Furthermore, these facts, when coupled with both of the defendants' statements, establish the corpus delicti of rape. Jerry cites to several cases in support of his argument that the State failed to prove the corpus delicti of the rape: People v. Lambert (1984), 104 Ill.2d 375; People v. Thomas (1960), 18 Ill.2d 439; People v. Kokoraleis (1986), 149 Ill. App.3d 1000; People v. Anderson (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 840. All are inapposite.
Defendants argue that the 26-year-old complainant's testimony that she had been "raped" was insufficient to prove the necessary penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ. In People v. Thomas (1960), 18 Ill.2d 439, 164 N.E.2d 36, defendant objected that there was no evidence of penetration. The record showed that in answer to a question as to what happened after defendant had taken off her pants, the complaining witness testified, "He raped me."
It is of course well established in this State that medical testimony is not required to prove a rape, and this is true even when it is established that the victim went to a hospital after the crime occurred. ( People v. Edmunds, 30 Ill.2d 538, 542; People v. Thomas, 18 Ill.2d 439, 444.) More significantly however, and contrary to defendant's assertions, there is nothing in the record herein to show that the victim was ever examined by any doctor following the alleged rape. It is possible that she might have testified that she saw a doctor in Michigan had she been allowed to expand on her statement that she did not visit a doctor or hospital in Chicago on the day of the alleged rape, but it was defendant's privately retained counsel who objected thereto and chose not to inquire into the subject on cross-examination. Defendant cannot now expect a retrial on the unsupported assumption that pursuit of that which he originally chose not to pursue would have been fruitful.
Other errors, if any, could not reasonably have affected the result. People v. Thomas, 18 Ill.2d 439. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In any event the defendant could hardly have been prejudiced, because as an alibi witness Gaston's testimony failed to corroborate the defendant, and as a character witness, his testimony was technically inadmissible because no attack had been made upon the defendant's credibility. People v. Thomas, 18 Ill.2d 439, 444. The judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is affirmed.
( People v. Wright (1972), 3 Ill. App.3d 829, 833, 279 N.E.2d 398.) Where the victim's story is consistent and such discrepancies do not detract from its reasonableness, her testimony may be found clear and convincing. People v. Thomas (1960), 18 Ill.2d 439, 442-43, 164 N.E.2d 36. The record reveals that the trial court found complainant's testimony very straightforward and credible.
We find that this alleged discrepancy did not distract from the reasonableness of complainant's story as a whole. (See People v. Brown (1963), 29 Ill.2d 375, 194 N.E.2d 326; People v. Thomas (1960), 18 Ill.2d 439, 164 N.E.2d 36; People v. Wright.) Complainant's testimony was very straightforward, and we find it to be clear and convincing. • 5 Even assuming complainant's testimony was not clear and convincing, her testimony was sufficiently corroborated by (a) her prompt complaint made to Mrs. Santana that she had been attacked ( People v. Secret (1978), 72 Ill.2d 371, 381 N.E.2d 285; People v. Thompson (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 134, 372 N.E.2d 1052), (b) medical evidence indicating a physical assault ( People v. Rankin (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 661, 392 N.E.2d 288; People v. Thompson), and (c) her emotional distress evidenced by crying ( People v. Rankin; People v. Thompson).
It is proper to impeach any witness, including a defendant in a criminal case, by evidence his reputation for truth and veracity is bad ( People v. Bakutis (1941), 377 Ill. 386, 390, 36 N.E.2d 724, 726), but evidence of a witness' good reputation for truth and veracity cannot be admitted in the first instance until his reputation has first been attacked as being bad. See Tedens v. Schumers (1884), 112 Ill. 263, 266; People v. Thomas (1960), 18 Ill.2d 439, 444, 164 N.E.2d 36, 39. • 11 Evidence of a defendant's reputation for truth and veracity is also admissible in a criminal proceeding if it relates to some issue involved in the crime charged.
( People v. Jackson (1963), 28 Ill.2d 566.) It is the task of the trier of fact, here the court, to weigh these discrepancies in light of all the other testimony in reaching its decision. If it is found that the discrepancies are so minor as not to detract from the reasonableness of her story as a whole, the testimony of the prosecutrix may be found to be clear and convincing. People v. Thomas (1960), 18 Ill.2d 439; People v. Brown (1963), 29 Ill.2d 375. • 7 The difference between the preliminary hearing transcript and the testimony of Mrs. Johnson and the police officers at trial is the only unexplainable discrepancy that has been pointed out by defendant.