Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants by and through their counsels of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 5, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants Kristin Caldwell, Xavier Johnson and William Brown now move to continue the status conference until January 16, 2014 and to exclude time between December 5, 2013 and January 16, 2014 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 325 pages of discovery. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
KELLY BABINEAU (CA State Bar #190418), The Law Office of Kelly Babineau, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for KRISTIN M. CALDWELL.
KYLE KNAPP, Attorney for XAVIER JOHNSON.
WILLIAM DuBois, Attorney for WILLIAM L. BROWN.
MATTHEW MORRIS, Assistant U.S. Attorney.
b. Counsels for the defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to review the current charges, to finish the investigation and research related to the charges, and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients.
c. Counsels for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 5, 2013 to January 16, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.