Opinion
Civil Action 22-157-SDD-RLB
10-23-2023
TEXAS CAPITAL BANK f/k/a TEXAS CAPITAL BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. FAT COW, LLC, DOUGLAS E. HOSFORD, and KARRY W. HOSFORD CIVIL ACTION
RULING
SHELLY D. DICK JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Attorney's Fees filed by Plaintiff, Texas Capital Bank f/k/a Texas Capital Bank, National Association (“Texas Capital”). The Motion is unopposed and comes after a Ruling and Final Default Judgment entered in favor of Texas Capital. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Texas Capital's Motion shall be granted.
Rec. Doc. No. 28.
Rec. Doc. No. 22.
See Rec. Doc. No. 26, amended by Rec. Doc. No. 32.
I. Attorneys' Fees
Texas Capital seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of $11,298.00. Texas Capital has attached counsels' detailed billing records for this matter and a Declaration by Texas Capital's counsel, Philip K. Jones, Jr., (“Jones”). Four attorneys represented Texas Capital in this case, billing $500 per hour (Jones), $495 per hour (William Blake Bennett), $475 per hour (Joseph P. Hebert), and $375 per hour (Carey L. Menasco). In the Declaration, Jones attests to the fees incurred and services performed in this matter on behalf of Texas Capital, as well as to the years of practice by each billing attorney and the actions taken in this case. He attests that the four attorneys who worked on this matter have extensive experience in the areas of bankruptcy, creditor's rights, and business litigation. As reflected in the billing records, the attorneys billed a collective 24.3 hours of time on this matter from November 1, 2022, to present day.
Rec. Doc. No. 28.
Rec. Doc. 28-2.
See Rec. Doc. No. 28-2.
In the Fifth Circuit, the “lodestar” method is used to calculate reasonable attorneys' fees. The “lodestar” analysis involves a two-step procedure. Initially, the district court must determine the reasonable number of hours expended on the litigation and the reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers. Then, the court must multiply the reasonable hours by the reasonable hourly rates. The product is the “lodestar,” which the court either accepts or adjusts upward or downward, depending on the circumstances of the case, assessing the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.
In re Fender, 12 F.3d 480, 487 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1143 (1994).
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 323-324 (5th Cir.1995) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
Id. at 324.
488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974).
A court's discretion in fashioning a reasonable attorney's fee is broad and reviewable only for an abuse of discretion, i.e., it will not be reversed unless there is strong evidence that it is excessive or inadequate, or the amount chosen is clearly erroneous.To determine a reasonable fee, a court must provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award, making subsidiary factual determinations regarding whether the requested hourly rate is reasonable, and whether the tasks reported by counsel were duplicative, unnecessary, or unrelated to the purposes of the lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit has noted that its “concern is not that a complete litany be given, but that the findings be complete enough to assume a review which can determine whether the court has used proper factual criteria in exercising its discretion to fix just compensation.”
Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 277, (5th Cir. 2000); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437-39; Associated Builders & Contractors v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1990).
Brantley v. Surles, 804 F.2d 321,325-26 (5th Cir.1986).
In assessing the reasonableness of attorneys' fees, the court must first determine the “lodestar” by multiplying the reasonable number of hours expended and the reasonable hourly rate for each participating attorney. The party seeking the fee bears the burden of proof on this issue.
See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Green v. Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 661 (5th Cir. 2002); Associated Builders & Contractors, 919 F.2d at 379; Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir.1998); Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324.
See Riley v. City of Jackson, 99 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir.1996); Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324.
The Court begins by determining whether the number of hours claimed by Texas Capital's attorneys is reasonable. Local Rule 54 provides specific guidance regarding how this burden is met, stating: “the party desiring to be awarded such fees shall submit to the court a contemporaneous time report reflecting the date, time involved, and nature of the services performed. The report shall be in both narrative and statistical form and provide hours spent and justification thereof.” “Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.” Here, the Court finds that the 24.3 hours claimed by Texas Capital's attorneys is reasonable and well-documented in the submitted time sheets.
Migis, 135 F.3d at 1047.
M.D. La. LR54(b).
Cooper v. Pentecost, 77 F.3d 829, 832 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted); see also Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324 (“[A] district court may reduce the number of hours awarded if the documentation is vague or incomplete.”).
The Court must also determine if the hourly rates of billing $500 per hour (Jones), $495 per hour (William Blake Bennett), $475 per hour (Joseph P. Hebert), and $375 per hour (Carey L. Menasco) are reasonable given counsels' ability, competence, experience, and skill. An attorney's reasonable hourly rate should be “in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that “the relevant market for purposes of determining the prevailing rate to be paid in a fee award is the community in which the district court sits.”
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984); see also Leroy v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir.1990) (“In evaluating an attorneys' fees award, we are guided by the overriding principles that a reasonable attorney's fee is one that is adequate to attract competent counsel, but that does not produce windfalls to attorneys ....” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).
Texas Capital cites recent Middle District case law wherein the Court approved hourly rates ranging from $345 to $595 per hour in a similar collection matter. In his Declaration, Jones highlights the twenty years of experience touted by Menasco and forty years of experience touted by Jones, Bennett, and Hebert in similar areas of practice.He also notes the recorded time of these attorneys that was “written off” and that the lawyers do not seek to recover. Such stricken time includes that of Menasco, who was enrolled later than the other attorneys in this matter. Jones considers 6.7 hours of Menasco's billed time (or $2,512.50 in fees), as being “unproductive, excessive, or duplicative” and does not seek to recover those fees.
Oak Harbor Inv. Props., LLC v. Sedona Corp., CV 20-844-SDD-RLB, 2022 WL 709186, at *1 (M.D. La. Mar. 9, 2022).
Rec. Doc. No. 28-2, p. 6-7.
Rec. Doc. No. 28-2, p. 5.
Rec. Doc. No. 28-2, p. 6.
Here, the Court finds that the hourly rate of $500 per hour by Jones, $495 per hour by Bennett, $475 per hour by Hebert, and $375 per hour by Menasco are reasonable. Therefore, having determined the “lodestar” reasonable hourly rate and hours for Plaintiff's counsel, and after consideration of the Johnson factors, the Court finds that an attorney's fee in the amount of $11,298.00 is reasonable.
The twelve factors are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974).
II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Texas Capital Bank f/k/a Texas Capital Bank, National Association's Motion for Attorney's Fees is hereby GRANTED.
Rec. Doc. No. 28.