Opinion
No. C 00-03868 WHA
August 29, 2001
INTRODUCTION
In this Section 1983 case, this order holds that the federal cause of action asserted is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
STATEMENT
Plaintiff Teddy Tene brings this civil-rights action against defendants San Francisco; the San Francisco Police Department; the San Francisco Sheriffs Department; Linda Connelly Associates, Inc., a criminal justice/social service agency; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive. On November 5, 1997, a San Francisco grand jury indicted plaintiff for violation of Section 182(a).1 (criminal conspiracy) and Section 368(c) (infliction of physical pain or mental suffering on an elder or dependent adult) of the California Penal Code, both felonies. A bench warrant was issued for plaintiffs arrest, which was effectuated on November 6, 1997. Plaintiff was placed on borne detention by the sheriff's department while the police investigation into the alleged conspiracy continued. Plaintiff alleges that this detention occured "forcibly" and "without any procedural protection whatsoever" (Compl. ¶ 14). "The complaint states that under the terms of his home detention, plaintiff was not allowed to contact his mother, two brothers, and sister, nor "to do anything on their behalf (Compl. ¶ 12); nor could he seek employment or enroll in school (Compl. ¶ 12). After slightly less than twenty months, all charges against plaintiff were dropped (on June 24, 1999). On December 23, 1999, plaintiff filed an administrative notice of his claim with San Francisco. The claim contained the Following "Basis of Claim":
Claimant was wrongfully indicted for fraud without any reasonable basis for the same and was done (sic) maliciously. All charges against claimant were dismissed on 6-24-99. Claimants (sic) civil rights were also violated in that claimant was incarcerated and/or in custody for a period of approximately 21 months without any probable cause and without any due process (Pl. Exh. 2).
San Francisco responded on January 27, 2000, with a notice of action on the claim in the form of a letter. That letter told plaintiff, inter alia, that "[s]ubject to certain exceptions, you have only six (6) months from the date this notice was personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file a state court action on this claim" (Pl. Exh. 3).
Within the six-month period specified in the letter, plaintiff lifed the instant suit in San Francisco Superior Court on July 24, 2000. His complaint alleged that the defendants' activities violated the due process clauses of the United States and California constitutions and exposed them to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint sought damages, declaratory relief, and attorney's fees and costs. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, defendants filed a notice of removal of action to this Court on October 19, 2000. Now, all defendants have filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under FRCP 12(c), along with a request that the Court take judicial notice of the indictment and bench warrant that led to plaintiffs arrest. Along with his opposition to this motion, plaintiff filed a request to amend his complaint and a proposed amended complaint (Morgan Decl. ¶ 6).
ANALYSIS
Before turning to the merits, it is necessary to note that the Court, as requested and without objection, will take judicial notice of the grand jury indictment and bench warrant that precipitated plaintiff's arrest. And, the Court will give plaintiff the benefit of the proposed amended complaint in ruling on the motion. Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings itself asserts that plaintiff's suit is barred by the statute of limitations.
1. Legal Standard
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial. any party may move under FRCP 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings. A motiob fbr judgment on the pleadings is proper when, even if all material Licts in the pleading under attack are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When deciding a Rule 12 (c) motion, a court must assume the truthfulness of facts alleged in the complaint, and construe all inferences reasonably drawn from those facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Hal Roach Studios v Richard Feiner Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990).
2. Federal Claims
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that the conditions placed upon his home detention violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution insofar as they denied him of liberty and associational rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments (First Amd. Compl. ¶ 15). Plaintiff seeks relief directly under the United States Constitution and via 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff's federal-law causes of action merit some clarification. A plaintiff may not sue a state defendant directly under the United States Constitution where 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy, even if that remedy is not available to the plaintiff. Martimez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1382 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs federal due process and equal protection grievances are best viewed as a necessary element of any valid Section 1983 cause of action he may possess.
Plaintiff also requests, without citing an independent jurisdictional basis, a declaratory judgment holding that defendants' home detention policy violates the due process clauses of the United States and California state constitutions. To demonstrate that a case or controversy exists sufficient to satisfy the Article III standing requirement when a plaintiff is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it appears there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer an injury in the future. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 171-73 (1977). This case-or-controversy requirement is not satisfied by general assertions or inferences that in the course of their activities parties will be prosecuted for violating valid criminal laws. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts leading to the inference that there is a "substantial likelihood" he will suffer an injury in the future. Furthermore, standing to seek damages in federal court does not by itself grant standing to pursue equitable relief. Hodgei-s-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1999). Regardless of the validity of his Section 1983 claim, plaintiff does not have standing to bring a claim for declaratory relief.
A Section 1983 plaintiff must satisfy the forum state's statute of limitations for personal-injury torts. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). In California, the applicable statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is the one-year period set forth at California Civil Procedure Code Section 340(3). Silva v. Grain. 169 F.3d 6O8, 610 (9th Cir. 1999). Federal law determines when a cause of action under Section 1 983 accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run. Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994). Under federal law, a cause of action generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of his or her actiom TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999).
In general, a cause of action under Section 1983 fir visitation denials acemnes at time time the restriction was imposed. See Knox v. Davis, No. 98-55871, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17671, at *910 (9th Cir., Aug. 8, 2001). But the statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions for money damages is tolled for tip to two years when an individual is. "at the time the cause of action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal charge." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Sec. 352.1(c). Though it is unresolved whether an individual under house arrest is "imprisoned" under the meaning of this statute, in other contexts the term has been construed broadly. See, e.g., Bledstein v. Superior Court, 162 Cal.App.3d 152, 167-69 (1984) (holding that tolling applies while prisoner is in halfway house). For the purposes of this motion, therefore, this Court will assume that plaintiff was "imprisoned" while under home detention, tolling the statute of limitations on his Section 1983 cause of action for damages even though the conditions placed upon plaintiffs confinement were known to him since Day One of his detention until June 24, 1999, the date of his release.
But even given this credit, plaintiff's filing of suit on July 24, 2000, occurred a full thirteen months afler he was released. Thus, his lawsuit was commenced too late. During the briefing and oral argument, much consideration was given to whether plaintiffs submission of an administrative claim within the thirteen-month period tolled the statute of limitations San Francisco's letter said plaintiff could sue within six months, and he did so. One muight think, therefore, that the defendants would be estopped from asserting any statute of limitations defense, at least as to the causes of action set fbrth in his administrative claim.
It is noted that several decisions in this district have categorically declined to enter into an equitable tolling inquiry where, as here, a plaintiff has first filed a notice of claim under the California Tort Claims Act, then later files a time-barred Section 1983 action. See Murray v. Garberville Highway Patrol, No. C 99-4567 CRB, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19017, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 1999); Thorne v. County of Humboldt, No. C 98-2470 THE, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19355, at *9, fn. 2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1998); Biteng v. City of Santa Rosa, No. 98-01800 MJJ, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11548, at *67 (N.D. Cal. July 1998); Stone v. San Francisco, 735 F. Supp. 340, 345 (ND. Cal. 1990). But the leading California case on the subject, Loehr v. Ventura County Comm. Coll. Dist., 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1085-86 (1983), did in fact apply Colher's equitable tolling factors, concluding that "[u]nder the circumstances" the statute of limitations would not be equitably tolled. Id. at 1085.
But this is not the same theory Mr. Morgan, plaintiffs counsel, wishes to pursue in the present suit. He states in his brief that plaintiffs causes of action are not for "`false imprisonment,' as asserted by defendants, but rather for the deprivation, without due process, of the rights of plaintiff guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of California" (Br. at 2). These purported transgressions concern the restrictions placed on plaintiffs ability to contact his family and pursue education amid employment (Br. at 3-4), not the fact of the detention itself. Plaintiffs administrative claim is therefore of no aid to him with respect to alleged equitable tolling, because it concerned wrongs other than the one he now seeks to address. "As the courts have explained for years, the equitable tolling doctrine requires that the same wrong serve as the predicate for the earlier and later proceedings to make sure defendant received proper notice." Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001) (en bane). Accord, Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. Superior Court, 177 Cal.App.3d 950, 956 (1986).
Equitable tolling, therefore, is not available for plaintiff's current cause of action. Having been submitted outside the one-year statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983, it must be dismissed.
3. State Claims
Plaintiff also argues that the conditions placed upon his home detention violated the due process clause of Article I, Section 7(a), of the California state constitution, as well as (in his brief) Article 1, Section 2, of flie California constitution. His complaint does not allege any traditional state-law tort causes of action. In light of plaintiff's decision to proceed directly under the state constitution, this Court declines to exert supplemental jurisdiction over these claims under the authority of both 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) and (e)(3). See Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993-94 (9th Cir. 1991); Carlsbad Aquafarm, Inc. v. States Dep't Health Serv., 83 Cal.App.4th 809, 818-19 (2000); Bonner v. Gity of Santa Ana, 45 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1478 (1996).
CONCLUSION
Defendants' request forjudicial notice is GRANTED. Plaintiffs request to amend his complaint is deemed GRANTED. Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) as to plaintiffs federal-law claims is GRANTED, even as to the amended complaint. Plaintiffs federal-law claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk shall REMAND the case to the Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco and shall then CLOSE the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.