She may have violated both the National Prohibition Act and the navigation act at the same time. Being licensed to engage in fishing only and being found engaged in another and an illegal trade, she became subject to forfeiture for violation of the terms of her license under the provisions of section 4377 of the Revised Statutes (46 USCA § 325). The Esther M. Rendle (C.C.A.) 7 F.2d 545; Id. (C.C.A.) 13 F.2d 839; The Mineola (C.C.A.) 16 F.2d 844; The Underwriter (C.C.A.) 13 F.2d 433, affirmed sub nom. Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 47 S. Ct. 735, 71 L. Ed. 1171; The Rosalie M (C.C.A.) 12 F.2d 970; Le Bouef v. United States (C.C.A.) 30 F.2d 394; The Amriald (D.C.) 6 F.2d 413; The Lorraine Rita (D.C.) 16 F.2d 607; The Dante (D.C.) 17 F.2d 304; The K-3696 (D.C.) 36 F.2d 430.

"Innocence of the owner is not a defense to forfeitures in rem incurred under the customs and navigation laws. There is no disagreement among the courts on this proposition, and the law on this point has been definitely settled. United States v. One Saxon Automobile et al. (C.C.A.) 257 F. 251; United States v. Mincey (C.C.A.) 254 F. 287, 5 A.L.R. 211; Logan v. United States (C.C.A.) 260 F. 746; United States v. One Black Horse (D.C.) 129 F. 167; The Esther M. Rendle [(C.C.A.) 7 F.2d 545; Id. (C.C.A.) 13 F.2d 839], supra; The Mineola [(C.C.A.) 16 F.2d 844], supra; Dobbins Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 24 L. Ed. 637; United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 244, 33 L. Ed. 555; Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 41 S. Ct. 189, 65 L. Ed. 376. See, also, United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210, 233, 11 L. Ed. 239; Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 47 S. Ct. 133, 71 L. Ed. 354, 47 A.L.R. 1044. "It was specifically held by the Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit, in Machado v. United States, 16 F.2d 844, that the law authorizing forfeiture of a vessel engaged in an unlicensed trade was not repealed by the National Prohibition Act, and that whether the vessel carried intoxicating liquor or other merchandise, when used in unlicensed trade, was immaterial."

The vessel was licensed as a party and work boat. By a license for "party and work" is meant that a boat is licensed to take shipping parties for general work, but not for the transportation of freight. The facts are almost identical with that of The Mineola (C.C.A.) 16 F.2d 844, 845, in which it is said: "Although there was no direct evidence that the lessee employed the Mineola for the purpose of bringing in a cargo of intoxicating liquor, all the circumstances connected with the use of the vessel for this purpose point to knowledge on his part." Under Revised Statutes, § 4377 (U.S. Code, title 46, § 325 [46 USCA § 325]), the forfeiture of the vessel is absolute if she is employed in any other trade than that for which she is licensed.

In the following cases it was held that the vessel was not employed in trade other than for which she was licensed. The Willie G., 30 Fed.Cas. 40, No. 17,762; The Swallow, 23 Fed.Cas. 494, No. 13,666; The Chiquita, 9 Cir., 44 F.2d 302. Libellant cites The Mineola, 1 Cir., 16 F.2d 844, and cases when the vessel was engaged in transporting non-tax paid liquor, a separate violation of the statute. The cases cited by appellant are not in point.

Section 60 provides as follows: "Whenever any certificate of registry, enrollment, or license, or other record or document granted in lieu thereof, to any vessel, is knowingly and fraudulently obtained or used for any vessel, such vessel, with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, shall be liable to forfeiture." The Government asks forfeiture for the "fraudulent use" of the vessel's certificate of registry within the meaning of Section 60, the vessel having been used for fishing, and cites The Active, 7 Cranch 100, 11 U.S. 100, 3 L.Ed. 282 and The Mineola, 1 Cir., 16 F.2d 844. Each of these cases holds that a vessel licensed for fishing only is subject to forfeiture for engaging in transportation of cargoes of merchandise, hence, the Government argues, the reverse, or fishing under a limited registry would subject the vessel to forfeiture. The cited cases, however, do not aid in the decision of the instant case, for they were brought under statutes specifically providing at the time of the decisions that whenever a licensed vessel is employed in any other trade than that for which she is licensed, such vessel shall be forfeited. Sec. 4377, R.S., 46 U.S.C.A. § 325.

When this case again came before the court on an amended libel (C.C.A.) 13 F.2d 839, the court followed the same rule and ordered the vessel forfeited. The Rosalie M. (C.C.A.) 12 F.2d 970; The Underwriter (C.C.A.) 13 F.2d 433, 435, affirmed 274 U.S. 501, 47 S. Ct. 735, 71 L. Ed. 1171 (under title Maul v. United States); The Mineola (C.C.A.) 16 F.2d 844; The Dewdrop (C.C.A.) 30 F.2d 394, were all forfeited upon the same grounds. In the case of The Underwriter, when heard in the Supreme Court, while the issue there was on another point, it was not suggested by counsel or court that the vessel was not liable to forfeiture under section 4377, Rev. St. (46 USCA § 325).

Assuming, without deciding, that the provisions mentioned give to a bona fide mortgagee under a preferred ship's mortgage a prior lien as against any claim of forfeiture in a proceeding of this character, nevertheless, the mortgagee herein has failed to show that he is entitled to the benefit of these provisions. No other defense being shown, the libelant would be entitled to a decree of forfeiture under the authority of The Pilot (C.C.A.) 43 F.2d 491, and The Mineola (C.C.A.) 16 F.2d 844; see, also, Maul v. U.S., 274 U.S. 501, 47 S. Ct. 735, 71 L. Ed. 1171. The exceptions to the answer of claimant are therefore sustained without leave to amend.

The defendant urges, however, that, if the court find evidence of transportation, it became mandatory upon the United States to proceed against the vessel under section 26 of title 2 of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA § 40), relying on Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 528, 50 S. Ct. 385, 74 L. Ed. 1016. There is no merit in this contention. The law is now well settled that, where acts complained of constitute violations of the revenue laws, the United States may proceed thereunder, even though such acts also constitute violations of the National Prohibition Act. Machado v. United States (C.C.A.) 16 F.2d 844. The Pilot (C.C.A.) 43 F.2d 491. Under section 4377, a vessel, if employed in any other trade than that for which she is licensed, is forfeitable. That section was not affected by section 26 of title 2 of the National Prohibition Act.

That it was engaged in such a business appears from the agreed statement of facts as aforesaid. It may be true that the owners of the vessel were not intending to bring the liquor into the United States, but the vessel was only permitted to engage in legitimate trade under the American flag, and, no matter where the vessel may be, whether in the United States waters or foreign waters, the trade it was permitted to indulge in is controlled by the United States law. If it desired to engage in the liquor business, which was permitted under British law, the owners should have surrendered its American registry and registered it under the British law, and thereby it would have been fully protected, but, when owners of vessels desire to operate the same under the protection of the United States, they must be very careful to conform to the prescribed laws of such country, otherwise they have no protection for the vessel or its cargo. The Mineola (C.C.A.) 16 F.2d 844. There is a proceeding provided by statute whereby the said Ford, as the owner of the said vessel, could have filed his claim in the Customs Department and executed the bond required, and had a hearing thereon.

Guilty knowledge on the part of any owner need not be proved. United States v. The Ruth Mildred, 286 U.S. 67. The Mineola, 16 F.2d 844. The Pilot, 43 F.2d 491, 493. United States v. American Motor Boat K-1231, 54 F.2d 502.