Summary
finding that the plaintiff did not have standing to file an action to quiet title when it had no lawful interest in the property
Summary of this case from Ello v. Seven Peaks Mktg. Chi.Opinion
Case No. 20070705-CA.
Filed October 30, 2008. Not For Official Publication
Appeal from the Second District, Ogden Department, 040903182 The Honorable Ernest W. Jones.
Timothy W. Blackburn and Richard H. Reeve, Ogden, for Appellant.
Evan S. Strassberg, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Thorne, Davis, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
The Home Abstract and Title Company, Inc. (Home Abstract) appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Orr Enterprises, Inc. (Orr), ruling that Home Abstract lacked standing. "We review a district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, affording no deference to the district court." Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, ¶ 5, 156 P.3d 175.
Home Abstract argues that the court erred in granting summary judgment based on a lack of standing because Home Abstract acquired standing pursuant to rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when the court entered an order substituting Home Abstract for plaintiff Corey Vandenberg. Indeed, the district court did in fact substitute Home Abstract for the original plaintiff. However, Home Abstract's substitution was not the basis for the court's ruling on standing. Instead, the district court determined that Home Abstract lacked standing to pursue the quiet title claim because the original plaintiff had no lawful interest in the subject property.
As a substitute party, Home Abstract stepped into the procedural position of the original party. See In re Bernal, 207 F.3d 595, 598 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing substitution of parties). The district court determined that the interest Home Abstract claimed to have acquired, and which would give them standing, would have arisen exclusively from a claimed conveyance from Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes to the original plaintiff, Vandenberg. The court further determined that the subject property was deeded to the original plaintiff nineteen days after the Vanderdoeses conveyed the same property to the Vanderdoes Land Trust (the Trust) and appointed Matthew Brown as the trustee. On the same day the Vanderdoeses conveyed the property to the Trust, they signed a document purporting to transfer their equitable interest in the Trust — including all property therein — to Brown. The court determined that a merger occurred, thereby uniting all interest in the property in the trustee of the Trust. Neither the original plaintiff nor Home Abstract produced a deed from the trustee. The court concluded that because neither the original plaintiff nor Home Abstract ever produced a deed from the trustee, or a deed that precluded the conveyance to the trustee, Home Abstract had failed to establish that it had an interest in the property. The court further concluded that, as a result of such failure, Home Abstract did not have standing to pursue the quiet title action.
The facts regarding the title of the property are undisputed. Home Abstract did not dispute below nor on appeal that the Trust was created, that a merger occurred conveying the property to the trustee, and that Home Abstract was unable to produce a deed from the trustee to either the original plaintiff or Home Abstract. Home Abstract does not dispute the facts that formed the basis for the district court's ruling that Home Abstract failed to establish that it had standing to pursue the quiet title action. As a result, we see no error in the district court's ruling that Home Abstract, as a substitute party, lacked standing since Home Abstract failed to demonstrate that the original plaintiff had a lawful interest in the subject property. Accordingly, we affirm the court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Orr.
At oral argument, Home Abstract argued that the district court erred in its determination that the original plaintiff lacked standing since the court did not make a finding regarding who in fact held an interest in the property. Because Home Abstract raised this argument for the first time during oral argument, we decline to address the merits of this issue and express no opinion on whether the original plaintiff had an interest in the property. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) ("It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief."); see also First Sec. Mortgage Co. v. Salt Lake County, 866 P.2d 1250, 1253 n. 6 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (refusing to reach arguments raised for the first time at oral argument).
Although we are unconvinced by Home Abstract's arguments on appeal, we do not agree with Orr that the appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we decline to award attorney fees to Orr. See generally Utah R. App. P. 33(a) (allowing an award of attorney fees as damages for a frivolous appeal).
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge.