Opinion
C.A. No. 06A-02-001 WCC.
Submitted: March 5, 2007.
Decided: June 28, 2007.
Appeal from Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. AFFIRMED.
Brian A. Sullivan, Esquire and Amy D. Brown, Esquire; Werb Sullivan; Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Appellant.
Eileen Filliben Edmunds, Esquire; Wilmington, Delaware Attorney for Appellee, Yogesh Bhatt.
Mary Page Bailey, Esquire; Wilmington, Delaware Attorney for Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Introduction
Before this Court is Tesla Industries Inc.'s ("Tesla") appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's ("Board") decision, in which it found that Yogesh Bhatt was not terminated by Tesla for just cause. Upon review of the record and briefs filed in this matter, the Board's decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
Facts
Mr. Bhatt was employed by Tesla for three years from October 1, 2002 until he was terminated on May 9, 2005. Mr. Bhatt requested approval of his time off five weeks prior to the requested days so that he could attend his daughter's wedding. His submission was subsequently approved by his supervisor, Roberto Morales, and Mr. Bhatt took his requested time off from work. Upon his return, Mr. Bhatt was terminated from his employment with Tesla for failing to follow the company's vacation request policy that allegedly required the personal approval of the company's president.
As a consequence, Mr. Bhatt filed for unemployment benefits with the Delaware Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance ("DOL"). On May 31, 2005, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(2), the DOL claims deputy determined Mr. Bhatt was ineligible for unemployment benefits. Accordingly, Mr. Bhatt appealed the DOL decision, and on July 7, 2005 a hearing before the Appeals Referee of the Division of Unemployment Insurance was held. Upon hearing testimony from Mr. Bhatt on behalf of himself as well as Frank Mooney, Stefanie Bloothoofd and Roberto Morales on behalf of Tesla, the Appeals Referee determined that Mr. Bhatt did in fact follow Tesla's vacation policy as set forth in the handbook and did not violate any known company policy. Therefore, the Appeals Referee reversed the DOL decision, ruling that Mr. Bhatt was discharged from Tesla without just cause and is qualified to receive unemployment benefits.
19 Del. C. § 3314(2) states, in pertinent part:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (2) For the week in which the individual was discharged from the individual's work for just cause in connection with the individual's work and for each week thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount. . . .
Bhatt v. Tesla Indus., Inc., Determination of Dep't. of Labor Claim No. 236865.
Bhatt v. Tesla Indus., Inc., (Decision of Appeals Referee No. 236865 (July 8, 2005)).
Id.
On July 12, 2005, Tesla filed a timely appeal of the Appeal Referee's decision. A hearing was scheduled for September 20, 2005, but because Mr. Bhatt's attorney was unavailable, the hearing was rescheduled to October 5, 2005. Then, because a Tesla representative was unavailable, the hearing was further postponed until December 14, 2005. On the date of the hearing a Tesla representative called the Board secretary and said that, due to an emergency requiring all of Tesla's management to complete a ground power unit for the United States Navy, Tesla could not attend the hearing. Tesla's request for a continuance was denied, and the Board dismissed Tesla's appeal due to its failure "to appear to prosecute." Tesla immediately requested a rehearing, and on January 11, 2006, the Board issued its opinion denying Tesla's request for a rehearing because 1) Tesla's delivery and completion of the Naval contract was not a satisfactory emergent reason for Tesla to not appear for the Board hearing and 2) the record does not reflect any error or extraordinary circumstances upon which the Board could exercise its discretion in granting a rehearing (the "Board Decision"). Subsequently, on February 2, 2006, Tesla timely filed the appeal of the Board's Decision, and this is the Court's decision on the matter.
R. at 32.
Tesla Indus., Inc. v. Bhatt, UIAB Hearing No. 236865 (Jan.11, 2006).
Standard of Review
According to 19 Del. C. § 3320(a), the Board's power to review an Appeal Referee's decision is very broad; the Board has the discretion to affirm, modify, or reverse a decision from an appeal tribunal. In addition, under 19 Del. C. § 3321(a), the Board's power to rule on a motion for a rehearing is entirely within its discretion. Because of the Board's expansive powers, this Court will not interfere with the rulings of the Board unless there is an abuse of discretion. Under this standard, an abuse of discretion may be found where the discretion is "based on clearly unreasonable or capricious grounds" or Athe Board exceeds the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice."
Clemmons v. Lifecare at Lofland Park, 2003 WL 21090169, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct.).
Funk v. Unemploy. Ins. Appeal Bd., 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991).
Nardi v. Lewis, 2000 WL 303147 (Del.Super.Ct.).
Discussion
Pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3322(a), this Court will only review the merits of a case after the appellant has exhausted all administrative remedies, otherwise this Court is without jurisdiction. In the case sub judice, Tesla failed to timely request a continuance of the December 14, 2005 hearing, and then failed to appear at the Board hearing to prosecute its appeal. Pursuant to Board Regulation 4.2, the Board may dismiss an appeal if a party is not present within ten minutes of the time indicated for the appeal hearing, and the record reflects that Tesla's appeal hearing was scheduled to begin at 9:20 a.m. but by 9:36 a.m. Tesla was still not present. Without Tesla's presence, the Board was unable to address the merits of the case, and simply dismissed Tesla's appeal. As a result, Tesla did not exhaust all administrative remedies prior to this appeal, causing this Court to now lack jurisdiction to review the substantive merits of the case.However, this Court does retain jurisdiction to determine solely whether the Board abused its discretion in denying Tesla's request for a rehearing. To establish the Board Decision was "clearly unreasonable or capricious," Tesla must show that it acted with excusable neglect when it failed to appear before the Board on December 14, 2005. Excusable neglect is more than "mere negligence or carelessness without a valid reason." Rather, the courts can find excusable neglect exists using one of two standards: 1) excusable neglect can be established if a person has a valid reason for his action or inaction or 2) excusable neglect can be established if a reasonable prudent person might have acted similarly under the circumstances. Here, Tesla fails to meet either of these two standards.
Wilson v. Servalli Rest., 1999 WL 1611271, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct.).
Randolph v. Alphonso's II Split Ends, 2007 WL 625370, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct.) (Rule 60(b)(1) requires the appellant to satisfy a three-pronged test to determine whether relief from an order or judgment should be granted, and excusable neglect is one of the three prongs that must be established.), citing Verizon Del., Inc. v. Baldwin Line Constr. Co., 2004 WL 838610, at *1, (Del.Super.Ct.).
Wright v. Quorum Litig. Serv., 1997 WL 524061, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct.); Snyder v. Quicksilver Trucking, 2007 WL 315337, *1 (Del.Super.Ct.) (AExcusable neglect requires more than a showing of mere carelessness or negligence, but neglect which may have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances."), citing Finocchiaro v. Panco Mgmt, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 419.
Id. at *4; Cohen v. Brandywine Raceway Assoc., 238 A.2d 320, 325 (Del.Super.Ct. 1968) (when a party was served with court documents and failed to act upon those documents merely because they were misplaced and forgotten the Court determined the inaction did not rise to the level of excusable neglect.).
Id. (Wright failed to appear at a UIAB hearing because he had a known scheduling conflict. However, the court held that inaction without any justifying circumstances is not a valid reason for failing to appear, and thus does not constitute excusable neglect. Furthermore, Wright's failed attempt to resolve the scheduling conflict, combined with his failure to notify either agency of the scheduling conflict, is not the act of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances and thus does not constitute excusable neglect.).
Pursuant to the Board Regulations, continuance requests are to be made at least six days prior to a scheduled hearing and requests filed thereafter "shall typically be granted only for reasons of unanticipated emergencies." Since Tesla submitted its request on the same day as the hearing, it was required to provide details of an unanticipated emergency." Tesla's request for a rehearing stated, in pertinent part:
We encountered problems with regard to the delivery and completing the manufacturing of a ground power unit for the Navy on the morning of this scheduled hearing. The manufacturing and delivery of this unit was time sensitive in nature, and required the participation of all Tesla Industries management in order to meet the agreed upon deadline.
Based on this request, the Board concluded that Tesla was Afully aware of the deadline for its Navy contract. It chose to deal with the contract in lieu of appearing before the Board." Because the record is devoid of any documentation of the unanticipated urgency of the Naval contract or the significance of that event to the company, except for Tesla's claim that problems arose with regard to its completion, the Court cannot overrule the Board's conclusion or find it to be unreasonable. As an example, there was no information provided to reflect the significance of this contract; the nature of the problem that would require all of its staff to resolve; how the size of the company required such drastic reaction and how it would have prevented sending a representative to the hearing; why the emergency was only discovered on the morning of the hearing; how the failure to resolve this power unit problem could have resulted in the loss of the Navy contract or at least significant penalties and how significant it would be to the company's financial status. In other words, Tesla failed to set forth sufficient information to truly justify that an "unanticipated" problem had arisen that created a significant "emergency" with dramatic consequences to the company if it was not immediately addressed. This lack of information led the Board to conclude that Tesla's failure to participate was simply a business decision which Tesla expected the Board to accommodate, and that does not constitute excusable neglect under either standard. The company could have made its case for a continuance, and if it had done so, would have made it more difficult for the Court to support the Board Decision as there may well have been a valid reason for Tesla's absence. However, with the present record, the Court cannot find the Board Decision to be unreasonable.
The Court notes it is not permitted to substitute its own judgment on whether it would have granted the continuance, but can only determine whether the Board has abused its discretion.
Lastly, the Court notes that there is no indication that Tesla failed to be properly notified of the Board hearing or that Tesla's failure to attend the Board hearing was due to any error of the Board or due to any factor beyond Tesla's control. But instead, Tesla made a conscious choice to not appear before the Board. As a result, Tesla must show the Board it had a valid excuse for its absence from the hearing, and it has failed to establish that such a valid excuse existed. As appropriately stated by the Connors Court:
[T]he Board has statutory and regulatory authority to dismiss claimant's case. Furthermore, where the Board effects its objective of efficiently administering its caseload and where the claimant has failed to provide a valid excuse for failing to appear at his or her hearing, then the Board may dismiss the case.
Connors v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 1996 WL 453327, *2 (Del.Super.Ct.).
Therefore, because Tesla failed to establish that it acted with excusable neglect when it did not appear before the Board, the Court must uphold the Board's discretionary decision to efficiently administer its caseload by dismissing Tesla's appeal and denying Tesla's request for a rehearing. The record reflects that both decisions were neither capricious nor unreasonable based on the information provided by the Appellant to the Board.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.IT IS SO ORDERED.