certified, the named representatives' continued standing is irrelevant as long as class members remain with live cases or controversies. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755-56 (1976) (finding class action is not moot when it is properly certified and class members remain with live claims); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975) ("The controversy may exist . . . between a named defendant and a member of the class . . . even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot."). Defendant admits that there are at least three named Plaintiffs whose claims remain viable. Therefore, the class action is not moot.
Defendant also maintains that the class should be decertified because the NAACP lacks standing. The Court notes that the NAACP is not a named class representative. Therefore, its standing has no effect on the status of the case as a class action.
To the extent that Defendant seeks dismissal of the NAACP based upon its alleged lack of standing, the Court rejects this contention, finding that the NAACP meets the requirements for "associational standing." See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Class Certification.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and denies Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Class Certification.