Opinion
C/A 2:23-CV-05139-RMG-MGB
03-22-2024
The Estate of Jane Doe 202, by HS, the personal representative of her Estate, PLAINTIFF, v. City of North Charleston, Leigh Anne McGowan, individually; Charles Francis Wholleb, individually; and Anthony M. Doxey, individually, DEFENDANTS.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil action filed by the Estate of Jane Doe 202, through counsel, alleging a Fourteenth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 5.) All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted.
BACKGROUND
According to the Complaint, this civil action arises out a “state court suit” that Jane Doe 202 (“Jane Doe”)filed in 2014, wherein she “could not get the state created danger cause of action fully litigated in that action.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) “In that case, the trial court directed a verdict on the state created danger cause of action.” (Id.) Jane Doe passed away during the appeals process, and “her estate was substituted as a party.” (Id.) According to the Complaint, “[t]he South Carolina Court of Appeals declined to rule on the state created danger issue identified in the appeal.” (Id.) “Jane Doe's estate petitioned for certiorari on two issues, one of which was the state created danger issue.” (Id.) The Complaint alleges that the South Carolina Supreme Court only heard “the other issue in the petition” and ruled on September 29, 2023, “without considering or ruling on the state created danger issue.” (Id. at 2-3.) The Complaint alleges this “action is filed because the state courts of South Carolina would not ‘allow full litigation of a constitutional claim,' and were ‘unable or unwilling to protect federal rights' as expressed in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1890).” (Id. at 3.) Based on the foregoing, the Complaint alleges “the estate of Jane Doe 202 [has] the right to file this action in the federal court.” (Id.)
The Complaint largely refers to Jane Doe 202 as Jane Doe. For simplicity, the undersigned does the same.
Here, the Court takes judicial notice of the referenced Court of Appeals decision, which discussed the state-created danger doctrine before “affirm[ing] the trial court's grant of a directed verdict on Jane Doe's ‘state-created danger' theory of liability.” Est. of Doe 202 by Doe MM v. City of N. Charleston, 858 S.E.2d 814, 817-18 (S.C. Ct. App. 2021), aff'd but criticized, 893 S.E.2d 319 (S.C. 2023); see Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records and proceedings of other courts).
The Complaint alleges a cause of action for “state created danger” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and provides factual allegations supporting this claim. (Id. at 16.) Specifically, the Complaint alleges that on March 27, 2014, the individual Defendant police officers encountered Jane Doe and her daughter at their house after responding to a 911 call. They eventually arrested Jane Doe's daughter, who was Jane Doe's “caregiver,” and removed her from the residence, “leaving Jane Doe at her home, alone.” (Id. at 5-13.) The Complaint alleges that these officers were aware, “or should have been aware, that Jane Doe had dementia and was unable to care for herself.” (Id. at 13.) According to the Complaint, Defendants' conduct “violated Jane Doe's constitutional rights, caused injury to Jane Doe, and increased her risk of harm.” (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages.(Id. at 20-21.)
Plaintiff's counsel previously filed two federal lawsuits in this Court on behalf of Jane Doe's daughter arising from the same incident. (Dkt. No. 2 at 2-3). One lawsuit included the same named Defendants and alleged that Defendants violated the daughter's constitutional rights in the course of her arrest. See Meyer v. McGowan et al 2:16-cv-00777-RMG-MGB. The other lawsuit alleged constitutional violations based on the daughter's treatment at the Charleston County Detention Center following her arrest. See Meyer v. Cannon et al 2:16-cv-00530-RMG-MGB. Defendants do not reference these prior lawsuits in their Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff filed this instant action on October 13, 2023. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 27, 2023. (Dkt. No. 5.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on January 10, 2024 (Dkt. No. 7), to which Defendants filed a reply on January 17, 2024 (Dkt. No. 8). The Motion has been fully briefed and is ready for review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a “complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “In reviewing a motion to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) . . . [a court] must determine whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in the complaint are ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the district court must “take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “In considering a motion to dismiss, [the court] accept[s] the complainant's well-pleaded allegations as true and view[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Stansbury v. McDonald's Corp., 36 Fed.Appx. 98, 98-99 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). However, while the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, it need not accept the “legal conclusions drawn from the facts, . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions or arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999); Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 298).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim should be dismissed because it is barred by: (1) the applicable statute of limitations; (2) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (3) the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel. (Dkt. No. 5-1.) The undersigned considers these arguments, below.
A. Statute of Limitations
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's § 1983 state-created danger claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Dkt. No. 5-1 at 10.) Because “§ 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, . . . § 1983 claims are governed by ‘the statute of limitations from the most analogous state-law cause of action.'” Reid v. James Madison Univ., 90 F.4th 311, 318 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Owens v. Baltimore City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014)). South Carolina law allows three years for a plaintiff to bring a personal injury action. S.C. Code § 15-3-530(5). Therefore, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in South Carolina is three years, regardless of the underlying allegations. See Hamilton v. Middleton, Case No. 4:02-cv-01952-23, 2003 WL 23851098, at *4 (D.S.C. June 20, 2003).
Here, Plaintiff filed this action on October 13, 2023, well beyond three years after the underlying incident occurred on March 27, 2014. Plaintiff states that, despite the cause of action alleged in the complaint, he is actually asserting a claim for violation of “the due process rights of Jane Doe's estate” based on the “state court proce[edings].” (Dkt. No. 7 at 10.) Citing the South Carolina Supreme Court's September 29, 2023 opinion as the date when the state litigation ended, Plaintiff asserts he timely filed this action. (Id. at 11 (citing Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 237 (2023) (“[T]he statute of limitations for a § 1983 procedural due process claim begins to run when the state litigation ends”).) Plaintiff concedes that “the federal complaint would be out of time without the state court's due process denial of the 2014 state complaint.” (Dkt. No. 7 at 11.)
With this clarification, Plaintiff has established that his due process claim should not be dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. At the same time, Plaintiff has further established that the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider this claim based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
As noted above, Defendants also argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Dkt. No. 5-1 at 3-7.) The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is “one of a number of doctrines that safeguards our dual system of government from federal judicial erosion.” Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000). Under this doctrine, “lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006); see Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). This abstention doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting [federal] court review and rejection of those judgments.” Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cty., Md., 827 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). It applies not only to matters directly decided by the state court, but also to claims which are “inextricably intertwined” with state court decisions. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87. Moreover, a party “may not escape the jurisdictional bar of Rooker-Feldman by merely refashioning its attack on the state court judgments as a § 1983 claim.” Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Virginia, 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997).
Here, by Plaintiff's own account, he will have to show that the state court committed procedural and/or substantive errors to succeed on his claim in this action. (See Dkt. No. 7 at 4, 7 (“We contend that the state Supreme Court failed to provide due process sufficient to reach the federal issue alleged in the state litigation .... It is the state appellate courts' failure to rule, rather than any state court ruling, which is complained of in this action.”).) Such a claim is expressly prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See In re Keeler, 273 B.R. 416, 421 (D. Md. 2002) (“There is no procedural due process exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for the argument that there was not a fair opportunity to be heard on the merits in state court, nor for state judgments that do not qualify as final judgments on the merits.”); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (“[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be an appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights.”); Bolden v. City of Topeka, Ks., 441 F.3d 1129, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Appellate review-the type of judicial action barred by Rooker-Feldman-consists of a review of the proceedings already conducted by the ‘lower' tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in accordance with the law.”); Moore v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 3:15-cv-515, 2016 WL 775783, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016) (“[I]f this Court allowed Moore's federal case to proceed further, the Court would, as a practical matter, be sitting in judgment on the procedures of the state courts. Rooker-Feldman explicitly prohibits such review by a federal district court.”); Stanfield v. Charleston Cnty. Ct., No. 2:15-cv-0756-PMD-MGB, 2015 WL 4929186, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 18, 2015) (“Plaintiff asserts that his alleged injury-namely, the violation of his right to due process-was caused by the entry of the state-court judgments. Any evaluation of Plaintiff's constitutional claim would necessarily require this Court to reexamine the state court's procedures, an analysis which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not permit Plaintiff's federal claims are inseparable from his state case, and thus the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.”).
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 5) should be granted. If Plaintiff is bringing a § 1983 claim based on the state-created danger doctrine, then his claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. If Plaintiff is bringing a § 1983 claim based on the violation of his due process rights in the state court proceedings, then his claim is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Either way, this action should be dismissed.
Having recommended dismissal on these grounds, the undersigned does not consider Defendants' remaining arguments for dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 5) be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).