Opinion
No. 03-07-00001-CV
Filed: February 12, 2010.
Appealed from the District Court of Travis County, 200th Judicial District, No. GN-04-001109, Honorable John K. Dietz, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed on Rehearing.
Before Justices PATTERSON, PURYEAR and PEMBERTON; Concurring Opinion by Justice PATTERSON.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING. MEMORANDUM OPINION
We withdraw our opinion of December 18, 2009, and substitute the following opinion in its place. Appellant's motion for rehearing is denied.
Texas Energy Innovation, Inc. ("TEI"), formerly known as Power Choice, Inc., sued Hino Electric Power Company, Inc. ("Hino Power") and Hino Electric Holding Company, L.P. ("Hino Holding") (collectively, "Hino") for breach of contract. TEI and Hino Power entered into a contract whereby TEI agreed to (1) assist Hino Power in obtaining regulatory approval to sell electricity, (2) supply Hino Power with electricity to sell, and (3) refrain from supplying electricity to any of Hino Power's competitors. In return, Hino Power agreed to obtain its full electricity requirements from TEI for thirty years and to pay TEI a five-percent commission on all electricity it obtained through TEI. After Hino Power obtained regulatory approval, it began obtaining electricity from companies other than TEI. TEI sued, and Hino moved for summary judgment on the basis that TEI could not prove its damages. Hino also countersued, claiming that TEI had committed fraud, malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty. TEI moved for summary judgment on Hino's counterclaims, arguing that they were time-barred. The trial court granted both parties' summary judgment motions, and both parties appealed. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the late 1990s, attorney Robert Webb and his business partners founded TEI to assist companies wanting to enter Texas's rapidly changing electricity market. Hino Power, looking to enter the market, enlisted the aid of Webb and TEI in 1998. In exchange for assistance with entering the market, Hino Power contractually agreed to obtain all of its electricity through TEI for thirty years and to pay TEI a five-percent commission on all electricity it obtained through TEI. The contract provided that TEI would act as a broker and obtain electricity from third parties on Hino Power's behalf. The contract also provided, however, that if TEI was unable to supply all of the electricity Hino Power needed, Hino Power could obtain electricity from other sources without paying TEI a commission. The contract prohibited TEI from working with any company other than Hino Power. Indeed, as of the time it appealed, TEI had never conducted any business other than its relationship with Hino Power.
TEI, Webb, and Hino Power had a somewhat complicated relationship. Between 1998 and 2000, Webb provided legal services to Hino Power in conjunction with its efforts to obtain regulatory approval. At the same time, Webb pursued the business interests of TEI, including negotiating the aforementioned contract with Hino Power. Webb drafted the contract, which Hino would later characterize as "one-sided, illegal, and self-serving." It appears that Webb disclosed his potential conflict of interest to Hino Power, but, as discussed below, Hino Power nevertheless eventually claimed that Webb (and TEI by proxy) acted improperly in the context of the TEI-Hino Power relationship.
TEI's and Webb's initial efforts to obtain regulatory approval for Hino Power failed, and Webb requested additional funding for further efforts. Hino Power refused, and in 2000 it hired a new attorney. In 2002, Texas's electricity market changed markedly when it was deregulated. Against that backdrop and with the assistance of its new attorney, Hino Power became a licensed retail electricity provider in 2003. Once licensed, it obtained its electricity from sources other than TEI. Hino claims that it did so because it believed the parties' contract expired when Webb stopped working for Hino Power in 2000.
In 2003, Hino Power's principals formed a second company, Hino Holding, whose relationship to Hino Power is not completely clear. In 2004, TEI sued Hino Power for breach of the parties' contract. In 2006, TEI amended its petition to add Hino Holding as a defendant. TEI alleged that it remained ready, willing, and able to perform under the contract but that Hino had breached the contract by obtaining electricity from other sources. Hino asserted various affirmative defenses and also countersued. Apparently holding TEI to the same standard as its attorney-principal Webb, Hino alleged that TEI had committed fraud, breached fiduciary duties, and committed legal malpractice in the course of the parties' relationship. Hino also impleaded Webb as a third-party defendant, though he is not a party to this appeal.
Discovery ensued, and TEI named an accountant as its damages expert. The trial court eventually struck the accountant as a witness to sanction TEI for various discovery abuses. After the court did so, Hino moved for partial summary judgment on the basis that TEI could not establish its damages without an expert witness. Hino styled its motion as both a traditional summary judgment motion and a no-evidence summary judgment motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c), (i).
TEI also moved for summary judgment, claiming that Hino's counterclaims were time-barred. TEI alleged that at the latest, Hino's causes of action accrued when the parties' relationship soured in 2000, so the statutes of limitations ran on them well before Hino countersued in 2006. TEI also alleged that Hino Holding could not have had any claims against it because Hino Holding did not even exist until roughly three years after TEI and Webb stopped working with Hino Power.
The trial court granted both parties' motions for summary judgment. TEI appealed, and Hino cross-appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A "traditional" motion for summary judgment is properly granted when the movant establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991); Holmstrom v. Lee, 26 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). A defendant seeking summary judgment must negate as a matter of law at least one element of each of the plaintiff's theories of recovery or prove as a matter of law each element of an affirmative defense. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995).
A party seeking a "no-evidence" summary judgment, on the other hand, does not bear the burden of establishing its right to judgment by proving a defense or claim, but instead asserts that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim on which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Holmstrom, 26 S.W.3d at 530. If the nonmovant fails to produce more than a scintilla of probative evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to each challenged element on which he has the burden of proof, summary judgment is proper. Id.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we take as true evidence favorable to the nonmovant, making every reasonable inference and resolving all doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Centeq Realty, 899 S.W.2d at 197.
DISCUSSION
Hino's Summary Judgment Motion
The elements of a breach-of-contract claim are: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tentative performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's breach. Stewart v. Sanmina Tex., L.P., 156 S.W.3d 198, 214 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). Hino's summary judgment motion turned on the fourth element. If Hino is correct that without expert testimony TEI had no evidence of its damages, then Hino was entitled to both traditional and no-evidence summary judgment on TEI's breach-of-contract claim.
TEI argues that Hino could not have been entitled to no-evidence summary judgment because Hino's argument that TEI needed expert testimony to prove its damages was a "purely legal" issue. In support of this argument, TEI cites Harrill v. A.J.'s Wrecker Service, Inc., 27 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet dism'd w.o.j.), in which the court stated in dicta that "purely legal issues can never be the subject of a no-evidence motion for summary judgment." Other courts have disagreed with this statement. See Cone v. Fagadau Energy Corp., 68 S.W.3d 147, 156 n. 4 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. denied). We express no opinion on it because Hino's argument was not "purely legal"; rather, Hino argued both that TEI needed expert testimony as a matter of law and that TEI could produce no legally sufficient damages evidence. But even if Harrill were correct and Hino's argument was "purely legal," the outcome here would not change because Hino would still be entitled to traditional summary judgment (as explained below).
The parties debate what kind of damages evidence TEI needed in the absence of expert testimony to survive summary judgment. TEI argues that the five-percent-commission clause in the parties' contract was enough, as it quantified what TEI stood to gain if Hino had not breached. In support of this position, TEI cites cases holding that a breached commission contract itself serves as prima facie evidence of damages. See, e.g., Park v. Swartz, 222 S.W. 156, 156-57 (Tex. 1920); Genitempo v. Chardee, Inc., 822 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied); McDonald v. Davis, 389 S.W.2d. 494, 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, no writ). Hino, on the other hand, argues that TEI needed evidence that it would have netted a profit under the parties' contract. In support of this position, Hino cites cases holding that "the correct measure of damages is lost net profit." Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 n. 1 (Tex. 1992); see also Wade v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 352 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, no writ) (plaintiff must show loss of net profits to recover for breach of contract).
The parties suggest that their respective cases employ different evidentiary standards, but in fact the cases simply illustrate that sometimes a commission contract can be legally sufficient evidence of damages. See McDonald, 389 S.W.2d. at 497 (prima facie, plaintiff's reasonable profit would have equaled his commission). Thus, in a sense, both parties are correct: TEI must present evidence that it incurred damages to survive summary judgment, but that evidence may include the commission clause of the parties' contract.
We say "include" rather than "consist of" because in this case the parties' contract is not sufficient by itself to establish that TEI incurred damages. Some Texas courts have found commission contracts themselves to be prima facie evidence of damages when they related to discrete transactions of readily quantifiable value. See, e.g., Park, 222 S.W. at 156 (commission on sale of real property); Genitempo, 822 S.W.2d at 824 (commission on sale of vessel); McDonald, 389 S.W.2d. at 497 (commission on sale of real property); see also Midas Fins., Inc. v. SCH-Trident, Inc., No. 05-08-00751-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 4812, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 25, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (commission on acquisition of loan). Here, the parties' commission contract concerns unspecified quantities of a fungible asset in a rapidly changing market, endures for a very long time (thirty years), and even expressly acknowledges that TEI may not be able to meet Hino Power's needs. Given these variables, TEI needed to show more than just its five-percent commission rate to establish that it was damaged.
We turn, then, to considering what sort of damages evidence TEI needed to produce to survive summary judgment. Generally speaking, whether a plaintiff has incurred any lost profits is determined by subtracting a plaintiff's operating expenses from the gross profits the plaintiff would have earned under a contract had the defendant not breached. See Springs Window Fashions Div., Inc. v. Blind Maker, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 840, 884 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.) ("Lost profits are damages for the loss of net income to a business, and, broadly speaking, reflect[] income from lost business activity less expenses that would have been attributable to that activity.") (citations omitted). A plaintiff's figures do not need to be exact, but they do need to approximate lost profits with "reasonable certainty." Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgmt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. 1994).
As a matter of law, the requisite level of certainty cannot be established for "[p]rofits which are largely speculative, as from an activity dependent on uncertain or changing market conditions, or on chancy business opportunities, or on promotion of untested products or entry into unknown or unviable markets, or on the success of a new and unproven enterprise." Id. All of these descriptions aptly apply here; the entire purpose of the parties' contract was to facilitate the entry of a new business (Hino Power) into a rapidly changing market, and that entry turned on the success of a new and unproven enterprise (TEI). Nevertheless, for the sake of thoroughness, we will still analyze TEI's damages evidence.
TEI argues that the record contains evidence of its lost gross profits in the form of Hino Power's post-2003 ledgers, which show the amount of electricity Hino Power purchased from parties other than TEI. TEI argues that its gross profits would have equaled a five-percent commission on those purchases (or at least an identifiable subset of them) if Hino Power had not breached. TEI also argues that the record contains evidence of its operating expenses in the form of figures that Webb generated to assist TEI's stricken expert in formulating his opinion.
We need not reach TEI's operating-expense evidence, as it is clear from TEI's gross-profit evidence alone that TEI's claims could not survive summary judgment. Contrary to TEI's assertion, Hino Power's ledgers do not provide a measure of TEI's lost gross profits. Even if we assume, as TEI says we must, that TEI was ready, willing, and able to perform under the parties' contract, TEI provided no evidence from which a fact-finder could determine with reasonable certainty the amount of TEI's gross profits. TEI offered no evidence to support the conclusion that it could have brokered Hino's power purchases at the prices or from the sources reflected in Hino Power's ledgers. TEI's performance depended on the cooperation of third-party electricity suppliers, and those suppliers could have chosen not to deal with TEI or to charge it prices different from those reflected in Hino Power's ledgers. Absent any evidence that TEI would have obtained the power at the rates reflected in the ledgers, TEI has not established that it would have made a gross profit under the contract. It necessarily follows that TEI has provided no evidence that it lost profits, i.e., suffered damages. The trial court therefore properly granted Hino's summary judgment motion.
We note, however, that as Justice Patterson's concurrence demonstrates, TEI's operating-expense evidence may also be insufficient as a matter of law.
TEI could not generate electricity itself; it could only broker electricity generated by others.
TEI's Summary Judgment Motion
The trial court granted TEI's summary judgment motion on the basis that Hino's counterclaims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and legal malpractice were time-barred. Assuming that these claims are cognizable, we hold that summary judgment was proper.
It is not clear how TEI, a corporation, could have breached a fiduciary duty on these facts or committed legal malpractice, but the parties have not briefed the issue.
The statute of limitations for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty is four years. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 16.004(a)(4)-(5) (West 2002). The statute of limitations for legal malpractice is two years. Sotelo v. Stewart, 281 S.W.3d 76, 81-82 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, pet. denied). Hino brought its counterclaims in 2006. Thus, Hino's fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims were time-barred if they accrued before 2002, and its malpractice claim was time-barred if it accrued before 2004. Hino argues that all of its claims accrued when TEI filed suit in 2004. TEI argues that Hino's claims accrued in 2000, when Hino Power terminated its dealings with TEI and hired a new attorney.
Generally, claims accrue when "when a wrongful act causes some legal injury." Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). The "discovery rule," however, dictates that the clock does not start to run on claims that are inherently difficult to perceive until the plaintiff "discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts establishing the elements of a cause of action." Sotelo, 281 S.W.3d at 82. Courts have held that the discovery rule applies to fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and legal malpractice claims, either because (as with fraud) the wrongs are by definition covert or because (as with breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice) people are entitled to rely on those who owe them special legal duties. See S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 1996).
In essence, then, the question of when Hino's causes of action accrued is really the question of when Hino discovered or should have discovered TEI's alleged wrongs. We find no merit in Hino's argument that it did not discover and should not have discovered TEI's wrongs until TEI filed suit. First of all, to the extent that Hino argues the filing of a suit was itself a legal wrong, it is incorrect. See RRR Farms, Ltd. v. American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc., 957 S.W.2d 121, 134 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) ("Filing a complaint is not an improper or illegal use of the process."). If filing suit against a client were legal malpractice per se, as Hino seems to contend, then attorneys could never sue their clients no matter how their clients wronged them. Second, to the extent that Hino's claims arise from the parties' contractual dealings, the evidence is clear that Hino Power became concerned about those dealings in 2000. Indeed, Hino Power went so far as to terminate TEI's and Webb's services and get a new attorney in 2000. The record also indicates that in 2000 or 2001 Hino Power was advised by its new attorney that TEI might have wronged it. At the latest, then, Hino Power was alerted to a potential need to protect its legal rights in 2000 or 2001. Its counterclaims were therefore time-barred in 2006.
To the extent that Hino Holding's counterclaims were merely derivative of Hino Power's, they too were time barred. See Guillot v. Hix, 838 S.W.2d 230, 235 (Tex. 1992) (derivative claim accrues at same time as claim it derives from). Hino argues, however, that regardless of when Hino Holding's counterclaims accrued, they were saved by section 16.069 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. That statute provides that time-barred counterclaims may be maintained if they (1) arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that underlies the plaintiff's suit and (2) are pleaded within thirty days of when the counterclaimant's answer is due. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 16.069 (West 2008).
TEI first named Hino Holding as a defendant in the amended petition that it filed on March 1, 2006, and Hino Holding asserted its counterclaims in the answer it filed on March 30, 2006. Hino Holding's counterclaims therefore met the timeliness requirement of section 16.069. The remaining question is whether they also met section 16.609's same-transaction-or-occurrence requirement.
Section 16.069 could not have saved Hino Power's counterclaims, on the other hand, as Hino Power was first sued in 2004 and did not counterclaim until 2006.
We hold that they did not. To determine what constitutes a "transaction" under section 16.609, "we employ the logical relationship test, which asks whether the essential facts on which the claims are based are significantly and logically relevant to both claims." Wells v. Dotson, 261 S.W.3d 275, 281 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2008, no pet.). Hino Holding's counterclaims were based on TEI's and Webb's actions between 1998 and 2000 — specifically, (1) Webb's efforts to induce Hino to contract with TEI and (2) Webb's subsequent legal representation of Hino despite his conflicting interests. TEI's claims, on the other hand, were based on Hino's procurement of electricity from third parties in 2003 and 2004. Because Hino's and TEI's claims turn on completely distinct sets of facts, we conclude that Hino Holding's counterclaims were time-barred. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 16.609.
Finally, the Hino entities argue that TEI's summary judgment motion was procedurally defective because TEI did not properly give Hino notice of the hearing on it. We reject this argument. Regardless of TEI's allegedly defective notice, Hino actually knew of TEI's motion, responded to the motion, and participated in the hearing on the motion without seeking a continuance. Hino therefore suffered no prejudice from the allegedly deficient notice and cannot complain of it on appeal. See Goode v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (affirming summary judgment despite technically deficient notice because appellant responded to motion and participated in hearing).
CONCLUSION
Because TEI's damages evidence was insufficient as a matter of law, Hino was entitled to summary judgment on TEI's claims. TEI was entitled to summary judgment on Hino Power's counterclaims because they were time-barred, and it was entitled to summary judgment on Hino Holding's counterclaims because they were not saved by section 16.069 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. We affirm the summary judgments against all parties.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING. CONCURRINGOPINION
I concur in the majority's judgment. I agree with the majority's conclusion that the district court did not err in its summary judgment rulings (i) in favor of Hino Electric Power Company, Inc., and Hino Electric Holding Company, L.P., concerning Texas Energy Innovations, Inc.'s (TEI) breach of contract claim and (ii) in favor of TEI concerning defendants' counterclaims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and legal malpractice. I do not join the majority's analysis and write separately, however, concerning TEI's breach of contract claim. I would affirm the district court's ruling based upon defendants' alternative no-evidence motion for summary judgment.
I refer to Hino Electric Power Company, Inc., as "Hino Power," Hino Electric Holding Company, L.P., as "Hino Holding," and the Hino entities collectively as "defendants."
TEI's Damage Expert
As an initial matter, although the parties agree that expert testimony was not required to prove damages, the circumstances surrounding the striking of TEI's damages expert, Jeff Heard, are relevant here.
Pursuant to a scheduling order, the discovery period ended on May 5, 2006, and the case was set for trial on June 5, 2006. In May 2006, TEI responded to defendants' request for disclosure. TEI disclosed that its calculation of economic damages was not complete and would be supplemented; TEI designated Heard as an expert to testify regarding damages but did not provide information on his damages calculations at that time. Later in May, TEI produced Heard's expert report, and defendants deposed Heard. Heard testified that his damages calculations did not include the costs that TEI would have incurred in performing under the contract but that TEI's estimated costs should be included in the calculations. On June 2, 2006, TEI produced Heard's revised damages calculations that included TEI's estimated "Costs of Operations" as an offset to the income that TEI would have received under the contract, but TEI did not provide back-up data to support these cost figures.
Defendants thereafter moved to strike Heard's testimony and report, or alternatively for a continuance, because TEI "failed to meet the requirements of rule 194 [of the rules of civil procedure] regarding the production of information relating to expert opinions" and materially altered its damages computation by including TEI's estimated costs. Defendants urged that the "latest damage computation report [from Heard] . . . contains an entirely new category of information first provided the Friday before trial." See Tex. R. Civ. P. 194; see also id. 193.6(a) (party who fails to respond to discovery in timely manner may not introduce the information in evidence that was not disclosed unless the trial court finds good cause or that the failure to disclose will not unfairly surprise or prejudice the other parties). After a hearing, the district court continued the trial date and ordered that TEI produce Heard for another deposition and that TEI "may not materially amend its damages calculations any further."
The parties' dispute continued with Heard's deposition occurring on June 9, 2006, and defendants' counsel filing a letter with the court on June 12, 2006, objecting, among other things, to Heard's reliance on three non-disclosed consulting experts to support the "Costs of Operations" in his revised damages calculations. Attached to counsel's letter were (i) TEI's interrogatory response that it did not have any consulting experts, and (ii) notes from one of TEI's principals, Robert Webb, that Heard relied upon to form his opinions as to TEI's estimated costs in his revised damages calculations. Counsel contended that Webb's letter "relay[ing] certain alleged conversations he held with these three new consultants" showed that TEI improperly was relying on non-disclosed consulting experts to support its estimates of costs.
Webb's notes are titled "Notes for Estimate of [TEI] Costs for Brokering Electric Power Supply for [Hino Power] (in 2006 dollars)." Webb provided estimated costs to Heard and the sources for his estimates, including conversations that he had with certain specified individuals. Webb states in relevant part:
As you requested, I have typed up my notes on how I prepared a cost estimate for providing power broker service to [Hino Power] based on their power purchase patterns and levels during 2004 and 2005. The sources of my information are identified with a local phone number for you to confirm any of the information they have provided.
The district court reconsidered defendants' motion to strike in another hearing and entered a subsequent order striking Heard as a witness and further ordered "that the prior order prohibiting any further material changes to the Plaintiff's damage calculations" remain in effect. On appeal, TEI has not challenged the district court's ruling striking its damages expert and limiting its damages calculations. In this context, I turn to the district court's ruling on defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants
After the district court struck TEI's only damages expert and limited its damages calculations as a sanction, defendants sought summary judgment under rule 166a(c) of the rules of civil procedure, contending that their summary judgment proof conclusively established that TEI could not prove that the alleged breach caused any damage to TEI and, alternatively, sought summary judgment under rule 166a(i), contending that TEI lacked evidence of damages. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c), (i). The district court granted defendants' motion without specifying the basis for its ruling. Because it is dispositive, I limit my analysis to defendants' no-evidence ground. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000) (when trial court does not specify ground for its ruling, court of appeals must affirm the summary judgment if any ground is meritorious).
Although it is not entirely clear, the majority purports to affirm the district court's ruling in favor of defendants under rule 166a(c). But, it was defendants' burden to negate TEI's damages to be entitled to summary judgment under rule 166a(c). See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995) (to obtain summary judgment, defendant must either negate at least one element of the plaintiff's theory of recovery or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense). Given that for purposes of their summary judgment motion, defendants did not challenge (i) the validity of the contract between TEI and Hino Power that provided a five-percent fee to TEI, (ii) defendants' breach of the contract, (iii) TEI's ability to perform under the contract, and (iv) defendants' electric power purchases beginning in 2003, defendants failed to establish their entitlement to summary judgment under rule 166a(c).
Standard of Review of No-Evidence Summary Judgment
In a summary judgment motion under rule 166a(i), the movant contends that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of the claims for which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial, and the trial court must grant the motion unless the respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The respondent is "not required to marshal its proof; its response need only point out evidence that raises a fact issue on the challenged elements." Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) (cmt. — 1997).
This Court reviews the evidence in an appeal from a no-evidence summary judgment under the legal sufficiency standard of review, the same standard that this Court applies to appeals from directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822-23 (Tex. 2005). A legal sufficiency challenge is sustained when (1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Id. at 810.
Measure of Damages
TEI contends that its role would have been one of a broker and that its measure of damages was five percent of defendants' electric power purchases subject to the contract from 2003 to the time of trial. TEI compares its measure of damages to a claim for a real estate broker's commission. See Park v. Swartz, 222 S.W. 156, 156-57 (Tex. 1920) (breached real estate commission contract serves as prima facie evidence of damages fixed by contract). But, even accepting TEI's characterization of its role as a broker of electric power, the contract between the parties contemplated the purchase of electric power over a period of years at unspecified prices and, therefore, is not comparable to a real estate broker's commission. Further, TEI's proposed measure of damages does not square with its own expert's opinion that TEI's costs to perform should be included in TEI's damages calculations or the general measure of damages for breach of contract.
"The universal rule for measuring damages for the breach of a contract is just compensation for the loss or damage actually sustained." Phillips v. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex. 1991) (quoting Stewart v. Basey, 245 S.W.2d 484, 485-486 (Tex. 1952)); see also Arthur Andersen Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tex. 1997) (out-of-pocket and benefit-of-the-bargain damages defined and compared). "Generally, the measure of damages for breach of contract is that which restores the injured party to the economic position he would have enjoyed if the contract had been performed." Mood v. Kronos Prods., Inc., 245 S.W.3d 8, 12 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied). Without including the costs to perform under the contract, TEI would be placed in a better economic position than it would have enjoyed if the contract had been performed. See Phillips, 820 S.W.2d at 788; Mood, 245 S.W.3d at 12.
I would conclude that TEI's costs to perform under the contract were necessarily required as a component of TEI's measure of damages in addition to the income it would have received from the contract. To defeat defendants' no-evidence motion, TEI therefore was required to provide evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to its costs to perform. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). I turn then to a review of the summary judgment evidence.
Summary Judgment Evidence
In its response to defendants' motion, TEI pointed to the parties' live pleadings, an affidavit from Webb, the contract between TEI and Hino Power, TEI's motion for leave to file its third amended petition, and the petition, limiting its request for damages to those from the date of the contract to the date of trial. TEI contended that no additional evidence was needed because the damages could be calculated based upon the recital of five percent in the contract and historical facts. TEI urged that invoices and ledgers previously produced by defendants showed that "some $88 million of power subject to the 5% fee had been purchased for resale" by defendants through March 2006 and that "some $4.4 million in payments to [TEI] are due and owing on the basis of historical fact" and that Webb and Mark White, principals of TEI, would be able to provide "information on what [TEI] has spent in preparing to fulfill its contractual obligations."
Webb averred that (i) he was an owner of TEI; (ii) the document attached to the response was the contract between the parties; (iii) he was an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas and that his primary area of practice was administrative law, usually dealing with public utilities; and (iv) "[u]nder the terms of the [contract] payment of 5% of the cost of all purchases of electric power by Hino is to be made to [TEI] except for electricity purchased by Hino from ERCOT, the independent system operator."
On appeal, TEI also points to evidence attached to defendants' motion for summary judgment. The defendants' evidence included (i) defendants' motion to strike TEI's damages expert Heard with an attachment of Hino Holding's general ledger showing its purchases of electric power from 2003, and (ii) the June 2006 letter by defendants' counsel to the district court with the attachment of Webb's notes with estimated costs to perform.
The only possible evidence pointed to by TEI of its costs to perform under the contract was Webb's notes to Heard that were provided as an attachment by defendants' counsel to the district court concerning defendants' motion to strike the expert. Defendants provided the notes to support their position that Heard's revised damages calculations improperly relied upon non-designated consulting experts. The district court agreed with the defendants. On this record, given the unchallenged district court ruling striking the expert and limiting TEI's damages calculations, I would conclude that the district court was barred from giving any weight to the only evidence of TEI's costs to perform — Webb's notes. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810. The remaining evidence of TEI's damages — the five percent recital in the contract — was legally insufficient by itself to create a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
Because costs to perform were a necessary component of TEI's measure of damages and TEI failed to produce evidence that created a genuine issue of material fact of its costs and without evidence other than the contract itself, I would affirm the district court's summary judgment ruling on defendants' no-evidence ground. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.
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The most difficult part of the estimate of maintaining a staff and office for power brokering for [Hino Power] was estimating the size and complexity of the actual electric load to be served. Based on the data on contracts and billing obtained from third party [ ] and its affiliates, I inquired about the size of operation to two former colleagues, [ ] . . .
I also confirmed the general office resources for providing power brokering service in ERCOT with [ ], who is an experienced advisor. . . .