Texas a M University System v. Koseoglu

12 Citing cases

  1. Texas a M v. Koseoglu

    233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007)   Cited 760 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a remand to permit a claimant to replead would serve no legitimate purpose when the underlying claim was a breach of contract claim and immunity could not be overcome

    The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to Texas A M's appeal, holding Texas A M's sovereign immunity from suit barred Koseoglu's breach of contract claim. 167 S.W.3d 374, 384 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. granted). Rather than dismiss Koseoglu's claim against Texas A M, the court of appeals concluded Koseoglu deserved an opportunity to amend his pleadings and therefore remanded the matter to the trial court.

  2. White v. Robinson

    260 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. App. 2008)   Cited 12 times

    Until recently, some disagreement existed among courts regarding the point at which a plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to amend. See Tex. A M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 167 S.W.3d 374, 380-84 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005), rev'd in part. 233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007) (explaining various approaches of courts).

  3. McLane v. Thomas

    NO. 03-18-00439-CV (Tex. App. Mar. 6, 2020)

    "[A] plaintiff must be given '"a reasonable opportunity to amend" his pleadings to attempt to cure the jurisdictional defects found' unless the pleadings are incurably defective." Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 839 (quoting Texas A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 167 S.W.3d 374, 383 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. granted), and citing Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2004), and Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867-68 (Tex. 2002)). This opportunity is afforded "only if it is possible to cure the pleading defect."

  4. Sakonchick v. Travis Cnty.

    NO. 03-19-00323-CV (Tex. App. Oct. 30, 2019)

    "[A] plaintiff must be given 'a reasonable opportunity to amend' his pleadings to attempt to cure the jurisdictional defects found' unless the pleadings are incurably defective." Texas A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. 2007) (quoting Texas A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 167 S.W.3d 374, 383 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. granted), and citing Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2004), and Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867-68 (Tex. 2002)). We afford a plaintiff this opportunity "only if it is possible to cure the pleading defect," see id. at 840, which "typically arises when the pleadings fail to allege enough jurisdictional facts to demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction."

  5. Como v. City of Beaumont

    345 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. App. 2011)   Cited 4 times

    The intermediate appellate court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court so that Koseoglu could amend his pleadings. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 167 S.W.3d 374, 383–84 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. granted), rev'd in part, 233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex.2007). The university argued for a dismissal with prejudice, but the Court of Appeals reasoned that Koseoglu had not had a reasonable opportunity to amend his pleadings because the plea to the jurisdiction had been denied by the trial court.

  6. COMO v. CITY OF BEAUMONT

    No. 09-10-00192-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 2, 2011)

    The intermediate appellate court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court so that Koseoglu could amend his pleadings. Tex. A M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 167 S.W.3d 374, 383-84 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, pet. granted), rev'd in part, 233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007). The university argued for a dismissal with prejudice, but the Court of Appeals reasoned that Koseoglu had not had a reasonable opportunity to amend his pleadings because the plea to the jurisdiction had been denied by the trial court.

  7. Wharton Cty. v. Genzer

    No. 13-06-078-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 20, 2007)   Cited 4 times

    In the instant case, the trial court did not determine that the County's plea to the jurisdiction was meritorious; consequently, Genzer was not put on notice that his pleadings were deficient. As a result, and because we determine that Genzer's pleadings do not affirmatively demonstrate an incurable jurisdictional defect, but merely a pleading deficiency, we find that Genzer should be afforded an opportunity to amend his pleadings. Tex. A M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 167 S.W.3d 374, 383-84 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. 05-0321, 2007 Tex. LEXIS 838 (Tex. Sept. 7, 2007). See County of Cameron, 80 S.W.3d at 559.

  8. Texas v. Esquire

    240 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. App. 2007)   Cited 11 times
    Concluding administrative agency had exclusive jurisdiction even though legislature did not use the term "exclusive" to describe the board's jurisdiction

    Esquire has filed a motion to dismiss Henricks's interlocutory appeal on the grounds that she is not a "governmental unit" authorized to take an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 2006) (authorizing interlocutory appeal from order granting or denying plea to jurisdiction by "governmental unit" as defined in Texas Tort Claims Act), § 101.001(3) (West 2005) (defining "governmental unit"); see also Texas A M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 167 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. granted). We need not reach that question here.

  9. Texas Education Agency v. Donna Independent School District

    221 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App. 2007)   Cited 6 times
    Describing deadline for "perfecting" appeal under education code as statute of limitations

    Id. § 101.001(3) (Vernon 2005). Although Martinez may be aligned as a co-defendant with the TEA and the Commissioner, who are clearly "governmental units" as defined above, individuals employed by governmental units are not themselves governmental units entitled to an interlocutory appeal. See id.; id. § 51.014(a)(8); Tex. A M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 167 S.W.3d 374, 378-79 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. granted); Castleberry Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 35 S.W.3d 777, 780 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (holding that a teacher was not a "governmental unit" entitled to interlocutory appeal); Univ. of Houston v. Elthon, 9 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (holding that university administrators were not "governmental units"), overruled on other grounds by Tex. Dep't of Parks Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 n. 4 (Tex. 2004). We hold that Martinez is not a "governmental unit," and therefore, he is not entitled to an interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

  10. Baylor v. Hernandez

    208 S.W.3d 4 (Tex. App. 2006)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that section 312.006 does not purport to grant immunity from suit to a supported medical school or to its residents, faculty, or employees

    Moreover, an interlocutory appeal is not available if the plea to the jurisdiction was not made by a "governmental unit." See Tex. A M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 167 S.W.3d 374, 377-79 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. granted); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shores, 128 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Perry v. Del Rio, 53 S.W.3d 818, 821 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001), pet. dism'd, 66 S.W.3d 239, 264 (Tex. 2001). Thus, to determine the extent to which we have jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of a plea to the jurisdiction, we must determine whether the issues presented are jurisdictional and whether the plea is made by a statutorily-defined "governmental unit."