Opinion
No. 1-18-1944
09-30-2019
ROBERT R. TEPPER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOHER STOLLER, Defendant-Appellant. LEO STOLLER, Counter Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT R. TEPPER, Counter Defendant-Appelee.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County
No. 04 L 3226
Honorable Michael Otto, Judge Presiding
PRESIDING JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McBride and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Appeal dismissed. Appellant's brief failed to comply with requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7).
¶ 2 Leo Stoller appeals from an order of the circuit court denying motions to vacate a revival of judgment pursuant to sections 2-1301 and 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1301, 2-1401 (West 2018).
¶ 3 The procedural history of this case is convoluted but ultimately irrelevant. All that needs to be known is this: In April 2001, plaintiff Robert Tepper obtained a judgment against Christopher Stoller for unpaid attorney fees. The judgment was revived in 2008, and when that revival was nearing its expiration in April 2018, Tepper filed a petition seeking to again revive the judgment.
¶ 4 In response to Tepper's April 2018 petition to revive, Leo Stoller—not Christopher Stoller, the actual judgment debtor—filed a section 2-1401 petition seeking to vacate the April 2001 judgment against Christopher. That petition, which was signed by attorney Phillip Kiss, contained, among other statements, the allegation that
"Tepper's Revived Judgment *** represents an ongoing pattern of 'fraud on the court' since, Tepper first fraudulently induced a judge to enter his 'void' judgment for $100,530.97 on April 26,2011, four months before the Arabs attacked and destroyed the Twin Towers in New York, against a mentally incompetent person Christopher Stoller, was void ab initio."
As to why Leo Stoller, not Christopher Stoller, was bringing the petition, Leo alleged in a footnote that "Christopher Stoller a 69-year-old disabled person, a protected person under the Americans for Disability had assigned to Leo Stoller ASSIGNMENT OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION, ASSIGNMENT OF PROCEEDS." (Emphasis in original.)
¶ 5 On August 23, 2018, the circuit court granted Tepper's petition to revive the judgment. On August 30, 2018, Leo filed a petition to vacate the August 23 order pursuant to section 2
1301 of the Code. That petition was also signed by attorney Kiss and, like the section 2-1401 petition before it, included another reference to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
¶ 6 On September 6, 2018, the circuit court entered an order denying Leo's 2-1301 and 2-1401 petitions on the basis that Leo lacked standing to file them. This appeal followed.
¶ 7 With respect to the denial of his section 2-1301 petition, Leo argues that "[s]ubstantial justice will NOT be done" if the circuit court's order reviving the judgment is not reversed. (Emphasis in original.) He then adds: "This case should be decided on the merits, rather than a technicality." That represents the entirety of his argument.
¶ 8 As for his section 2-1401 argument, his whole argument is that "[s]ubstantial justice will NOT be done" if the denial of his section 2-1401 petition is not reversed, and that "[i]t is not unreasonable to compel Plaintiff to pursue his case on the merits."
¶ 9 An appellant seeking reversal of a court order must provide a cogent, thought-out, coherent argument articulating the basis upon which reversal is justified. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018). Simply telling us that "substantial justice" requires reversal, without more, clearly does not satisfy this burden. We can discern no meaningful argument and thus no basis whatsoever to overturn the trial court's rulings. "Reviewing courts will not search the record for purposes of finding error * * * when an appellant has made no good-faith effort to comply with the supreme court rules governing the contents of briefs." Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality, LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 15 (quoting In re Estate of Parker, 2011 IL App (1st) 102871, ¶ 47).
¶ 10 Because Leo's appellate brief comes nowhere close to complying with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7), we dismiss this appeal.
¶ 11 Appeal dismissed.