Opinion
H050061
11-28-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. IVAN GERONIMO GOMEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 20CR006994)
WILLIAMS, J. [*]
Appellant Ivan Geronimo Gomez was convicted after a court trial of arson in violation of Penal Code section 451, subdivision (a), among other crimes, for having started the Dolan Fire in Big Sur in August 2020. The fire ultimately burned for months over some 120,000 acres along the central coast and adjacent land in the Los Padres National Forest, injuring a fire captain, destroying numerous structures, and killing 11 endangered condors that were the subject of organized preservation efforts. Gomez had been working at a remote and illegal marijuana grow site on federal forest land located inland from the coast at Big Sur, which site was determined to have been the general origin area of the fire.
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In the hours after the fire began and emergency response to it was underway, Gomez was detained by state parks officers at a location on Highway 1, downhill and to the coast from the grow site. There had been reports of a person throwing rocks at vehicles while traveling along the highway and Gomez was the only person in view. Once detained at Highway 1, Gomez was discovered to have several Bic lighters in his pants' pockets. When asked where he had come from, Gomez said that he" 'worked the mota up the hill,'" meaning the marijuana grow site. He then spontaneously admitted to having thrown rocks at moving vehicles after being told that this was the reason for his detention. Once he made these statements, a Spanish-speaking officer provided a Miranda advisement to Gomez in English, and Gomez confirmed his understanding of his rights in both English and Spanish. After the advisement, Gomez told the officer that he had started the fire at the grow site and had killed five men there. He said the men "were dead because they were rats" and that he had "killed them" and "had burned them in the fire" to hide the bodies. He then confirmed three times for the officer that he had killed five men with fire at the grow site. No evidence of anyone's death at the site was ever found.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
After his arrest, Gomez was taken to a sheriff's facility, where he was processed for booking and given a second Miranda advisement by a detective, this time in Spanish. Gomez again confirmed in both Spanish and English that he understood his rights. After advisement, Gomez was interviewed for some three hours in the middle of the night by two detectives, one the same Spanish-speaker who also loosely translated the conversation among the three in the interview from English to Spanish and vice versa. During the entire course of the interview, which was videotaped, Gomez provided answers to questions and gave information that ranged from what appeared to the detectives as having some basis in fact-Gomez's background information and operational details of the grow site-to that which was fantastical and delusional. This included numerous incriminating statements such as that Gomez had killed some 1,700 people by goring, stabbing, or shooting them; that he had started the fire to kill spiders with smoke; that he had started the fire to turn rocks into gold; that he had intentionally started the fire with a lighter either on grass or paper; and that he had killed five men at the grow site who had tried to rape him and started the fire to cover it up. But he also said that he had started the fire by accident because the fire was not fire, it was like water; that he did not start the fire, perhaps others had; that the fire had come from outside the grow site, causing everyone there to run away; that he actually had killed not 1,700 people but closer to 90 or 100, but he did not kill them, rather, they broke their backs; and that he, too, was an investigator like the detectives. The entire recorded interview went this way with Gomez supplying some potentially accurate facts, with some of those independently corroborated, interspersed with his seemingly delusional, psychotic, and contradictory statements about the fire and other things.
At trial, Gomez moved to exclude his post-Miranda statements to law enforcement as violative of his Fifth Amendment rights, on the basis that he had not expressly waived these rights and was not shown to have fully appreciated or understood them because of his methamphetamine-induced psychotic mental state and his resulting break with reality. The trial court rejected this claim, finding valid implied Miranda waivers, while also concluding that some of what Gomez had said to law enforcement was delusional. In admitting Gomez's statements, the trial court cited the totality of the circumstances and specifically relied on the ability of the officer to whom he made his pre-Miranda statements to fully understand them, and his initial post-Miranda statements about his having started the fire.
On appeal, Gomez reprises his claim that the admission of his statements to law enforcement violated his Fifth Amendment rights in that his waiver and understanding of these rights was not shown to have been knowing or intelligent "at all times." He also contends that the admission of his "uniquely bizarre" and unreliable statements violated his due process rights and deprived him of a fair trial. He finally urges that there is insufficient evidence to support his 11 convictions for animal cruelty in violation of section 597, subdivision (c), one for each lost condor, in that the record contains no evidence of his general intent or act to "maim, mutilate, or torture" a qualifying animal as the proscribed acts set out in the statute, even on the assumption that he started the fire that caused the loss of these animals.
We reject Gomez's claims and affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
We take the facts from the trial testimony and, as further explained below (see fn. 4, post), from the transcript of the recorded law enforcement interview with Gomez after his arrest. The recording of the interview was made an exhibit at trial and the proffered transcript of the audio accompanied that.
A. Gomez's Detention and Arrest
On August 18, 2020, at around 8:15 p.m., California State Parks Officer Peter Brandt was on patrol in Big Sur when he saw a large wildfire cresting the hills to the east of the John Little State Natural Reserve. The fire appeared to have been burning for some hours. Brandt called for backup and began evacuating residents at the state reserve. As Brandt proceeded, a report came in of a shirtless man throwing rocks at moving vehicles, including that of a responding firefighter, on Highway 1.
Officer Brandt, joined by Sergeant Matthew Khalar and Officer Bryan Powell, went to the area around Lime Creek Bridge on Highway 1 in search of the rock thrower. They saw a shirtless man walking south on Highway 1. He was wearing cargo shorts and hiking shoes and was holding a flashlight. He had no other gear or backpack, perceived as "kind of unusual for people walking along that stretch" of "desolate highway with no infrastructure." There were no other pedestrians in the area.
The officers activated their emergency lights and followed the man, later determined to be Gomez, in their patrol cars. Gomez initially shone his flashlight at the officers and continued walking. But he eventually complied with their commands and got on his knees with his hands behind his head after the officers used their cars to "triangulate[]" him, forcing him to stop. The officers gave their commands in English and before Gomez complied, one officer pointed a taser at him. During a search of his person, officers found three Bic lighters in Gomez's pockets.
Sergeant Khalar spoke to Gomez in English. He asked from where Gomez had come. Gomez answered that he" 'worked the mota'" up the hill. The sergeant sought clarification, asking," 'You worked the marijuana grow up the hill?'" Gomez replied," '[Y]es.'" Khalar told Gomez he was being detained on reports of someone throwing rocks at moving vehicles, to which Gomez spontaneously responded," 'Yeah, that was me.'" The sergeant, who had no trouble understanding Gomez, handcuffed him and placed him in the back seat of a patrol car, where Gomez waited for about 20 minutes, during which he sometimes appeared to be talking to himself in both English and Spanish.
B. The Interviews
Because Gomez continued speaking while waiting in the patrol car and occasionally switched to Spanish, Sergeant Khalar thought to have a Spanish speaker on site in case Gomez was willing to give a "further statement" to law enforcement. Khalar requested assistance from his commanding officer, Superintendent Marcos Ortega, who was fluent in Spanish. When Ortega arrived on scene some 20 minutes later, he was told that Gomez was being detained for throwing rocks at cars on the highway. He was also informed that the fire was coming down the canyons from the direction of an illegal marijuana grow site.
Ortega began speaking with Gomez, still in the patrol car after the 20 minutes it took for Ortega to arrive. Ortega asked Gomez if he understood English, and Gomez said, "[Y]es." Ortega then gave Gomez complete Miranda warnings in English, using a standard-issue card with the full advisements. When Ortega asked if Gomez understood these rights, Gomez nodded his head up and down affirmatively and said, "Yes." He gave the same answer when Ortega then asked him if he wanted to talk to police, nodding up and down and responding," 'yes or si.'" Then, Ortega "confirmed with him in Spanish," saying" 'me entiendes,' do you understand me? And he said yes or 'si.'" Gomez and Ortega spoke a mix of English and Spanish during their conversation that followed, which lasted no more than a couple of minutes, and Gomez's responses were "appropriate" to the questions.
Ortega first asked Gomez "how many people were up on the mountain" at the illegal grow site, as law enforcement was responding to the fire and it was important for safety reasons to know if people were present there and if so, how many. In Spanish, Gomez said there were "five people up on the mountain, but that they were all dead because he had burned them in the fire" as "they were rats." Ortega was concerned by this response, prompting him to ask Gomez three times "if he had killed five people with the fire, and he confirmed all three times." Ortega did not ask whether Gomez had started the fire but, according to Ortega, Gomez "volunteered that information." Gomez confirmed with Ortega all three times that there had been five other people at the grow site, and that he "had killed" them and "had burned them" "by starting the fire."
At that point, Ortega stopped questioning Gomez and turned him over to Monterey County Sheriff's detectives who had arrived on scene. Once at the sheriff's facility, Gomez was processed for booking and Detectives Michael Smith and David Gonzales conducted a videotaped interview with him, which took place over three to four hours, with breaks, in the wee hours of the morning the day after the fire started. Sergeant Khalar or Superintendent Ortega had informed Detective Smith that Gomez had made statements (in both English and Spanish) about having started the fire and killing five people, and that he had been found on Highway 1 "super sweaty," "shirtless," and "with a flashlight in his hand." Smith was also told that Gomez had not initially complied with commands but that he eventually did. Officer Brandt also relayed to Smith that Gomez "seemed out of it."
The recorded interview was conducted in English and Spanish, with Detective Gonzales, characterized as a native Spanish speaker, loosely translating questions and answers and Gomez sometimes speaking in English. Processing included Gomez being photographed, his clothes and shoes collected, and swabs taken from inside his mouth and under his fingernails. Gomez was asked to and did write down his name and date of birth and he provided other biographical information like his nationality and marital status (single). Gomez said he was 30 years old, was born in Oaxaca, Mexico, had a 10-year old daughter, had worked in construction for six years, and had lived in several California cities. Gomez said he then resided in Fresno. When asked what he did before working in construction, he said he used drugs, clarifying, "[a] lot of crystal."
The videotape (with accompanying audio) admitted as an exhibit at trial was transmitted to this court and we have reviewed it. An unofficial transcript of the interview in English and Spanish was also created and that too is part of the appellate record. We have used this transcript in describing portions of the interview for context and flavor while acknowledging that it is not official. And we say that Detective Gonzales "loosely" translated during the interview because, as shown by the videotape, there were many times when people were talking over each other or when new questions in English were asked while the prior question or answer was still being translated. Or when the translation appeared to be cut short in an effort by Detective Gonzales to keep up with the next statements made. Further, the English translation of Gomez's words said in Spanish in the accompanying transcript are sometimes different from how Detective Gonzales translated the same words during the interview. An example of this is the English translation in the transcript of Gomez having said, "[W]e always change our places" while Detective Gonzales's translation of these words during the interview was, "They always change spots." The translation done by Detective Gonzales was thus informal and perhaps imprecise, and not everything that was said in either English or Spanish during the interview appears to have been fully captured in translation from one language to the other or appears to be reflected in the informal transcript provided. Nonetheless, the parties were referenced below to have reached a stipulation to the accuracy of the transcript and it is helpful to an understanding of the recorded interview.
With processing and background preliminaries concluded, the interview proceeded with Detective Gonzales reading Gomez his Miranda rights in Spanish from a standard-issue card. When asked in Spanish if he understood his right to remain silent, Gomez said, "Si," as in "Yes." When asked if he understood that anything he said could be used against him in court, that he had the right to an attorney before and during questioning, and that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed for him at no cost before any questioning, Gomez nodded his head affirmatively and said, "Uh-hum." No express waiver of Miranda rights was then requested or provided, but Gomez never asked for an attorney or invoked his right to remain silent during the succeeding interview.
Gomez was asked if he had served in the military, to which he first responded yes, but clarified that although he had had no military service, he had "studied like forestry, but . . . didn't finish it." When asked about his education, Gomez said that he had gone to middle school in Oaxaca but stopped there. He said his goals were to "get ahead, to continue working, to work hard." He first denied having been arrested before but then said he had been arrested five times and put in jail for "speeding." He confusingly described having been arrested not for speeding but for being in a stolen car with drugs. When one of the detectives said that no one goes to jail for speeding, Gomez said he had been "really drugged up" and "lost control." He said he didn't like alcohol, but had used "crystal" in the past, and admitted to having used marijuana on the day of the fire. He denied having used other substances that day, and later offered as proof for this that they could "take [his] blood." Gomez said he hadn't slept for two nights but that he felt "fine" and that he had last eaten "yesterday," having had "meat."
When asked how long he'd been in Big Sur, Gomez first said he "go[es] over there once in a while" but this time had been there "since March." He was asked how many men he worked with at the grow site and if he knew their names. He said about 10 men had been working there, and he provided not their actual names but their monikers or nicknames, but, he said, only six men were present on the day of the fire. The workers were all friends, sleeping at the site in tents, and he was their "boss." He would "smack" them and "beat them up" if they didn't do what they were told. On the day the fire started, Gomez woke up early and searched for sticks to use as stakes to hold the plants that were getting big; the group of men were also then working to harvest leaves from the plants.
At times, the conversation during the interview, which covered many topics, appeared to proceed in a generally rational and organized fashion, with Gomez's answers appropriately and logically following from the detectives' questions. At many other times, his answers were nonresponsive, disjointed, disorganized, included references to unrelated topics, and made no sense. For example, in what both sides characterize as Gomez attempting to negotiate with the detectives to continue smooth operations at the grow site despite the fire, he said the following, as reflected by the transcript of the interview: "If you watch out for me up over there, . . . it depends on what comes out, if you watch out for me, four, I, uh, to start with, I can, uh, well, let's talk, then. If you watch out for me over there, uh, I'll take care of you. I can talk to my brother. Well, if you take care of my dudes. [¶] And then, if there's one that's dangerous, you just let me have him and, well, I, I'll fuckin' eliminate him so he'll let us work. Because the other time, I was working with my brother there, some black guys followed me, they tried to rape me."
At another point a moment later, Gomez resumed with that narrative: "[W]ell, I was not, not, not all right. They did something evil to me. The people, I don't know what I was in and all that.... [¶] And, um, and one time, like most of the time, we always change our places.... [¶] And one time I changed the place and, and . . . [¶] and I came with a car and some black guys were there. [¶] Like covering, I thought they were you guys, I'm being honest with you.... [¶] They had cones and, and they put the car in the ocean.... [¶] They put cars in the ocean. Well, they would put it in over there. Not over here.... [¶] And they were some black guys.... [¶] And . . . and I ran to the hill, well, and that was it then.... [¶] And I thought, I'll never forget that shit there.... [¶] Nothing happened, well, I run, but they did try to rape me. They're crazy [the Black guys], I don't know what.... [¶] . . . [¶] [I saw the Black guys] [o]ver there, on-where you stopped me. Right there, almost next to where they stopped me.... [¶] . . . [¶] Those dudes, if, if you throw a rock at them, that, they throw away the rock. So .... [¶] . . . [¶] another, another two steps ahead of them." This theme of Gomez having been followed by or attacked on an occasion by some "black guys" was revisited several times in the interview, but never with clarity as to what exactly was supposed to have happened or when.
In another discrepancy in the transcript of the interview, it shows this last phrase by Gomez translated by Detective Gonzales as: "And that he works hard."
At another point when Gomez was asked if he knew why he had been detained at Highway 1, he said he didn't know. The detectives then asked if Gomez remembered what he had told officers upon his detention. Gomez said, "Yes.... That if I planted, that if they watched out for me while planting marijuana, that I would compensate them.... [¶] [S]o no rats would go up there." The detectives followed this by asking if Gomez had told officers that he had started the fire, to which he responded, "Nah," adding that "the black guys that were there" left because he "threw rocks at them." The detectives then asked about the five men and Gomez having told police that they "were burning" in the fire. He responded that the men were working at the grow site "out of necessity." He first said the men had been hurt in the fire, but then retracted that and said that because of the fire, "they got scared and took off running.... [¶] They looked like zombies on the hill.... [¶] . . . [¶] I don't know if they will show up, the hill got burned."
When then asked how the fire started, Gomez replied, "I don't know, by itself" and added that it had come from somewhere other than the grow site. He then said he first saw the fire to the south of the site, and that everybody there "took off running" when they saw it. The detectives returned to the topic of Gomez having told officers that he had killed five men with the fire "because they were rats." When asked why he had said that, he responded that "the fire killed them, I think. Because they left, they took off running, I didn't kill them." Gomez later acknowledged that he did tell an officer that he had killed people with the fire because they were rats. When asked why he had "killed those men," he replied, laughing, "Just because, because they're rats, they had AIDS.... They're little gay guys." When asked how he had killed them, he again denied having done so, saying he "didn't kill them, well, the fire killed them.... And then, um, well, then they all together wanted to fuckin' grab me. . . I didn't kill them, the fire did."
The detectives pressed Gomez about his previous statements that he had started the fire, asking how he had done it. He said, "What did I start the fire with? Well, with a lighter," later explaining he lit the "hill" but also that the grass "lit by itself." He also confirmed he had started the fire not with grass but with paper. When asked why he done it, he said, "[T]o make smoke . . . [¶] because there are a lot of fuckin', uh, spiders . . . [¶] [a]nd the spiders die with the smoke." He said the other men tried to help "put it out" by throwing "dust on it" but "they got scared" and they all "took off running before getting burned by the fire."
Gomez later said that he knew the fire had killed the other men "[b]ecause all the mountains [were] burning." But he also reasoned it was possible the men "got another ride and went somewhere else" or were picked up by police as he had been. He offered to go to the grow site the next day to check if the other men were still alive and hiding in a nearby river. He later again insisted the other men had died by being burned in the fire, and suggested that "[m]aybe they lit the fire." But, in the next breath, he again said, "I started the fire" but did not kill the other men because the "fire killed them." The detectives asked why Gomez had initially said that he had killed five men with the fire. He responded, "[S]o they would look for them or do something because, well, it's burning.... I [told him] I killed him [sic] so they can at least take me, and then afterward, if they don't find him [sic], well, I'm here to go look for them.
Because [I] don't think that people go in there, it's really, it's really awful." He reiterated that he didn't know what had happened to the other men, but that "[t]omorrow, when I'm over there, I'll see if they died, man." He then again called the men "rats" and accused them of "go[ing] around stealing everywhere," deviating from the topic, and referring to some other time he was robbed in Palm Springs. "They do evil stuff to people too. Let's say, if you have a daughter, like they dominate the mind of that person, all of them together cut their hair, and all of them fuck her. And then she gets an illness. And then after that they go over there and over here. Desperately, hitting the young girl. [¶] Well, I don't know. I, I just, when I see strange people and, and I just step aside because .... [¶] . . . [¶] I don't want to fight."
When asked again if he did or did not kill the five men, Gomez said, "I didn't kill them. I just said that so they would help me.... [¶] Those guys could still be there on the hill." The detectives said they didn't understand why Gomez had previously told law enforcement that he had killed five men. He replied that he did so because he "got scared ... when [he] saw the fire. . . . [¶] I rather blamed myself that I killed them so that [law enforcement] would help me because . . . the fire was coming very fast, and . . . [I] took the responsibility so you guys can help me."
Responding to questions about what he had been doing before being stopped by police, Gomez said he had gone down to the road from the grow site to "get lunch," an understood euphemism for leaving a remote grow site to pick up supplies, including food. He seemed to say that his brother, Lino, who lives in Thousand Palms but has a connection to a nearby ranch and drives a Cherokee, was supposed to pick him up but Lino didn't show.
The detectives then asked Gomez how many people he had killed in his life. He said, "A lot," and then specified "[s]eventeen hundred." He then clarified that he, personally, had killed "like ninety, a hundred," suggesting they were people trying to steal his marijuana. Then he said he didn't kill them, "they just broke their backs." A moment later, he repeated that he had killed 90-100 people, "some by goring [as with animal horns], others with a, a pistol, others with a knife, um, and . . . [¶] [o]thers with a sniper weapon," meaning a gun. He explained that the last time he had killed someone was a year before, near Indio, and he did so "[w]ith a rod" because the man was trying to "hit" him.
After Gomez seemed to recount a couple of incidents that had occurred at the grow site during the prior year, the detectives returned to the topic of what had happened on the day of the fire to the other men at the grow site. Gomez repeated that he thought they had died by being burned after they "took off running when they saw the smoke." They were running fast and he unsuccessfully tried to catch up with them. Whistling, Gomez said, "Fuckin' 'A,' it seemed as if they saw the Devil, toward the end." When again pressed on why he had previously said he had killed the men by starting the fire, Gomez said, "First I started it, and then they took off running. Then I said that I killed them," explaining again that he had said so, so that law enforcement "would do something for [him]," meaning help him, and that he didn't know what had happened to the men. When asked why he had started the fire, Gomez confirmed there was "no reason" and that this fire was the only one he had ever started.
Then, Gomez jumped to the following: "It was, look, it was the, it was, um, look, look, I, um . . .to me they've done, there's a lot of jealousy in this fuckin' job. Wherever, at any fuckin' business. Fuckin' people don't eat or let anyone else eat. They seem like fuckin' little dogs, they don't eat or let anyone else eat. Nothing but fuckin' evil, envy, nothing but connecting, disconnecting.... [¶] I'd rather go to the hills alone now.... [¶] And everything started because of that, and before going to this hill, I dreamed that in a car where I was, I dreamed about bulls, uh, very big, balls here on the neck, I thought, I like that dream, I thought, we might make it. And I left ...." One of the detectives asked, "Balls of what?" Gomez replied, "Balls. Like bulls, the bulls, see, they have balls, it's so pretty.... [¶] That means, that dream means that I'll harvest product, good product." Gomez then relayed that he was paid about $100,000 every six months for the work he did, with the other workers getting paid either the same or by the day or by "piece rate," depending on the job.
The detectives again returned to probing "what happened [that day] with the fire," to which Gomez replied, "Hmm, nothing, the hill just burned." He said that he lit it "[t]o turn some things into gold," which meant to him to "have a lot of faith in God," reiterating that he had started the fire so his "rocks would turn into gold." He again denied having killed the five men but repeated that he had told officers that he did so, so they would "help put out the fire or something. That's why I said that they were killed." But he also said in the same breath that he "had the intention" to start the fire and confirmed that it wasn't an accident. He thought he could "put it out. Because the, the fire that I started, it's not fire, it's protected by . . .water..... [¶] . . . [¶] It was just an accident, I don't know, it's just that when I lit it, it became like thick, and I still had a chance to put out one, one area. But then after that, since we were walking, the air expanded.... [¶] But it's not fire, fire, it's fire like water.... Because on the hill where we are, fires don't start."
After the detectives told Gomez he was not making sense, one asked again if Gomez had tried to kill his co-workers, which he again denied, calling his earlier statements to the contrary "a lie." The detectives then asked whether Gomez had shot a gun that day, and he said, "Yeah," explaining that he had shot "at two police officers." When asked where the gun was, he said that his coworkers who had run away from the fire had taken it. The detectives reminded Gomez that this was the time to tell them the truth about what had happened. Gomez responded that they were investigators and that he was "an investigator too" and it was his co-workers who "use drugs, [and] have guns," and who had "started all this ruckus. [¶] . . . [¶] They burned the hill." He then accused his co-workers of throwing "rocks at all the cops" and at him, so he "headed for the hill, to ask [law enforcement] for help." When asked yet again why he had told police that he killed five people and covered it up with a fire, he again denied having killed them but said they "killed themselves" and he "took the blame, well, to save those dudes. But if those dudes didn't save themselves[,] it's because they're sick in the head.... [¶] . . . [¶] But to save them, well, I took the blame."
The detectives then returned to questioning Gomez about the man he said he had killed in Indio. Gomez named the man, "Pumba," but then denied having killed him. When later asked for more details about this, Gomez said it had happened in Fresno. When they pointed out that these were two different locations, Gomez then said the killing actually happened in Guatemala, then Guadalajara, prompting one of the detectives to say, "You understand your . . . answers are all over the place, right?" Gomez said, "Yes." The discussion later returned to this topic, with Gomez saying the last person he had killed was a woman named "Marisa" but "also a man" named "Cortes." It was in Guadalajara four years ago, although Gomez had been in the United States for 12 years. He said he killed Cortes with a gun because Cortes refused to lend him money and "he owed [him] weed" and it happened in Tulare, in "Portersville [sic]." Gomez said he had killed someone else named "Jaime" with a rod or pipe in Cathedral City because Gomez was "acting crazy" and "using crystal."
The interview also covered some further details of the grow-site operations. Gomez said he had worked there for about eight, going on nine years and there were about 1,500 plants, a rough quantity later confirmed by satellite image, yielding about 2,000 kilos of product. His duties included planting, applying chemicals or fertilizer to the plants, and moving the harvested marijuana out of the site on foot in black bags. The product was then taken by car to "Fresno, Kings Canyon." One gun was kept at the site "for security." There were multiple trails to the site from the highway but they "always use just one" to get in and out of the site. The climb was not difficult and it took about two hours to go from the highway to the site. The detectives tried to get Gomez to name the "cartel" behind the operation. He gave several different answers. At first, he said he "just had [his] cartel" but changed that to "all the big" cartels. Then he said he was working with a cartel called "Bro Boy" but then changed the name to "Chapo," neither of which were cartels, according to the detectives. Then Gomez said a group called "For Join the Garden Landscaping" was connected to the grow site, but returned to "Bro Boy" and then "Don Neto." At the suggestion of one of the detectives, he then agreed that a cartel called "New Generation" from Sinaloa and Jalisco, Mexico, owned the grow site. Then he said it was his "family" who ran the site, consistently with his references to his brother "Lino," but they paid a friend to let them use it.
The detectives told Gomez that he would be charged with arson and murder if they found "bodies." Gomez said that meant "[n]othing" and wasn't "serious" to him as he'd "already lost more" and had nothing to lose. When asked why he didn't care if he went to jail for murder, he said because he'd "always been in jail." He said he was last in jail four months before, then changed that to 16 months before, and then eight, again for "speeding." He said this was in Fresno, then Delano, then Tulare. He later said he had been arrested about five times before but for "nothing serious"-not paying tickets, speeding, and being in a stolen car with drugs.
Toward the end of the interview, the detectives asked Gomez if he was "crazy" or "just playing with" them. Gomez replied, "I'm not playing with you guys. It's not true. I'm crazy. I've already ended up that way, already." Then he said, "I'm not playing the fool at all. I'm telling the truth." When asked again why he didn't care about going to jail for the rest of his life, he said, "Because . . . because I haven't done anything wrong.... [¶] I haven't robbed anyone, I don't owe anyone. I've always done the correct thing." When asked a final time why he "started a big fire," Gomez said, "No, I already told you guys that those dudes killed themselves, they're crazy.... The guys are nothing but kids who are rapists, they come from the jail all fucked up and .... [¶] I go, and I don't know what the fuck .... Bunch of hoodlums."
Detective Smith testified that many of Gomez's statements in the recorded interview about what had happened on the day the fire began were "odd" and that "it was tough to try to figure out what his exact rationale" was for starting the fire. Smith perceived Gomez as having given a number of contradictory and inconsistent statements and observed that "he was jumping around a lot." Smith was "running out of patience" with Gomez by the end of the interview because he perceived Gomez as exhibiting "nonchalance" about the fire and missing the "gravity" of the situation. But Smith also perceived that Gomez was providing "some solid facts that [Smith] knew to be true." From these portions of the interview, he was "able to corroborate or connect as true that [which] might [have] seem[ed] out of the ordinary or difficult to understand."
For example, Smith took Gomez's statement to the effect that he could have put out the fire and the fire was "protected" by water to refer to "the creek running through the marijuana grow," meaning "there was a water source close to where he was saying he started the fire[.]" And what Gomez said about his brother "Lino" living elsewhere but frequenting a nearby ranch and driving a Cherokee also rang true to Smith, as Smith had come across such a person, whom he thought was "probably" connected to the "same marijuana garden," while investigating a dead body found on Highway 1 the year before. Smith also recalled "Lino" as sharing with Gomez "facial expressions and the pattern of speech and the way things were answered" along with both being from Oaxaca and speaking Spanish with the need for a translator for the conversation, corroborating this family connection.
C. The Fire, Its Investigation, and Determinations as to its Cause
Firefighters responding to the blaze on August 18, 2020, were unable to stop it. It was finally classified as contained some four and a half months later, on December 31, 2020, after burning 124,924 acres. In the end, 20 structures were burned or destroyed by the fire-14 homes, four outbuildings, a fire station, and a California condor enclosure maintained by the Ventana Wilderness Society.
On September 8, 2020, while fighting the fire, a fire captain and his crew were overrun by the fire trying to save a remote fire station that was ultimately destroyed. The captain was severely injured and was hospitalized for months with second and third-degree burns covering over 40 percent of his body, including his face. He lost all the tips of his toes and the tips of four fingers, and had undergone eight surgeries by the time of Gomez's trial in 2022.
Four days after the fire started, a United States Forest Service investigation team led by Officer Matt Swanson, along with special agents, fire investigators, and sheriff's deputies, were dispatched to investigate the fire and its origin. The investigation presented "a great challenge" because of the fire's size-well over several hundred acres when first detected by satellite. Infrared photos showed the fire advancing downhill into Dolan canyon.
Given the "remoteness . . . of the fire itself when it was first reported and first detected, [the team] had a huge area that [they] had to narrow down." Before hiking into the canyon, the team had been informed that Gomez "had walked out of the fire area," "was contacted by law enforcement officers," and had said that "he had lit the fire in a marijuana camp over the hill." Google Earth photos taken on the day the fire started showed a marijuana grow site in the area. Investigators first deployed a drone to that area to ascertain if the cultivation site was still active. Once they determined the site was unoccupied, the team hiked in for about two miles down the ridgeline and into the canyon, which took them close to six hours. It was a "very[,] very steep[,] steep, rugged rocky, unforgiving hike."
In the canyon, the team discovered two large camps-an "upper camp" and a "lower camp"-"that were associated with the trespass marijuana grow." The lower camp was "very elaborate" and "[v]ery, very, very well[-]established," equipped with kitchen and marijuana-processing areas, and clothing, tents, and sleeping bags for the inhabitants. There were over 1,000 marijuana plants in the lower camp, many of them "extremely tall. Some of them [were several] feet wide. Very well[-]watered, very healthy marijuana plants" that had apparently escaped the fire.
As compared to the lower camp, the upper camp had "a lot more significant fire damage," which indicated the fire "had advanced up into and through the upper-camp area." The burn indicators and fire patterns showed the fire did not come from there but instead "came up and over the ridgetop and traveled downhill at a rapid pace." The investigators ultimately determined that "the fire had originated further down the canyon . . . and that the uppercanyon camp had just been overtaken by fire."
After two weeks of investigation and examining approximately 260 acres, the team made their determination of the fire's general origin area-a location of just under one and a half acres surrounding the lower camp. Once investigators identified the general origin area of the fire, they "scour[ed]" the area through a "grid[d]ing process" that involved walking "foot by foot, sometimes inch by inch, to exclude or include the possible causes [of the fire] within that area." During that process, the investigating team found several possible ignition sources: cigarettes, a campfire ring, and propane stoves. Near the upper camp, investigators also found an inoperable firearm that had been mostly consumed by the fire. But, as concluded by the team, forensic investigation of the physical evidence using standard methodology did not suggest that any of these possible sources were likely to be the actual source of the fire's ignition. But because the cigarette butts, propane stoves, and the campfire ring were found within the general origin area, where it was clear the fire had been ignited, they were included as possible causes.
Based on their training and experience, their investigation of the fire, and Gomez's statements that he had intentionally started a fire in a marijuana grow, Officer Swanson and the investigating team concluded that "the most probable cause of the fire" was "incendiary or arson." The team believed a Bic-style lighter, which is "an open-heat source, an open-flame source," could have been used to start the fire by igniting grass, a leaf, or wood. A Bic lighter is "the tool most commonly used by arsonists" because "[i]t's mobile," "small," "[y]ou can put it in your pocket," and "[i]t doesn't leave evidence." Swanson concluded that "the fact that there were multiple lighters found on [Gomez] out on the highway" supported a lighter as a "viable source of ignition within the [general origin] area [of the fire] and also a source that could have been removed from the area."
The investigators concluded that the fire had started no later than 5:00 p.m. on August 18, 2020, based in part on how long it would take a person to light a fire in the lower camp, hike up the canyon from there, and then hike down to Highway 1, where Gomez was detained around 9:00 p.m. They factored into this conclusion that someone who worked at the grow site would have been in good physical shape, and would have been very familiar with not only the trails leading in and out of the canyon but with the topography and geography of the entire area based on the regular need to get supplies and provisions and bring them to the site.
Critically, absent Gomez's statements, the investigating team would not have concluded that arson was the most probable cause of the fire; the determination as to the cause would likely have been left as inconclusive.
Which is exactly where the defense fire-investigations expert, retired Fire Marshall Robert Rappaport, landed after reviewing the U.S. Forest Service and the Monterey County Sheriff's Office reports on the fire, studying relevant photos and video of the fire scene, and examining other relevant materials. Rappaport did not personally conduct or participate in the fire investigation and did not personally examine the general origin area. He largely agreed with the Forest Service's conclusion that the fire had originated in the one and a half acres of land surrounding the lower camp of the grow site and that the possible ignition sources included arson, the campfire, and cigarettes. He also included as a possible ignition source gunfire or ammunition, given the firearm found in the upper camp.
But Rappaport disagreed that arson could be elevated to a probable cause of the fire, explaining that while "incendiary [was] a possible cause," from the materials he had reviewed, he had not seen "any evidence to boost that possible to a probable." He said he had not "seen any sufficient [physical] evidence that any one person deliberately or intentionally set this fire." He looked for and did not find evidence in the materials he reviewed to align with Gomez's recorded statement that he had set grass on fire with a lighter. He saw no physical evidence that anyone had deliberately set the fire and no physical evidence that any particular location of grass in the general origin area had been lit on fire. Rappaport had reviewed Gomez's recorded interview with the sheriff's detectives and did not find it credible or reliable enough to support a conclusion about arson as the probable cause of the fire. Rappaport opined that in his opinion, there was "no probable cause as defined by the scientific method and [his] review of the case" and "undetermined" was the "most appropriate [cause] classification" for the fire, with arson among the list of possible causes.
At trial, the prosecution offered additional evidence to rebut Rappaport's opinion testimony. Investigator Cooper Fouch with the United States Forest Service had participated in the investigation of the fire. He disagreed with Rappaport that none of the identified possible causes of the fire-campfire, stoves, cigarettes, firearm, and arson-could be elevated to a probable cause, in part because Rappaport's analysis did not factor in Gomez's statements to law enforcement. Fouch opined that the campfire and the firearm remained only possible ignition sources. As to the campfire, he concluded that the workers at the site were likely not using it to cook food because cooking equipment was located in a different place at the site. Also, in Fouch's experience, workers at an illegal grow site would want to avoid detection by use of a campfire, especially in the summer months "when everybody is on high alert for fires." As to the recovered firearm, it was unloaded, inoperable, and had not even been found in the lower camp area.
Based on "the totality of circumstances," Fouch concluded that the fire was "incendiary," meaning deliberately started. This was based in part on Gomez's statements, including that he worked at the grow site that was determined to encompass the general origin area of the fire. Also, in Fouch's view, Gomez had ample time to travel from the site to the spot where he was detained on Highway 1, as Fouch estimated it would have taken only an hour and a half for him to travel this distance. Fouch also considered that Gomez had "three lighters in his pocket when he was detained" and investigators found two similar functioning lighters in the lower camp. Fouch also viewed the information Gomez had provided about operational details of the grow site to be consistent with the practices of illegal marijuana cultivation sites. For example, Gomez knew his co-workers only by their nicknames and used the term to "get lunch," which is understood in this context as picking up drops of supplies. Further, some of the factual information Gomez had provided was corroborated during the investigation. He said he had started work on the day of the fire looking for sticks to use as stakes for the plants, and investigators found piles of sticks in the lower camp within the general origin area and some sticks had already been used to hold up larger plants. Gomez had also said there were about 1,500 plants at the site and investigators were able to confirm "the plant count" "somewhere in the 1,600 range." Thus, for Fouch, there was more than just Gomez's incriminating statements about having started the fire to elevate arson from a possible to a probable cause of the fire.
Two weeks after the fire started, Monterey County Sheriff's Detective Sergeant Bryan Hoskins and others hiked to the marijuana grow site, of which the Sheriff's Office had by then been aware for several years. Many trails led to and from the area, and based on Hoskins's experience, it would have taken someone less than two hours to travel on foot from the grow site to the Lime Creek Bridge Area at Highway 1, near where Gomez had been detained.
Hoskins, a homicide detective, and two search and rescue teams with cadaver dogs searched the grow site for several days. They located from between 500 to 1,500 marijuana plants in the lower camp. They also found cigarette butts and a Bic lighter, which matched the lighters found on Gomez's person when he was searched upon his detention. The lower camp was well-established, and it appeared that people had been staying there. Environmental damage at the grow site included the construction of four dams, the use of irrigation tubing and fertilizer, the felling of trees, the contamination of ground water, and the presence of garbage. The search team did not find any people or human remains. Due to the fire and the presence of ash on the ground, the dog handlers estimated the probability of detecting or locating human remains to be "very low," "[b]elow 20 percent."
D. The Condors
Wildlife biologist Joe Burnett managed a condor release program for California condors in Big Sur through the Ventana Wilderness Society. The society had "been relocating condors since 1997 in an effort to restore the species to their native habitat" in Monterey County. They worked collaboratively with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services and the Pinnacles National Park. By August 2020, the society "had reached a milestone for the population[; they] had hit 101 free-flying condors in the wild, which was a huge milestone [they] were celebrating."
On August 20, 2020, two days into the fire, it swept through an area where condors were known to nest. That night, 27 condors were in that area and each of them had a "stud book number" assigned to them when they were hatched in captivity. The next day, 11 condors were unaccounted for and were suspected to have died in the fire. Of the 11, two "were nestlings" and weren't yet tagged. "Nine were all wearing radio transmitters, and of those nine, three had GPS," which stopped working. The 11 missing condors ranged in age from three and a half months to 23 years. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service "sent out law enforcement to help look for remains, which [they] were unable to [locate.] The fire was so hot, it seemed like it was a long shot that [they] would find remains." Other condors were also injured by the fire, including one that later succumbed to his burn injuries.
In his trial testimony, Burnett explained that it was unlikely the 11 missing condors had escaped the fire. He said, "[B]ased on the level of effort and tracking we do, and part of our project and our goal is to track the survival of these birds. [¶] Any bird that goes missing, we rigorously track for. And if they were to fly out of the area-the U.S. Fish and Wildlife manages a release south of us in Southern California, and we've had that happen where birds leave our flock and get picked up there. [¶] We also flew up in an airplane . . . looking for some of these radio signals. Basically, looked at every effort. [¶] And we were picking up other birds that had been in it, . . . the ones that did survive. So we knew each of these birds. [¶] And they are very back to the range, they are site tenacious as we call it. They don't tend to leave their home base. [¶] So it was really odd that they didn't turn up, not only for a week but weeks go on and they don't turn up. It was clear to us that they didn't make it through that night." And if the condors had succumbed to a natural predator, like an eagle or a coyote, their tracking devices would have been recovered, which they were not, suggesting these devices were also affected by the fire.
There was no evidence presented that Gomez knew anything about the presence of the condors or the existence of the release program operating in that location. And no evidence he came in contact with or saw any condors in connection with the fire or his work at the grow site.
E. Other Trial Evidence
The defense offered expert forensic psychiatric testimony from Dr. Manuel Saint Martin. Dr. Saint Martin evaluated Gomez, met with him on three occasions, conducted one objective test, and reviewed the recorded interview video and transcript and some discovery materials in the case.
From his clinical examination of Gomez, Dr. Saint Martin testified that Gomez exhibited no "observable sensory deficits." Gomez concentrated satisfactorily during the interviews and "could listen to [Saint Martin's] questions and respond appropriately." Although Gomez's recollection of "the offense" was "spotty," "his memory in general . . . was fine." His "mood was . . . even"; his "speech was okay, a little bit monotone"; his "body language was intact"; his "motor behavior was . . . a little bit slow." Gomez told Dr. Saint Martin that he was taking certain medication for depression and anxiety; it appeared to the doctor that the unidentified medication was instead to address Gomez's hallucinations. Gomez had told Dr. Saint Martin that he suffered from both visual and auditory hallucinations. Dr. Saint Martin thought some of the symptoms Gomez was exhibiting during his examination could have been attributed to the medication he was taking.
Dr. Saint Martin's evaluation and psychological testing of Gomez revealed that Gomez showed symptoms of depression and psychosis. Dr. Saint Martin explained psychosis as a clinical condition presenting an inability to distinguish reality from hallucinations or fantasy. Someone experiencing psychosis tends to have irrational thinking and to suffer from delusions and paranoia. They may be unable to think logically or form coherent sentences and may provide nonsensical answers to questions. Their answers could also be a mix of truth and delusions. They may be able to communicate basic information but can get lost when trying to communicate more complex matters. They may also suffer from persecutory or paranoid delusions.
Based on Dr. Saint Martin's evaluation, including Gomez's relaying of his prolonged methamphetamine use, coupled with his self-report of having used methamphetamine on the day of the fire, and Dr. Saint Martin's observation of Gomez's behavior during his recorded interview with Detectives Smith and Gonzales, the doctor opined that Gomez was intoxicated with methamphetamine and experiencing a methamphetamine-induced psychosis in that interview.
This condition, in the doctor's opinion, would make Gomez's statements and answers in the interview "unreliable" because they were based on fantasy or misinterpretation of questions he was asked. One cited example of Gomez exhibiting psychosis was the presence of a discord between his facial expressions and his thinking during the recorded interview. His eyes were darting around, looking from one thing to another, as though he were experiencing hallucinations. Other cited examples of Gomez's methamphetamine intoxication in the interview were the way he was "very talkative" and the way he answered questions, with his responses having "no bearing on the question or it's nonsensical. Meaning that he couldn't even put a statement together that made sense." He was also "thirsty" and drinking water throughout, which are signs of methamphetamine psychosis and intoxication. And he made "paranoid statements" about "people chasing him."
Dr. Saint Martin was clear though that not everything someone suffering from methamphetamine psychosis says is based on fantasy and not grounded in reality or the truth. Such a person will frequently mix reality with fantasy or delusion. The way to parse between the two to determine if the person's statements are based in reality is to "have some other information to corroborate it." With respect to Gomez's recorded interview, Dr. Saint Martin acknowledged that Gomez made a "number of truthful statements" on various factual details and the "fact that he had the means to start a fire" would "help lend credence" to the truthfulness of those statements.
The defense also offered expert opinion evidence at trial from Professor Felipe Lopez on Oaxacan culture and the Zapotec language. Dr. Lopez did not meet with Gomez but watched and listened to his recorded interview with Detectives Smith and Gonzales and reviewed the transcript of the interview. Dr. Lopez opined that Gomez is likely not a fluent Spanish speaker, has no formal education, and lacks the cultural framework to understand the U.S. justice system. Gomez, for example, made errors in tense and gender when speaking Spanish in the interview. But none of Dr. Lopez's concerns in this regard were related to Gomez's various statements about starting the fire. Dr. Lopez also said that Gomez's attempts to "bribe the interrogator," which the doctor said was common in Mexico when dealing with police and trying to negotiate one's way out of a situation, showed Gomez's unfamiliarity with the U.S. legal system. Dr. Lopez also concluded that Detective Gonzales, as the interpreter in the interview, likewise does not speak Spanish fluently, missing and mistranslating certain idiomatic expressions.
II. Procedural Background
As noted, Gomez was arrested after he was detained at Highway 1 in Big Sur the night the fire started. The initial felony complaint was filed two days later, on August 20, 2020. Competency proceedings were initiated under section 1368, but on September 23, 2020, Gomez was found to be competent to stand trial and criminal proceedings were reinstated. An amended complaint was filed on October 29, 2020, adding additional charges. A preliminary hearing proceeded that day and Gomez was held to answer, with the initial information filed the next day. On February 21, 2021, Gomez's motion filed under section 995 was heard and denied. An amended information was filed on April 14, 2021, and a second amended information on July 21, 2021.
On December 17, 2021, the parties waived their right to a jury trial, and the existing count 1, aggravated arson in violation of section 451.5, subdivision (a), was dismissed in view of this waiver.
The operative third amended information was filed at trial on March 28, 2022. It charged arson causing great bodily injury in violation of section 451, subdivision (a), as to a named firefighter (count 1); arson of a structure or forest in violation of section 451, subdivision (c) (count 2); throwing a substance at a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 23110, subdivision (b) (count 3); cultivating marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11358 (count 4); and 11 counts of cruelty to an animal in violation of section 597, subdivision (c) (counts 5-15). The information also alleged in connection with count 1's arson charge the enhancement that multiple structures were caused to burn (§ 451.1, subd. (a)(4)).
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found Gomez guilty of all charges and the enhancement attached to count 1 to be true. The court sentenced Gomez to an aggregate 24-year prison term. On count 1, the arson charge, the court imposed the nine-year upper term, plus five years for the multiple-structures enhancement. It then imposed consecutive terms of one-third the midterm on each of the remaining counts. The court imposed "minimal" fines in view of the restitution award to the State of California and the United States Department of Agriculture in the amount of $6,294,000, plus additional amounts yet to be determined to affected firefighters.
The record reflects a waiver of section 654 with respect to count 2, the arson charge under section 451, subdivision (c).
Gomez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Admission of Gomez's Statements Did Not Violate Either His Fifth Amendment or Due Process Rights
On appeal, Gomez contends that the admission at trial of his post Miranda statements to law enforcement-to Sergeant Ortega, and to Detectives Smith and Gonzales during the extended and recorded interview, prejudicially violated both his Fifth Amendment and due process rights, the latter argument specifically articulated on appeal for the first time.
As to his Miranda claim, Gomez contends he did not validly waive his Fifth Amendment rights because although there was no law enforcement coercion affecting the voluntariness of a waiver, any waiver still could not have been knowing and intelligent because of his evident methamphetamine-induced psychosis and intoxication that prevented him from understanding "at all times" that he had the rights to remain silent and to request an attorney. He claims that his waivers were not "made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." (Moran v. Burbine (1985) 475 U.S. 412, 421 (Moran).)
As to his due process claim, Gomez contends that his statements were so unreliable that their admission deprived him of a fair trial.
Gomez seeks reversal and a new trial on the arson and animal-cruelty counts (counts 1 &2, and 5-15) as the remedy for both claims of a constitutional violation. We address these claims in turn after providing additional relevant background from the trial proceedings.
A. Additional Background
Gomez moved in limine to "suppress [his] statements made to law enforcement during custodial interrogations" on the basis that the statements were "obtained in violation of his rights under [Miranda]." This challenge was limited to the absence of an express waiver of Gomez's Fifth Amendment rights. The People, for their part, moved in limine to admit Gomez's statements, in that he "was read his Miranda rights, indicated he understood, and then admitted . . . that he . . . lit the fire." The court deferred its ruling on the statements until after the close of evidence so it could review the videotaped interview and accompanying transcript and be presented with all evidence bearing on the issue.
At the close of evidence, the court took up the Miranda issue. Gomez's counsel reiterated the absence of express Miranda waivers, but also argued that because of his methamphetamine intoxication while making statements in custody, Gomez did not "fully appreciate[]" and waive his Fifth Amendment rights. The prosecutor, for her part, pointed out that Sergeant Khalar, on first contact, had no trouble communicating with Gomez and that Gomez had told Superintendent Ortega that he understood English. She further emphasized that Gomez was advised of his rights on two occasions, in both English and Spanish, said he understood them, and then never asked for an attorney or opted to remain silent, instead "answering [the officers'] questions almost spontaneously when they were being asked." This, she urged, amounted to "implied [Miranda] waivers," which are allowed under the law.
The trial court found that Gomez's Miranda rights were impliedly waived "in the context of the totality of the circumstances." The court further observed that Sergeant Khalar, the first law enforcement officer to contact Gomez, and before any Miranda advisement, "had no trouble understanding [Gomez's] answers" and indicated that Gomez's responses to law enforcement "questions made sense when in context." The court found "both [Gomez's] statement at . . . the initial detention and the subsequent statement audio and videotaped at the station, were preceded by an appropriate recitation of Miranda rights. [Gomez] waived those rights, and his waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary."
After this ruling, during closing argument, defense counsel again returned to Gomez's "completely intoxicated[,] bizarre state of mind" when making his statements. Counsel emphasized that Gomez's multiple admissions to starting the fire always included as his stated purpose achieving "something that is completely either delusional [or] bizarre," and as Detective Smith had said, "he seemed like he was just out of it." Counsel urged that the physical and forensic evidence did not point to Gomez having lit the fire, and absent his statements, there was no evidence to show he did. Further, Gomez's admissions to starting the fire were mixed with his more numerous denials, and many of his statements in interviews were nonsensical and interspersed with inappropriate bursts of laughter, evidencing his methamphetamine intoxication. Counsel argued that Gomez's inculpatory statements about his having started the fire had to be viewed not in isolation but together with his denials and "in the context of the entire interview," which was replete with his delusional statements, all the "product of [his] methamphetamine-induced psychosis." Counsel submitted that "Gomez's [recorded] statement is a virtual word and/or thought salad of nonsensical[,] incredible claims," "chock[][-]full of unbelievable ranting," the veracity of which was doubtful and unreliable. He added that Gomez also could not appreciate and validly waive his Miranda rights because of his unfamiliarity with the U.S. justice system.
The prosecution countered in closing that although Gomez had said some bizarre things, "he [had] also said some very credible things" based on the factual evidence. Even when Gomez said he started the fire to "cover up the people he murdered or to turn things into gold or [described the manner in which] he lit the fire on the hill, he is throughout the interview admitting that he started the fire." And she pointed to independent and corroborating evidence, including the presence of the lighters and the location of the fire's general origin area at the marijuana grow site where Gomez worked, that, she contended, pushed his statements about having started the fire from the realm of delusion or fantasy into reality.
After announcing its guilty verdict, the trial court went on to explain that it found the "first conversation [Gomez] ha[d] with the officers post[-]Miranda," meaning his conversation with Superintendent Ortega, to be "extremely significant." At that time, Gomez admitted working the "marijuana grow up the hill. He admitted to starting the fire with a lighter. The law enforcement officers located three lighters on his person. He identified the location of the origin of the fire, which was intentionally hidden to avoid detection to further the illegal growing activities." The court also found Dr. Saint Martin's "impress[ive]" testimony about Gomez's statements to be "persuasive" and the court was convinced that Gomez "had ingested and was under the influence of methamphetamine, [and] that [while] parts of his statement were accurate and true, other parts of his statement were inaccurate and fantastic. The [c]ourt agree[d] some of [the statements were] delusional, consistent with psychotic thoughts or hallucinations." But "based on the totality of the evidence presented by both sides, the [c]ourt [was] convinced [Gomez's] statements about starting the fire [we]re accurate and credible."
At sentencing, the trial court added that there was "no doubt" Gomez "started this fire" and "was under the influence at the time." The court also confirmed from the probation report that Gomez had no documented criminal history, despite his assertions in the recorded interview of his having been arrested or jailed numerous times.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
"The rule the [United States Supreme] Court established in Miranda is clear. In order to be able to use statements obtained during custodial interrogation of the accused, the State must warn the accused prior to such questioning of [their] right to remain silent and of [their] right to have counsel, retained or appointed, present during interrogation." (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 717 (Fare).) The warning is needed simply to make an accused aware of the right to remain silent and the consequences of foregoing it, as it is only through awareness of these consequences that "there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege." (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 469.) "Miranda further recognized that after the required warnings are given the accused, '[i]f the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived [their] privilege against self-incrimination and [their] right to retained or appointed counsel.' [Citation.]" (Fare, at p. 724.) But "a valid waiver of Miranda rights may be express or implied." (People v. Sauceda-Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203, 218 (Sauceda-Contreras).) When implied, "it can be 'inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.'" (Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 379 (Berghuis), quoting North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 373 (Butler).)
Notwithstanding the "heavy burden" on the prosecution to show waiver as described in Miranda, the "usual principles of determining" a waiver "implied from all the circumstances" apply. (Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 383-384.) And this" 'heavy burden' is not more than the burden to establish waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. [(Colorado v. Connolly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 168 (Colorado).)]" (Berghuis, at p. 384.) "A suspect's expressed willingness to answer questions after acknowledging an understanding of [their] Miranda rights has itself been held sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of such rights. [Citations.]" (Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 218-219.) "Butler made clear that a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of [their] rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.' [(Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 373.)] The Court in Butler therefore 'retreated' from the 'language and tenor of the Miranda opinion, which 'suggested that that the Court would require that a waiver . . . be "specifically made."' [Citation.] [¶] If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given and the accused made an uncoerced statement, this showing, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate 'a valid waiver' of Miranda rights. [Citation.] The prosecution must make the additional showing that the accused understood these rights. [Citations.] Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent." (Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 385.)
Thus, "[e]ven absent the accused's invocation of the right to remain silent, the accused's statement during a custodial interrogation is inadmissible at trial unless the prosecution can establish that the accused 'in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived [Miranda] rights' when making the statement. [(Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 373.)] The waiver inquiry 'has two distinct dimensions': waiver must be 'voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,' and 'made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' [(Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 421.)]" (Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 382-383.) "Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. [(Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 725; see also Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 374-375.)]" (Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 421; see People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146 (Linton); Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 219.) Said another way, and as Gomez emphasizes repeatedly in his briefing, "[o]nce it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State's intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law." (Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 422-423, fn. omitted.) This determination is made on" 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.'" (Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 374-375.)
But that an accused must know "at all times" (Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 422) of their rights to remain silent and to have an attorney does not mean there can be no implied waiver of Miranda rights when a person is voluntarily intoxicated or exhibiting symptoms of compromised mental health, including psychosis with delusions, during a custodial interview. (See, e.g., Colorado, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 170 [schizophrenia-induced, psychotic delusions with internal voices compelling confession do not necessarily render a waiver of Miranda rights involuntary]; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 645 (Cunningham) [even if some of defendant's behavior was irrational or bizarre, there was no evidence his" 'abilities to reason or comprehend or resist were in fact so disabled that he was incapable of free or rational choice' "]; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 471-472 (Panah) [acute psychosis and influence of drugs did not affect voluntariness of Miranda waivers, as while defendant was sometimes irrational during interrogation, he was still responsive to questioning and there was no police coercion]; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 988 (Frye) [voluntary consumption of an intoxicating substance, "standing alone, does not establish an impaired capacity"], disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 240-250 [no evidence defendant's serious injuries, related pain and medications, and low intelligence impaired his judgment or understanding of his Miranda rights in that his answers were clear and responsive despite his initial memory issues and disorientation]; People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170, 1189 (Jackson) [that defendant was on PCP and other drugs did not defeat his mental capacity to waive Miranda rights where he was able to comprehend and answer the questions posed and responses seemed "normal"]; People v. Loftis (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 229, 232 [defendant showing symptoms of PCP influence still appeared to have no difficulty understanding his rights and talked to officer about the incident; his answers were responsive and appropriate to questions and officer had no difficulty understanding them]; People v. Watson (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 384, 396-397 [defendant's low IQ, brain damage, schizophrenia, and ingestion of large amounts of LSD and alcohol did not deprive him of free and rational choice to waive Miranda rights]; People v. Houle (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 892, 896 [influence of amphetamine did not impair defendant's ability to intelligently understand and waive Miranda warning]; People v. Stroud (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 670, 673-683 [although having some effect, defendant's high blood-alcohol content did not impair his reasoned and intelligent understanding and waiver of Miranda rights; defendant was drunk but officer had no difficulty understanding him]; cf. In re Peter G. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 576, 582-584 (Peter G.) [13-year-old minor who consumed nine beers and was "highly intoxicated" during interrogation did not "possess requisite free will and rational intellect to waive his Miranda rights"].)
The U.S. Supreme Court in Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 485489 (Lego) held that the prosecution's burden of proof of the validity of a confession is by a preponderance of the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt. (See also Colorado, supra, 479 U.S. at pp. 168-169 [reaffirming Lego's holding].) The California Supreme Court in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 605, 608 (Jimenez) maintained that the standard of proof on this issue in California remained beyond a reasonable doubt. But in People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 65, 71, the California Supreme Court held that the 1982 passage by voters of article I, section 28 of the California Constitution, otherwise known as the "Truth-in-Evidence" law, abrogated the holding of Jimenez and made the validity of confessions and admissions provable by a preponderance of the evidence to accord with federal law. Thus, some earlier California cases, including Peter G. on which Gomez relies, were adjudicated based on a higher burden of proof than is now required.
We must view a defendant's odd or irrational statements not alone as indicative or compelling of a lack of a knowing and intelligent waiver but in the context of the entire interrogation. And we consider each case within its own particular totality of circumstances, including in light of the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Their reasoning powers would have to have been "so impaired" that the person was "incapable of freely and rationally choosing to waive [their] rights and speak with" law enforcement to find a waiver not knowing or intelligent. (Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 988.) The condition must have been such to deprive the accused "of knowledge essential to [their] ability to understand the nature of [their] rights and the consequences of abandoning them." (Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 424; see also People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 301 [incapacity or incompetence to defeat waiver not shown where defendant though medicated with morphine after having been shot and not having slept for several days, still understood questions posed and gave responsive answers that were "prompt, detailed, and pertinent"].) As the above-cited cases show, this threshold does not require an interview with law enforcement to be devoid of a suspect's irrational or even delusional thinking or behavior influenced by drugs or alcohol, or mental illness or deficiency. The ability of the accused to understand the questions posed in a custodial interview and to provide responsive answers is the dominant feature held to be indicative of a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights despite a state of intoxication or mental compromise. (See, e.g., Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 988.)
" 'On appeal, we conduct an independent review of the trial court's legal determination and rely upon the trial court's findings on disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence.' [Citation.] The facts surrounding an admission or confession are undisputed to the extent the interview is tape recorded, making the issue subject to our independent review. ([People v.] McWhorter [(2009)] 47 Cal.4th [318,] 346.)" (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 1176-1177.) "Although we independently determine whether, from the undisputed facts and those properly found by the trial court, the challenged statements were illegally obtained [citation], we' "give great weight to the considered conclusions" of a lower court that has previously reviewed the same evidence.' [Citations.]" (People v. Walsh (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 236.)
C. The Admission of Gomez's Statements Did Not Violate His Fifth Amendment Rights
Gomez appropriately does not contend he was inadequately advised of his Miranda rights. Nor does he dispute that he twice clearly acknowledged his understanding of his rights and showed a consistent willingness to answer questions throughout his interviews. Nor does he challenge the voluntariness of his statements, acknowledging that the record shows no coercion by law enforcement as required for such a claim. (Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 421.) Instead, he primarily contends that because of his state of methamphetamine-induced psychosis and intoxication, plus lacking a cultural framework to understand the U.S. justice system and Spanish not being his native language, it was not shown that he "at all times" throughout his interviews knowingly and intelligently understood his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney, or the consequences of their relinquishment, such that he validly waived these rights.
Despite the many cases that have affirmed Miranda waivers notwithstanding the defendant's intoxication or compromised mental condition, Gomez urges that this case "is different" because of the apparent pervasiveness, degree, and extent of his psychotic state throughout his interviews. He argues that his "delusion and fantasy infected the entire interrogation," calling into question "the veracity of those statements that do not, on their face, appear to be delusional." This, he argues, is shown by: 1) the trial court's finding, based on the testimony of Dr. Saint Martin, that Gomez was "under the influence of methamphetamine" during his interviews and that, as the court said it, "some of" (italics added) his statements were "delusional, consistent with psychotic thoughts or hallucinations"; 2) his post-Miranda statements that reflected his inability to respond to questions rationally and logically, and that show his confusion as he inconsistently mixed fantasy and reality when recalling events, even those as recent as the preceding day of the fire; and 3) other contributing background deficiencies that impacted his thinking and understanding, including his lack of formal education, his missing a "cultural framework [from which] to understand our justice system," and Spanish not being his native language.
Gomez recites many of his delusional and irrational statements from the recorded interview and transcript to support his argument but does not cite an instance in which he is urged to not have understood specific questions. And he points to some of his answers that were non-responsive or off-topic but does not address those that were in fact responsive or responsive in context, even if sometimes hard to follow, disjointed, or odd. He also entirely discounts his having acknowledged more than once his understanding of his Miranda rights, in both English and Spanish, and scarcely points to a specific instance in which he was shown to have misunderstood them or the consequences of their waiver. He contends instead that his general psychotic state during the entire interview compromised the whole of his comprehension and ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.
At the outset, and as the trial court found, it is indisputable from the record, especially from the video and related transcript, that many of Gomez's statements made during the entire course of the interviews, especially the lengthy recorded one, were delusional and irrational. And the trial court's observations about Gomez being under the influence of methamphetamine at the time is also supported by substantial evidence. But these facts alone do not vitiate a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights if the person nonetheless showed an understanding of the rights and the consequences of their waiver. (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 725; Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 374-375; Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 645.) And as Dr. Saint Martin testified-persuasively to the trial court-a person like Gomez who is experiencing a methamphetamine-induced psychosis would not be completely disconnected from reality and would frequently mix reality with fantasy and delusion. Parsing between the two to determine whether such a person's statements are based in reality can be done, according to Dr. Saint Martin, using corroborating information. The trial court here found that Gomez's statements, assessed in context and in the totality of the circumstances, did indeed present a mixture of reality and delusion but that law enforcement "had no trouble understanding" his pre-Miranda answers, and that his responses generally "made sense when in context." The trial court also considered Gomez's initial post-Miranda statements to be "extremely significant" in their accuracy in that he admitted to working at the marijuana grow site and to starting the fire with a lighter, three lighters were found on his person, and he identified the location of the general origin area of the fire-the grow site. The court further perceived some of Gomez's statements in the recorded interview to be "accurate and true" when taken in context while other parts were "delusional, consistent with psychotic thoughts or hallucinations," which was in line with Dr. Saint Martin's testimony.
While the truth or accuracy of Gomez's statements in general are not the measure of a valid Miranda waiver, here, according to the record, the truth or accuracy of his statements-assessed by the extent to which they could be or were corroborated-was indicative of his mental state as being grounded in reality as opposed to fantasy or delusion, as relevant to his understanding of his rights and the consequences of their waiver. As noted by the People, there were numerous instances in which Gomez's answers, even if odd, were responsive in context, as corroborating evidence showed. For example, Detective Smith found that Gomez was providing "some solid facts" that Smith knew to be true and from these portions of the interview, he was "able to corroborate or connect as true that [which] might [have] seem[ed] out of the ordinary or difficult to understand." Gomez's answers about his biographical background were on the whole responsive. And his reporting of details of the grow site operations, when taken in context, from the number of plants it generated (range of 1,500), to his working with stakes on the day of the fire, to the presence of one firearm for "security," to the presence of water via a creek on site, were all corroborated, as was the involvement of his brother, "Lino," with the illegal grow operation.
As argued by the People, Gomez was 30 years old at the time of his interviews, and had had some, though limited, formal education, including forestry training. He articulated basic life goals in the interview-to continue to work hard and get ahead-and did not appear to exhibit abnormally low intelligence. Although it appears he had no documented criminal history, he said he had previously been arrested several times and had spent some time in jail, which would have afforded him at least some experience with the criminal justice system. To prove that he had not consumed drugs that day other than marijuana, he offered to have his blood drawn, as if he were at least familiar with such aspects of a criminal investigation. When told he would be charged with arson and murder if they found "bodies" and then later was asked why he didn't care about going to jail for "the rest of his life," he said, "because I haven't done anything wrong." He was thus able to assert denials of guilt when he wanted to even though these were mixed with his numerus inculpatory statements about starting the fire.
Further, as noted by the People, during the recorded interview, when Gomez did not understand a question, he regularly asked for clarification by querying, "Pardon?", or, "Huh?", or "Hmm?", and he then responded appropriately. And he did not seek clarification or appear to be confused, irrational, or delusional when indicating, twice, that he understood his Miranda rights after having been so advised. Instead, he continued speaking to officers and answering questions, sometimes spontaneously and consistently without reservation or hesitation. (See, e.g., Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 218-219; Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 385; Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 373.) At one point later in the recorded interview, he requested a break and was provided one, after which he resumed answering the detectives' questions.
But, critically, from our independent review of the recorded interview and our observations of Gomez's behavior and statements shown there, he appears to be situationally oriented "at all times." He appears to know and understand throughout that he is in law enforcement custody and that he is speaking to officers-detectives-who are investigating the fire and his potential role in it. He also seems to understand that he is facing exposure to time in prison for his role in starting the fire. And, in spite of this, he appears willing if not eager to submit to questioning and provide answers, many of which were responsive or responsive in the context of the entire interview even though disorganized or fantastical. The "word and/or thought salad" of many of his responses to the detectives' questions does not negate this overarching impression. Nor does the degree to which Gomez was a poor historical narrator, even of recent events. Whether he was able to perceive, recollect, or communicate historical facts is a different question from whether his abilities to reason, comprehend, or resist were so disabled during the interview that he was incapable of understanding his Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving them. This is especially so, given Miranda's prophylactic purpose, in the complete absence of any effort by law enforcement to take advantage of the situation by any form of coercion, including by deception or trickery. (See Florida v. Powell (2010) 559 U.S. 50, 59 [Miranda warnings serve prophylactic purpose vis a vis law-enforcement conduct and provide procedural protections of a suspect's rights against selfincrimination]; People v. Miranda-Guerrero (2022) 14 Cal.5th 1, 15-16 [Miranda advisements are prophylactic measures].)
Despite the number of Gomez's sometimes fantastical responses and off-topic digressions or inconsistent statements interspersed throughout his interviews, this quantum is not the pivot point for assessing whether his Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent. It is, rather, whether he nonetheless exhibited, in the totality of circumstances, the requisite level of comprehension of his Fifth Amendment rights and the consequences of waiving them, even while also perhaps exhibiting psychosis with delusions and some accompanying irrational or bizarre behavior. (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 725; Jackson, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1189.) Just as delusions or a state of intoxication do not necessarily render a waiver of Miranda rights involuntary (see Colorado, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 170; Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 645; Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 470-472; Jackson, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1189), nor do they necessarily render such a waiver unknowing or unintelligent. In assessing the validity of a Miranda waiver, we must view an accused's odd or strange or even irrational statements in the context of the entire interrogation, as the trial court did here.
Doing so, despite the number of times in his interviews that Gomez made statements that seem delusional or disconnected from reality, we conclude, in the totality of the circumstances and when placing his responses in the entire context of the interviews and the factual evidence established at trial, and based on a preponderance of the evidence, that Gomez nonetheless showed an understanding of his Fifth Amendment rights and the consequences of waiving them. He certainly gave delusional, irrational, or disoriented responses to questions by officers a number of times. But, on the whole, neither this fact nor the frequency of such statements vitiated his apparent comprehension of his rights or negated his expressed understanding of them, as he now urges. The evidence does not support that Gomez's" 'abilities to reason or comprehend or resist were in fact so disabled that he was incapable'" (Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 645) "of freely and rationally choosing to waive his rights and speak with the officers" (Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 988; see also People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 204.)
We further conclude that Gomez, in fact, impliedly waived these rights that were twice clearly explained to him, by twice clearly acknowledging he understood them, and continuing both times to answer questions and volunteer information without ever invoking his right to remain silent or to have the presence of counsel. (Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 379, 386; Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 373; Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 218-219.) "The purpose of excluding evidence seized in violation of the Constitution is to substantially deter future violations of the Constitution. [Citation.] Only if we were to establish a brand new constitutional right-the right of a criminal defendant to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated-could [defendant's] present claim [of involuntariness] be sustained." (Colorado, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 166.) Although Gomez here seeks exclusion of his statements based not on the basis that they were involuntary but rather that they were not knowingly or intelligently made, this observation by the U.S. Supreme Court is nonetheless instructive. We accordingly reject Gomez's argument that his Miranda waivers were not knowing or intelligent and that his post-Miranda statements should have been excluded on this basis.
Our conclusion here should not suggest that no quality or degree of mental illness or intoxication exhibited by a suspect in a custodial interrogation could preclude a knowing and intelligent Miranda waiver. But, on this record, we do not perceive Gomez's evident methamphetamine-induced psychosis or intoxication at the time to have disabled his" 'abilities to reason or comprehend or resist'" (Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 645) such that he was incapable of free or rational choice (Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 988) or lacked the "knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them" (Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 424).
D. The Admission of Gomez's Statements Did Not Violate His Due Process Rights
Although not clearly articulated in the trial court, Gomez contends on appeal that his "bizarre, illogical, and delusional" post-Miranda statements made in law-enforcement interviews were so unreliable that their admission also violated his federal constitutional right to due process and a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment. He makes three arguments as to why this claim, which merely restates his Miranda claim under an alternative legal principle, is not forfeited on appeal. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435-437 (Partida) [while assertion of one ground for excluding evidence does not raise other unspecified grounds, no useful purpose served by reviewing court declining to consider claim that merely restates, under alternative legal principles, preserved claim where other claim is based on same facts and with a similar legal standard].) These are that his trial counsel's closing argument preserved the claim, any objection raised below would have futile (see People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7-8; People v. Abbaszadeh (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 642, 648), and forfeiture here is a close issue such that preservation of the constitutional claim should be assumed (see People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6).
The People do not argue forfeiture of Gomez's due process claim and acknowledge that it is essentially one that restates his Miranda claim under alternative legal principles. We agree and will exercise our discretion to consider the claim preserved, reaching its merits, especially as the record evidence cited in support of Gomez's due process claim is the same as that cited in support of his claim of a Miranda violation. (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 436.)
In the event we find his due process claim was not preserved, Gomez alternatively argues ineffective assistance of counsel for defense trial counsel's failure to have specifically articulated this claim. As we do not rest on forfeiture of Gomez's due process claim, instead reaching the merits, we need not address his alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Evidentiary rulings violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment only if they render a trial fundamentally unfair. (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 67-70; Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. 344, 370, fn. 13 [due process clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments can be a bar to the admission of, for example, unreliable evidence that rises to the level of a due process violation].)" 'Ordinarily, even erroneous admission of evidence does not offend due process unless it is so prejudicial as to render the proceeding unfair.' ([Citation]; see Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 436.)" (People v. Covarrubias (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1, 20.)" 'To prove a deprivation of federal due process rights, [a defendant] must satisfy a high constitutional standard to show that the erroneous admission of evidence resulted in an unfair trial.' [Citation.]' "The dispositive issue is ... whether the trial court committed an error which rendered the trial 'so "arbitrary and fundamentally unfair" that it violated federal due process.' [Citations.]" [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) Thus, the erroneous admission of evidence, even if violative of state law, is a very "narrow due process argument on appeal." (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 436.)
Having concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting Gomez's statements as they were shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have been knowing and intelligent, and thus there was no Miranda violation, we likewise conclude on the same evidence, and for the same reasons, that the admission of his statements did not violate federal due process. Again, while some of what Gomez said in his interviews was irrational and the product of delusions, other parts were not and were factually accurate and credible, as the trial court found. This lent some measure of reliability to the whole of what he said. When considered in the totality of circumstances and in the context of the whole record, including its many corroborating facts, the admission of Gomez's statements was not even error, let alone error rising to a constitutional due process violation that fundamentally deprived him of a fair trial. We accordingly reject Gomez's claim that the admission of his post-Miranda statements violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. The Animal Cruelty Convictions as General Intent Crimes Are Supported by Substantial Evidence That Gomez Committed a Proscribed Act Resulting in the Torture of 11 Protected Condors
Gomez challenges his 11 convictions of animal cruelty in violation of section 597, subdivision (c) (counts 5-15) on the basis that there is no substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, that he violated this statute, which is a general intent crime. (People v. Alvarado (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1188-1189 (Alvarado) [construing § 597, subd. (a), which uses same relevant language].) He contends that even if there is substantial evidence that he lit the fire that caused the loss of the 11 condors, there is still no evidence he committed any proscribed act of "maliciously and intentionally maim[ing], mutilat[ing], or tortur[ing] any" qualifying animal as described in the statute. Gomez seeks reversal of these convictions for insufficiency of the evidence with no possibility of retrial. (Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 16 [retrial barred by double jeopardy principles when conviction is reversed for insufficiency of the evidence].)
Section 597, subdivision (c) provides in full: "Every person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, or tortures any mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian or fish, as described in subdivision (e), is guilty of a crime punishable pursuant to subdivision (d)." (See also, e.g., CALCRIM No. 2953.) Section 597, subdivision (e)(1)(B) in turn provides that subdivision (c) of this statute applies to "[f]ully protected birds described in Section 3511 of the Fish and Game Code." Section 3511, subdivision (b)(5) of the Fish and Game Code lists the "California condor" as a fully protected bird.
When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must determine if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576, 578 (Johnson).) The factfinder is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and a reviewing court must"' "presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence."' ([Johnson, at p. 556].)" (People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 23.) We "must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053; see also People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 690.) Further," 'each of the essential elements'" of the charged offense must be supported by substantial evidence and" 'it is not enough for the respondent simply to point to "some" evidence supporting the finding ....' [Citation.]" (Johnson, at p. 577.) That the evidence might also be reconciled with contrary findings is insufficient to warrant reversal. (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 529.) A reversal for insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support" the judgment. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
Here, for purposes of this argument, Gomez concedes that viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the trial evidence shows: 1) he started the Dolan fire in the hills overlooking John Little State Reserve; 2) the fire spread and two days later, it burned through a condor nesting area from which 11 condors went missing, along with the GPS or tracking devices attached to nine of them that were presumed incinerated, and the 11 condors were then presumed dead; and 3) five more condors were recovered from the area with burn injuries, one of which was euthanized. Gomez contends that no evidence supports that he maliciously and intentionally committed an act of maiming, mutilating, or torturing a condor, as these terms appear in section 597, subdivision (c), and that the People's argument that any wrongful act may suffice, rather than one specifically proscribed by the statute, lacks merit.
As both sides agree here, animal cruelty is a general intent crime, and there is no requirement beyond a showing that a defendant" 'acted intentionally in engaging in the proscribed conduct.'" (Alvarado, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1188.)" 'Specific and general intent have been notoriously difficult terms to define and apply ....' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1186.) But the terms" 'willfully,' 'knowingly,' 'intentionally,' and 'maliciously' are expressions of general, not specific, intent when used in a penal statute. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 1188.)" 'When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1186.) For a general intent crime, the defendant, therefore, must intend the wrongful act, but is not required to have intended the result. (People v. Iraheta (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 611, 621.) And a conviction for a violation of section 597, subdivision (c) does not require the specific intent that a qualifying animal be the object of the prohibited act to" 'maim, mutilate, or torture.'" (See Alvarado, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1188.)
In reaching its holding, Alvarado relied on People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1219-1223 (Sargent), in which the high court concluded that a statute criminalizing child abuse by direct assault required a showing of general rather than specific intent. (Alvarado, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1188 [Sargent "made clear that regardless of whether the proscribed act could also in some circumstances be considered an end result, where it is used to describe the act itself and there is no purpose or result required, it is a general intent crime"].) Alvarado also relied on and applied People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 85-86 (Atkins), in concluding that animal cruelty is a general intent crime. Atkins had construed section 451, an arson statute, holding that the terms "willfully and maliciously," when applied to a penal statute, require only that the illegal act or omission occur "intentionally," and do not transform an offense into a specific intent crime. (Atkins, at pp. 85-86.) The term"' "intentionally"' requires only that the agent acted intentionally in engaging in the proscribed conduct, and not that the agent knew that the conduct was proscribed." (Alvarado, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1188.) In the context of animal cruelty, malice is defined in general as "a wish to vex, annoy, or injure" a living animal, or "an intent to do a wrongful act." (§ 7, subd. 4; People v. Dunn (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 418, 420.) "General criminal intent thus requires no further mental state beyond willing commission of the act proscribed by law." (Sargent, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1215.) It is "present '[w]hen a person intentionally does that which the law declares to be a crime . . . even though [they] may not know that [their] act or conduct is unlawful.'" (People v. Turner (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 658, 682, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Newman (1999) 21 Cal.4th 413, 422, fn. 6 &People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 411.)
Gomez acknowledges that section 597, subdivision (c) is a general intent crime. But he insists there is no evidence he either intended or committed any proscribed act of maiming, mutilating, or torturing a condor, even if he did start the fire that caused the loss of 11 of them. We recognize that section 597, subdivision (c) requires a general intent to commit, plus the commission of, one of the statute's listed proscribed acts. But we find substantial evidence in the record of Gomez having committed "torture" by his having started the fire in forest habitat where living animals would be burned alive or killed by smoke inhalation. That evidence need not be more than that which Gomez concedes for purposes of his argument.
" '[T]orture'" is defined in section 599b, contained within the same title as section 597. Section 599b provides in relevant part that "[i]n this title, . . . the words 'torment,' 'torture,' and 'cruelty' include every act, omission, or neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is caused or permitted ...." Thus, as used in section 597, subdivision (c), "torture[]" includes the commission of any act whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering to a qualifying animal is caused or permitted. It is not a reach on this record to conclude that Gomez's malicious and intentional act of starting the forest fire resulted in the incineration or death by smoke inhalation of wildlife in the forest. This was an act of torture, as so defined, in that it caused wildlife to experience unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering before ultimately dying from the forest fire. That 11 condors were among the wildlife identifiably lost is undisputed, and Gomez offers no authority for the proposition that the general intent to commit the act of torture requires knowledge of the specific characteristics or protected status of the particular subset of wildlife that the prosecution could identify among the various tortured species.
The People blur their response to Gomez's claim by appearing to suggest that any wrongful act may suffice for the commission of an act specifically proscribed by section 597, subdivision (c)-an issue we need not and do not decide. But they also cite to section 599b. Gomez did not address this applicable definitional statute in his briefing, focusing in his reply brief only on the asserted lack of merit in the People's suggestion about any wrongful act being sufficient. But as we see it, section 599b supplies the applicable definition of "torture[]" as used in section 597, subdivision (c) and would include as a proscribed act Gomez having started the fire. This directly defeats his claim of insufficiency of the evidence of animal cruelty, because viewing the record as we must in the light most favorable to the judgment, there is substantial evidence that he intentionally and maliciously started the fire that caused or permitted unnecessary and unjustifiable physical pain or suffering on 11 qualifying animals.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: GREENWOOD, P.J., LIE, J.
[*] Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.