Moreover, "[a] referee's findings in aggravation carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record." Fla. Bar v. Ticktin , 14 So.3d 928, 937 (Fla. 2009). Next, we conclude that there is not a reasonable basis in the case law cited by the referee for his recommendation.
In Florida Bar v. Herman , 8 So.3d 1100 (Fla. 2009), the Court suspended a lawyer for eighteen months for investing in a company that was in direct competition with a client's company, and for hiring his client's top salesman to run the company, without disclosing his activities to the client. In Florida Bar v. Ticktin , 14 So.3d 928 (Fla. 2009), the Court suspended an attorney for ninety-one days for taking over his client's role as chairman and CEO of the client's corporation without advising his client in writing of the conflicts of interest. And in Florida Bar v. Maynard , 672 So.2d 530 (Fla. 1996), the Court disbarred an attorney for, among other misconduct, convincing his client to loan money to a company in which the attorney had a substantial interest, without reducing the transaction to writing or advising the client to seek independent legal advice.
SeeAtt'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Goldsborough , 330 Md. 342, 624 A.2d 503, 512 (1993) ; see alsoFla. Bar v. Ticktin , 14 So. 3d 928, 939 (Fla. 2009) (per curiam) (rejecting embarrassment and personal financial loss flowing from lawyer misconduct as mitigating factor). We conclude that the severity of sanctions in attorney discipline cases involving assault with bodily injury and child endangerment arising in a family context should not turn on inevitable collateral consequences but should reflect the seriousness of the offense, the need for deterrence, and our role of upholding the integrity of the legal profession in the eyes of the public.
Accordingly, we decline to apply this factor in aggravation.See Fla. Bar v. Ticktin , 14 So.3d 928, 938 (Fla. 2009) (stating that "[v]ulnerability of a victim is established when findings support that a respondent exercised undue advantage over a client who was not reasonably in a position to protect himself or herself" and noting that the fact that a client was incarcerated did not require a finding of vulnerability of the victim); In re Kagele, 149 Wash.2d 793, 72 P.3d 1067, 1079 (2003) ("People hire attorneys because they are in situations serious enough to require legal expertise and advice. A client's need for an attorney does not render him or her vulnerable....").
Next, the referee found under Standard 9.22 the following factors in aggravation: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (d) multiple offenses; (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; and (i) substantial experience in the practice of law. "A referee's findings in aggravation carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record." Fla. Bar v. Ticktin , 14 So.3d 928, 937 (Fla. 2009). Bosecker has not made this showing.
Moreover, "[a] referee's findings in aggravation carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record." Fla. Bar v. Ticktin , 14 So.3d 928, 937 (Fla. 2009). With regard to the aggravating factor of prior disciplinary offenses (Standard 9.22(a) ), we previously approved the facts and recommendations of guilt as provided in the separate referees' reports.
We decline, however, to adopt the Hearing Officer's finding that K and R were vulnerable victims, concluding that neither individual was particularly vulnerable or fragile. See Florida Bar v. Ticktin, 14 So.3d 928, 938 (Fla. 2009); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Day, 173 P.3d 915, 920 (Wash. 2007); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Christopher, 105 Wash.2d 669, 682-83 (Wash. 2005).
Indeed, this Court has disciplined lawyers under rule 4–1.8(a) for engaging in a variety of business transactions with their clients. See, e.g., Herman, 8 So.3d 1100 (finding a violation of rule 4–1.8(a) where the lawyer invested in a company in direct competition with his client's corporation); Fla. Bar v. Ticktin, 14 So.3d 928 (Fla.2009) (finding a lawyer in violation of rule 4–1.8(a) where the lawyer took over his client's role as chairman and CEO of the client's corporation); Fla. Bar v. Kramer, 593 So.2d 1040 (Fla.1992) (finding a lawyer in violation of rule 4–1.8(a) where the lawyer loaned his client money, secured the loan by instructing the client to execute a deed granting certain property to the lawyer, and failed to disclose the actual nature of the transaction to his client). .Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4–5.7(a) states, “A lawyer who provides nonlegal services to a recipient that are not distinct from legal services provided to that recipient is subject to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar with respect to the provision of both legal and nonlegal services.”
Indeed, this Court has disciplined lawyers under rule 4-1.8(a) for engaging in a variety of business transactions with their clients. See, e.g., Herman, 8 So. 3d 1100 (finding a violation of rule 4-1.8(a) where the lawyer invested in a company in direct competition with his client's corporation); Fla. Bar v. Ticktin, 14 So. 3d 928 (Fla. 2009) (finding a lawyer in violation of rule 4-1.8(a) where the lawyer took over his client's role as chairman and CEO of the client's corporation); Fla. Bar v. Kramer, 593 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1992) (finding a lawyer in violation of rule 4-1.8(a) where the lawyer loaned his client money, secured the loan by instructing the client to execute a deed granting certain property to the lawyer, and failed to disclose the actual nature of the transaction to his client). Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-5.7(a) states, "A lawyer who provides nonlegal services to a recipient that are not distinct from legal services provided to that recipient is subject to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar with respect to the provision of both legal and nonlegal services."
A referee's findings in aggravation carry a presumption of correctness and should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record. See Fla. Bar v. Ticktin, 14 So.3d 928, 936 (Fla. 2009); Fla. Bar v. Arcia, 848 So.2d 296, 299 (Fla. 2003); see also Fla. Bar v. Morse, 784 So.2d 414, 415-16 (Fla. 2001); Fla. Bar v. Bustamante, 662 So.2d 687, 687 (Fla. 1995); Fla. Bar v. Hecker, 475 So.2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 1985). Contrary to the respondent's argument, it is not necessary for misconduct to have been a basis for discipline in order for it to be considered in aggravation.