Opinion
No. 06-07-00085-CV
Submitted: October 18, 2007.
Decided: December 18, 2007.
On Appeal from the 249th Judicial District Court, Somervell County, Texas, Trial Court No. C09853.
Before MORRISS, C.J., CARTER and MOSELEY, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice CARTER.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
While riding his Harley Davidson motorcycle one night, Ronald Glenn Harris was pulled over by a state trooper, who told him that his license plate was not properly illuminated. After a discussion in which Harris admitted he had drunk four beers, but stated he had stopped drinking over two hours earlier, the officer (Shane Neal) performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test on Harris' eyes and was evidently not entirely satisfied. Neal then asked Harris to blow in his portable breath machine. Harris refused. Neal then asked Harris to perform some physical tests, which Harris did — but which Neal stated he failed. The evidence also shows that Harris had both hips replaced and that this negatively affected his ability to perform the types of fine motor control required by the various balance tests.
§ 547.801. Lighting Equipment
547.322
(f) A taillamp or a separate lamp shall be constructed and mounted to emit a white light that:
(1) illuminates the rear license plate; and
(2) makes the plate clearly legible at a distance of 50 feet from the rear.
(g) A taillamp, including a separate lamp used to illuminate a rear license plate, must emit a light when a headlamp or auxiliary driving lamp is lighted.
547.801
(1) not more than two headlamps mounted at a height from 24 to 54 inches;
(2) at least one taillamp mounted at a height from 20 to 72 inches;
(3) a taillamp or separate lamp to illuminate the rear license plate that complies with the requirements of Sections 547.322(f) and (g);
Neal again asked Harris to take the breath test, and Harris again declined. Neal then arrested Harris and transported him to jail, where Harris also refused to take a breath test on the stationary machine. Harris has not been prosecuted for driving while intoxicated — instead, the State pursued an administrative action seeking to suspend his license. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Neal stopped Harris because of the defective license plate light, that Neal believed Harris to be intoxicated because of his tests, and that Harris refused to give a breath sample. The judge also found that Harris had "one or more" prior alcohol-related or drug-related enforcement contacts during the prior ten years. The record shows that Harris had received probation for driving while intoxicated in 1985, and again twelve years later, in 1997, and that he was arrested on this charge September 16, 2006. Based on the judge's conclusions, she then sustained the suspension of Harris' license for two years.
Harris appealed to the district court of Somervell County, which found in his favor, reversing the ALJ's decision. The Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) now appeals, alleging the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of the ALJ that Neal had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Harris and further that Neal had probable cause to believe that Harris was driving while intoxicated. We reverse the trial court and reinstate the ALJ's order.
This appeal was filed with the 10th Court of Appeals in Waco and was transferred to this Court by order of the Texas Supreme Court as part of its docket equalization process.
Standard of Review
At the license suspension hearing, the DPS was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop or arrest Harris; (2) probable cause existed to believe that Harris was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; (3) Harris was placed under arrest by the officer and was requested to submit to the taking of a specimen; and (4) Harris refused to submit to the taking of a specimen on request of the officer. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 724.042-.043 (Vernon Supp. 2007); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Vasquez, 225 S.W.3d 47, 53 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Norrell, 968 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.). Issues (3) and (4) are not disputed.
Courts review administrative license suspensions under a substantial evidence standard. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 524.043 (Vernon 2007); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174 (Vernon 2000); see also Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999).
Initially, we recognize that the meaning applied to the term "substantial" evidence has little to do with the dictionary meaning of the word. Substantial, in this context, does not mean ample, or considerable in quantity. In contested cases, the reviewing court must affirm the administrative findings if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support them. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131. Substantial evidence requires only more than a mere scintilla of evidence. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex. 1995). Thus, as has been acknowledged, the burden for overturning an agency ruling is formidable. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Pucek, 22 S.W.3d 63, 67 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.). In fact, it is so formidable that an administrative decision may be sustained even if the evidence preponderates against it. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131. We are not allowed to determine whether the ruling is correct, but only whether there is some evidence that might support it. Id.; see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174.
See Hammack v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 131 S.W.3d 713, 725 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied); Peaster Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glodfelty, 63 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep't of Agric., 923 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1245 (11th ed. 2006).
A court's review of an ALJ's decision is appellate in nature. Thus, the district court was not retrying the case, but instead reviewing the decisions made by the ALJ. Likewise, in our review, we are independently determining whether the ALJ's decision was supported by the evidence before it. An additional issue in this case is the refusal of the ALJ to admit some evidence — which the district court found to be an erroneous ruling. The district court did not reverse and remand based on the evidentiary errors, however, but reversed and rendered based on the inadequacy of the evidence before the ALJ.
The appellate court reviews de novo the trial court's determination. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Cuellar, 58 S.W.3d 781, 783 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.); Raesner v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 982 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
Under this standard of review for administrative decisions in contested cases, the court shall reverse or remand the case for further proceedings if the appellant's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decision are: (A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision; (B) in excess of the agency's statutory authority; (C) made through unlawful procedure; (D) affected by other error of law; (E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole, or (F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174(2); see also Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Cantu, 944 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) ("[T]o reverse an agency decision, the reviewing court must conclude (1) that the agency's decision was erroneous for one of the reasons enumerated in subsections (A) through (F), and (2) that substantial rights of the appellant have thereby been prejudiced.").
The Evidence
Neal testified he could not see the license plate at night, that it was not clearly visible, and that no light was illuminating the license plate. There was a videotape of the stop. The tape is of poor quality, but the license plate appears to have had some illumination at the time of the stop. It appeared brighter when the following officer's lights reflected from the plate, but the poor quality of the tape makes it impossible to conclude as Harris urges that Neal's testimony was "wrong and impossible." When the facts are in dispute and the findings are based primarily on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, "almost total deference" is given to the finder of facts. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997).
Neal then testified as set out above about the procedures he followed after the stop and the ultimate arrest made after he concluded Harris was intoxicated.
Harris testified about the lighting design on his motorcycle — the same bulb illuminates the taillight, the brake light, and the license plate. Counsel also attempted to introduce evidence about the motorcycle's condition shortly after the arrest, when Harris had it inspected, as he testified, the day after he got out of jail. The court refused to admit the evidence, and Harris made an offer of proof to that effect.
Harris also attempted to introduce testimony by telephone (with the agreement of the State) at the administrative hearing. The testimony would have also been about the nature of the lighting on this type of motorcycle, provided by a local justice of the peace. The ALJ refused to allow the method of testimony, with the comment that it required prior notice before such testimony was accepted due to the unreliability of its telephone lines.
The district judge found this improper and admitted an affidavit from that proposed witness concerning the lighting arrangement on the motorcycle.
At the hearing before the district court, it also became clear Harris had not been charged with driving while intoxicated as a result of this stop.
Evidence presented at the administrative hearing also included Neal's officer's report stating that Harris had slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, an odor of an alcoholic beverage on his person, and admitted he had drunk four beers. Additionally, the HGN test showed clues of intoxication and some of the field tests showed that Harris was unsteady.
Analysis
Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). A reasonable-suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances, giving almost total deference to the fact-finder's determination of historical facts and reviewing de novo the application of the law to facts not turning on credibility and demeanor. Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89).
The ALJ was presented with a poor-quality visual recording that appears to indicate that some light at the rear of the motorcycle was (to some degree at least) working at the time Harris pulled off the road. She was also presented with evidence from the arresting officer that the license plate light was not working when he pulled Harris over and that the license plate was not clearly legible from fifty feet. Harris has shown that conflicting evidence was before the ALJ. However, the only issue before the district court was whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings. A reviewing court cannot disregard an ALJ's factual determinations where there is conflicting evidence. See Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131. We conclude that substantial evidence (at least more than a scintilla) supported the ALJ's reasonable suspicion determination. See Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.).
Further, we find there is sufficient evidence to uphold the decision of the ALJ that Neal had probable cause to believe that Harris was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.
As previously noted, courts must affirm administrative findings in contested cases if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support them. In fact, an administrative decision may be sustained even if the evidence preponderates against it. Hesskew v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 144 S.W.3d 189, 191 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2004, no pet.). Based on the standard of review required, we find that the district court erred by reversing the determination of the ALJ.
We reverse the judgment of the district court and reinstate the judgment of the ALJ.