See Vercher v. Alexander & Alexander Inc., 379 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 2004). Tesch v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 829 F.Supp.2d 483, 493 (W.D. La. 2011)(quoting Anderson v. Cytec Industries, Inc., 619 F.3d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 2010)). See Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., 188 F.3d 287, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1999)(abrogated on other grounds).
In the context of ERISA, awards of prejudgment interest are justified as furthering the congressional policies embodied in the act. Tesch v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 829 F.Supp.2d 483, 502 (W.D. La. 2011). Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to invest the funds in question to inure to the benefit of other beneficiaries of the fund.
Both remedies are available, at the court's discretion, in ERISA cases. See, e.g.,Tesch v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 829 F.Supp.2d 483, 499–502 (W.D. La. 2011). Plaintiff requests that he be allowed to submit a supplemental brief on remedies.
The situation is thus unlike Tesch v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., the principle case on which Mr. Rodrigue relies, where the plaintiff was owed a certain sum of money at a definite time before entry of judgment and therefore required compensation above the nominal amount owed in order to reflect the time-value of that money while he did not have use of it. 829 F. Supp. 2d 483, 502-03 (W.D. La., 2011).
However, based on that same record, the Court cannot find that Unum abused its discretion in not requiring plaintiff to undergo a medical examination, given the results of the objective tests and the thorough consideration of plaintiff's complaints of subjective pain by Drs. Krell, Sentef, and Sternbergh, upon which Unum relied. While many cases, including cases out of this Court, have held that subjective accounts of pain cannot be summarily dismissed, see, e.g., Tesch v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 829 F.Supp.2d 483, 497–99 (W.D.La.2011); Schully v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 634 F.Supp.2d 663, 683 (E.D.La.2009), aff'd380 Fed.Appx. 437 (5th Cir.2010); Audino v. Raytheon Co. Short Term Disability Plan, 129 Fed.Appx. 882, 885 (5th Cir.2005), a plan administrator's decision is not arbitrary or capricious as long as it considers, evaluates, and addresses the claimant's subjective complaints, Corry, 499 F.3d at 401;see also Anderson, 619 F.3d at 514. Unum's final letter of denial noted plaintiff's reports of back pain that prevented him from being able to sit.
Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 273 (citations omitted); Tesch v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 829 F. Supp. 2d 483, 493 (W.D. La. 2011). Lastly, the Supreme Court instructs district courts to "take[] into account" as a "factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion" the conflict of interest arising from a plan administrator's dual role in making benefits determinations and funding the benefit plan. Glenn, 554 U.S. at 115; Holland, 576 F.3d at 247 (citations omitted).
Thus, the attorney fee award should not prove excessive. If LINA is able to fund benefits for other claimants and for the instant plaintiff, there is no apparent reason why it could not satisfy an award for attorney's fees as well. Moreover, an award of attorney's fees in this case may help motivate other conflicted plan administrators to buttress their claims review procedures. See Tesch v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 829 F.Supp.2d 483 (W.D.La.2011) (citation omitted). As to the fourth Bowen factor, the court finds that plaintiff did not seek to benefit any other participants or beneficiaries, or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA. Finally, the court finds that although LINA did not prevail herein, it advanced well-reasoned arguments, that if credited, could have compelled a different outcome.
Accordingly, each such party must therefore "support its motion with credible evidence - using any of the materials specified in Rule 56(c) - that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tesch v. Prudential Ins. Co., 829 F.Supp.2d 483, 492 (W.D. La. 2011). In this case, the parties have essentially stipulated that there is no factual dispute in need of resolution, that the disposition involves legal interpretations of the applicable statutes, and they have each presented opposing motions for summary judgment based upon application of appropriate law.