. Specifically, landlord asserted that: (1) "[i]t is undisputed that subsidized landlords cannot terminate a tenancy or refuse to renew a lease without good cause," Landlord Brf. at p. 3 (citing 24 C.F.R. 966.4(1)(2)(i) and 42 U.S.C. § 1437f); and (2) "[i]t is undisputed, and remarkably clear from settled New Jersey precedent that a landlord may not refuse to renew the lease of a subsidized tenant without good cause," Landlord Brf. at p.3 (citing Templeton Arms v. Feins, 220 N.J.Super. 1 (App. Div. 1987)). Landlord also argued that the Montgomery Gateway decision was "overruled" by N.J.S.A. § 52:27D-287.9(a), a statutory provision enacted in 2021 that addresses aspects of eviction proceedings in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic
136 Cong. Rec. H 7138, supra. It is clear, therefore, that, both during the initial compliance period and during the extended use period, a landlord participating in the § 42 tax credit program may not terminate the tenancy of a low-income tenant other than for good cause. See Cimarron Village v. Washington, 659 N.W.2d 811 (Minn.App. 2003); Templeton Arms v. Feins, 531 A.2d 361 (N.J. Super. 1987). Effect on Tenant Holding Over Statute
We believe Tenant's construction of the requirements in the lease and lease addendum are inconsistent with the federal law upon which they are based. {13} Under prior statutory versions of the Section 8 housing program, a number of courts held that good cause was required for the non-renewal of Section 8 leases, the same as it is required for mid-lease terminations, see, e.g., Mitchell v. United States Dep't of Hous. Urban Dev., 569 F. Supp. 701, 710 (N.D.Cal. 1983); Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 502 F. Supp. 362, 367 (W.D.N.C. 1980); Templeton Arms v. Feins, 531 A.2d 361, 366 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 1987); Rushie v. Berland, 502 N.Y.S.2d 359, 360-61 (N.Y.App. Term. 1986) (per curiam). Prior to 1996, Section 1437f(d)(1)(B)(ii) only provided that "the owner shall not terminate the tenancy except for serious or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the lease, for violation of applicable Federal, State, or local law, or for other good cause."
Div. 2007) (quoting Delaware Valley Wholesale Florist, Inc. v. Addalia, 349 N.J.Super. 228, 232 (App. Div. 2002)); see also Templeton Arms v. Feins, 220 N.J.Super. 1, 21 (App. Div. 1987) ("The good cause standard, then, is flexible, taking its shape from the particular facts to which it is applied."). Accordingly, "[w]hat constitutes good cause or delay will depend upon the circumstances."
The court first noted that the record did not support the landlord's assertion that the Section 8 program requirements were overly burdensome, but then stated that "[t]o permit a landlord to decline participation in the Section 8 program in order to avoid the 'bureaucracy' of the program would create the risk that '[i]f all landlords . . . did not want to "fill out the forms" then there would be no Section 8 housing available.'" Id. at 1114, quoting in part from Templeton Arms v. Feins, 220 N.J.Super. 1, 531 A.2d 361 (App.Div. 1987). In a 1987 decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court construed that State's anti-discrimination law as allowing an administrative burden defense and vacated a summary judgment in favor of the Attorney General because there were issues of fact bearing on that defense.
To permit a landlord to decline participation in the Section 8 program in order to avoid the "bureaucracy" of the program would create the risk that "[i]f all landlords . . . did not want to `fill out the forms' then there would be no Section 8 housing available." Templeton Arms v. Feins, 220 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App.Div. 198 7). We note that N.J.S.A. 2A:42-100 exempts only owner-occupied houses with no more than two units, and that therefore our decision will apply to smaller residential units such as three and four-family buildings. Nevertheless, we anticipate that the impact of our decision will not impose significantly greater burdens on owners of small buildings than on owners of larger ones. Nothing in the record before us suggests that compliance with the requirements of the Section 8 program is more onerous for the owner of a three-family house than for the owner of a large apartment building.
Id., 12233. Furthermore, in Templeton Arms v. Feins, 220 N.J. Super. 1, 16-17, 531 A.2d 361 (1987), the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court specifically addressed the relationship between "good cause" and "good faith" in the context of termination of a 8 tenancy. "The good cause standard . . . is flexible, taking its shape from the particular facts to which it is applied.
The owner does not have to show good cause against the current tenant, but good cause to discontinue renting to Section 8 tenants altogether. See Templeton Arms v. Feins, 220 N.J.Super 1, 531 A.2d 361, 369-73 (App.Div. 1987) (discussing good cause standards for opting out). This "procedural morass" is the final general concern with the Section 8 program mentioned by Sullivan Associates.
The owner does not have to show good cause against the current tenant, but good cause to discontinue renting to Section 8 tenants altogether. See Templeton Arms v. Feins, 220 N.J.Super 1, 531 A.2d 361, 369-72, cert. denied, 109 N.J. 489, 537 A.2d 1282 (1987) (discussing good cause standards for opting out). The notice must contain sufficient detail to enable the HUD field office to evaluate whether the owner has good cause and whether there are additional actions that can be taken by HUD to avoid the termination, and "must state that the owner and the housing authority may agree to a renewal of the HAP contract, thus avoiding the termination."
See Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 214 (1997) ("Although 'good cause' is not statutorily defined [in the Unemployment Compensation Act], New Jersey courts have construed the phrase to mean cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed." (internal quotation omitted)); Templeton Arms v. Feins, 220 N.J. Super. 1, 21 (App. Div. 1987) ("The good cause standard, then, is flexible, taking its shape from the particular facts to which it is applied. Good cause is distinct from good faith, although good faith is relevant in evaluating good cause.").