Opinion
B320147
06-28-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEVIN HARMON, Defendant and Appellant.
Shay Dinata-Hanson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputys Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. TA155611, Carol J. Najera, Judge. Affirmed.
Shay Dinata-Hanson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputys Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CURREY, ACTING P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Following the denial of his renewed motion to suppress evidence (a firearm) discovered in the search of a motel room "checked out" to a third-party, defendant and appellant Devin Harmon pled no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon. He was placed on formal probation for two years.
In denying the renewed suppression motion, the trial court found Harmon failed to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room, a necessary prerequisite to raising a Fourth Amendment challenge to the room's search. Harmon does not challenge this finding on appeal. Instead, he contends the trial court erred by concluding he lacked "standing" to challenge the search because, under People v. Dees (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 588 (Dees), the prosecution was estopped from arguing he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room. As discussed below, we reject this argument, and therefore discern no error in the court's ruling on his entitlement to challenge the room's search. In light of this conclusion, we need not address Harmon's contention that the search was unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm.
"[S]ince Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128 [99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387], the United States Supreme Court has largely abandoned use of the word 'standing' in its Fourth Amendment analyses. [Citation.] It did so without altering the nature of the inquiry: whether the defendant, rather than someone else, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched or the items seized." (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 254, fn. 3.) Given the shift in "the federal high court's terminology," the California Supreme Court has advised "mention of 'standing' should be avoided when analyzing a Fourth Amendment claim." (Ibid.)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2021, the Los Angeles District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging Harmon with possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count one.) The complaint further alleged Harmon sustained five prior strike convictions. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12.)
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In February 2022, Harmon moved under section 1538.5 to suppress evidence found in the search of a motel room. The motion was heard at the preliminary hearing held in March 2022. There, based on the evidence presented, the magistrate denied the motion. In so doing, the magistrate first determined Harmon had "a reasonable expectation of privacy [in the area searched] . . . as a social guest." The magistrate then concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the search was reasonable.
In April 2022, Harmon filed a renewed motion to suppress pursuant to section 1538.5, subdivision (i). The trial court denied the motion at a hearing held five days later. Relying on the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the trial court determined Harmon could not raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search because he "had no right to privacy" in the area searched.
At a hearing held in May 2022, Harmon pled no contest to the firearm charge. The trial court accepted his plea and found him guilty of the offense. Per his plea agreement, the court placed him on formal probation for two years. Harmon timely appealed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the evidence presented at Harmon's preliminary hearing.
At approximately 9:30 a.m. on September 28, 2021, Officer Carlos Gonzalez of the Los Angeles Police Department received a radio call stating that a 16-year-old female was being trafficked inside of Room 8 at the Sun Motel. He and his partner responded to the call. When they got to the motel, they saw Harmon standing at the threshold of the gate to the motel driveway. Harmon told Officer Gonzalez that he was acting as a gate sentry. Officer Gonzalez requested additional officers to report to the motel. Three other officers later arrived to assist with the investigation.
Subsequently, Officer Gonzalez proceeded to Room 8, located at the back of the motel, approximately 80 feet away from the front gate. He was the first officer to arrive at the room. When he got there, the door to the room was wide open. He saw two males, Deandre Vaughn and Arthur Carter, inside the room and ordered them to come out. Officer Gonzalez then performed a protective sweep of the room to ascertain whether any other individuals were inside, including the reported trafficking victim. No one else was in the room.
Shortly thereafter, the other officers detained Vaughn and Carter outside the room. Officer Gonzalez testified Vaughn "disassociated himself from the room and made statements consistent with the room just simply being like a general population room, that he was employed by the motel, and that [the room is] a maintenance room, and people . . . just come in and out of the room ...."
While speaking with Vaughn, Officer Gonzalez saw Harmon walking toward Room 8. Vaughn made eye-contact with Harmon and instructed him to shut the door to the room. According to Officer Gonzalez, Harmon then "made an attempt to possibly either enter the room . . . or shut the door ...." When Harmon was less than 10 feet away from the entrance, Officer Gonzalez detained him to prevent him from entering the room. Officer Gonzalez then told Harmon that he was being detained for obstructing and delaying law enforcement's investigation.
Sometime thereafter, Officer Gonzalez learned Harmon was on parole. He also spoke to the motel manager, who provided him with the following information. At the time of the incident, "Vaughn had checked out Room 8[,]" although "Harmon . . . was checked into Room 8[ ]" in the past. Harmon had recently stayed in Rooms 8 and 2, but was currently staying in Room 7 with his son. However, Harmon "does roam freely between Room[s] 7 and 8." Based on this information, Officer Gonzalez got the impression that Harmon was "jumping around between rooms . . . within [the last] week[,]" and believed "it [was] clear . . . that many people [we]re coming in and out of Room 8[.]"
Officer Gonzalez testified he "conducted a parole confine search of Room 8 under . . . Harmon's parole status." Among other items found in the room, Officer Gonzalez discovered a loaded chrome silver revolver in one of the dresser drawers. Subsequently, he secured the gun in his patrol vehicle for safekeeping.
When Officer Gonzalez returned to the motel from his patrol vehicle, Harmon told him the gun was his, and that he wanted to take it. Officer Gonzalez declined to give Harmon the gun because, at the time, he believed the gun could have been Vaughn's, as the drawer in which it was found also contained a receipt bearing Vaughn's name. Officer Gonzalez asked Harmon to describe the gun to him. In response, Harmon described the gun and the location where it was found.
Subsequently, Officer Gonzalez transported Harmon to the police station, where he advised Harmon of his Miranda rights. After stating he understood his rights, Harmon said he is a security guard and that, based on his lifestyle, he believed he should be armed. Harmon stated that upon arriving to the Sun Motel, he took the firearm to Room 8 and placed it in the drawer where it was found. He also accurately stated the gun was loaded with four live rounds.
Officer Gonzalez testified he did not find any paperwork at the motel showing Harmon "had checked out Room 8[.]" Nor did he find any paperwork in Room 8 with Harmon's name on it. Further, Officer Gonzalez never saw Harmon inside Room 8. At some point that day, Harmon told one of the police officers that he lived in Pasadena.
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Principles and Standard of Review
"The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy against unreasonable intrusion on the part of the government." (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 971.) "[T]he United States Supreme Court has stated that 'in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one which has "a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society."' [Citations]. The defendant must assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in '"the particular area searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge."'" (Id. at p. 972, original italics.) When seeking to suppress evidence based on violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, the "defendant has the burden . . . of establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the thing seized." (Ibid; People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 507 ["Defendant bears the burden of showing a legitimate expectation of privacy"].)
"The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment." (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
II. Analysis
On appeal, Harmon does not contend the trial court erred by finding he did not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in Room 8. Nor does he argue or otherwise suggest the record reflects he carried his burden on the issue. Instead, Harmon argues reversal is required because: (1) under Dees, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d 588, the prosecution was estopped from asserting he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in Room 8; and (2) the search was unreasonable because the police exceeded "the scope of their parole search authority[ ]" by searching Room 8.
In addition, at no point in the trial court proceedings did Harmon identify any facts showing he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Room 8.
As discussed below, Harmon's estoppel argument is meritless. Consequently, we conclude he has not shown the trial court erred by determining Harmon could not challenge the search of Room 8 under the Fourth Amendment. In light of this conclusion, we need not address Harmon's second argument; i.e., that the search was unreasonable.
In Dees, a deputy sheriff responding to a call relating to a disturbance at a residence observed a brown Cadillac parked on the street. (Dees, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 590-591.) The vehicle's registration was expired, the driver's window was down, and the keys were in the ignition. (Id. at p. 591.) The deputy sheriff saw the defendant walking down the middle of the street and asked whether the car belonged to him. (Ibid.) The defendant responded, "yes." (Ibid.) Subsequently, over the defendant's objection, the deputy sheriff searched the car and recovered three bags of methamphetamine, 10 syringes, and other items. (Ibid.)
At the preliminary hearing, the defendant presented witness testimony showing he did not own the Cadillac. (Dees, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 590, 592.) Based on this evidence, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in the search of the vehicle, as well as other evidence. (Id. at p. 590.) The magistrate denied the motion. (Id. at p. 592.) In so doing, the magistrate acknowledged the defendant told the police that the car was his, but ultimately determined his "'out-of-court admission'" was insufficient to demonstrate he was entitled to challenge the search under the Fourth Amendment. (Ibid.)
Subsequently, a jury found the defendant guilty of possession of methamphetamine for sale, unauthorized possession of a hypodermic needle or syringe, and being under the influence of a controlled substance. (Dees, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 590.) On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred by declining to address the merits of his suppression motion because "the prosecution cannot argue ownership of the Cadillac and its contents as indicative of guilt while at the same time relying on his subsequent disavowal of ownership to defeat his Fourth Amendment interest [in the Cadillac]." (Id. at p. 596.)
The appellate court agreed with the defendant's argument and reversed. (Dees, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 590, 598.) In support of its conclusion, the appellate court explained: "The posture of the suppression motion, decided on the basis of facts adduced at the preliminary hearing which the magistrate deemed sufficient to hold appellant to answer, points to a fundamental problem infecting the lower court's decision: the same facts which connected [the defendant] to the crimes of possessing drugs and paraphernalia, and which the magistrate would have to accept to find sufficient cause to believe [the defendant] was guilty of the offenses, were rejected by the lower court to prove standing [to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge]. The only evidence at the preliminary hearing tying [the defendant] to the contents of the Cadillac was the [officers'] testimony . . . that [the defendant] admitted the car was his and questioned their right to search it." (Id. at pp. 597-598, original italics.) Under those circumstances, the appellate court "conclude[d] the People are estopped to argue that [the defendant] did not carry his burden to prove standing[ ]" to assert a Fourth Amendment challenge because "the People in effect conceded [the defendant's] connection to the car and his expectation of privacy therein." (Id. at p. 598.)
The facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Dees. Unlike the prosecution in Dees, the prosecution here did not assert conflicting positions regarding Harmon's interest in the area searched. Instead, the prosecution argued that Harmon failed to demonstrate he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Room 8 because the evidence reflected he "has no interest in th[e] room[.]" The prosecution did not-as Harmon contends- assert the gun belonged to him because his actions (i.e., attempting to enter the room and/or shut the door) indicated he had dominion and control over Room 8. Instead, the prosecution relied on Harmon's admission to the police that the gun was his, as well as his accurate descriptions of the gun and where he had placed it in the room. Consequently, in contrast with Dees, the "circumstances of [this] particular case" did not "make possession [of the prohibited item] and denial of an expectation of privacy [in the area searched] inconsistent[.]" (Dees, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 597.) Rather, on the facts in this case, the prosecution properly argued Harmon "possessed the seized good, but was not subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation, without legal contradiction." (United States v. Salvucci (1980) 448 U.S. 83, 90 [100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619].)
Accordingly, we reject Harmon's estoppel argument because it is unsupported by the authority on which it is based and inapplicable to the facts of this case. And, as noted above, Harmon has not argued or otherwise shown that, on the record before us, the trial court's determination that he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in Room 8 was erroneous. Harmon therefore has not demonstrated the trial court erred by concluding he could not raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search of Room 8. Thus, he has not established the trial court erred by denying his suppression motion on that basis. Having reached this conclusion, we need not address Harmon's contention that the search was unreasonable.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MORI, J., ZUKIN, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California Constitution.