Summary
noting court — eight days after court clerk entered default — ordered complaint would be dismissed for lack of prosecution unless plaintiff immediately moved for entry of judgment by default
Summary of this case from N.C.W.C., Inc. v. National Auto Warranty Services, Inc.Opinion
3:01-CV-1748 (FJS/GJD).
August 3, 2004.
JAMES R. MULDOON, ESQ., WALL MARJAMA BILINSKY, LLP, Syracuse, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
SEOUL INFORMATION INDUSTRIAL, INC., for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for default judgment as to Defendant Seoul Information Industrial, Inc. ("Seoul") pursuant to Rule 55(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that it owns U.S. Patent No. 5,830,055, which consists of a coin/token changing machine. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Seoul violated 35 U.S.C. § 271 by making, using and selling an infringing machine in this District and in other areas internationally.
Plaintiff alleges that, after filing its complaint, it diligently attempted to serve Defendant Seoul in compliance with the Hague Convention on Service Abroad. Plaintiff succeeded in doing so on April 22, 2003. Defendant Seoul failed to appear, and, on November 6, 2003, the Clerk entered default against Defendant Seoul. By letter dated November 14, 2003, the Court notified Plaintiff that it must file a motion for entry of a default judgment on the issue of liability or face dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute. The Court further ordered that, if Plaintiff moved for default judgment, Defendant would have to respond on or before February 9, 2004. Plaintiff complied and filed the instant motion.
Defendant Seoul has never appeared in this action.
Defendant Seoul returned the summons executed on February 3, 2003; accordingly, sufficiency of service is not at issue in this motion. See Dkt. No. 13; see also Thomas v. Biocine Sclavo, S.P.A., No. Civ 94CV1568, 1998 WL 51861 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1998).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Default Judgment StandardThe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe a two-step process to enter judgment by default. See Thomas v. Biocine Sclavo, S.P.A., No. 94CV1568, 1998 WL 51861, *2-*3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1998). Under Rule 55(a), a clerk must first enter the default against a party who fails to plead or otherwise defend. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). The party seeking entry of default must provide evidence that the entry of default is appropriate. See id. The second step in the process requires that a plaintiff move the court for default judgment. See Thomas, 1998 WL 51861, at *3. In considering a motion for default judgment, the court will treat the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true, and the court will then analyze those facts for their sufficiency to state a claim. See id. at *3-*4 (citations omitted).
With these standards in mind, the Court will address Plaintiff's claims.
B. Plaintiff's causes of action for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 et seq.
To establish a prima facie patent infringement claim, a plaintiff must plead (1) that the trial court has jurisdiction over the matter; (2) that the plaintiff has title to the patent; (3) that the plaintiff is the original and first inventor who was subject to infringement; (4) the claims of the patent which the defendant has infringed and (5) that the defendant received notice of the infringement. See 60 Am.Jur.2d Patents § 875 (2003) (footnotes omitted); see also Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc. v. New Wave Dental, Inc., No. 01-CV-0211E, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25514 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2002).
Plaintiff alleges that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1338(a) and personal jurisdiction over Defendant Seoul because Defendant Seoul has committed patent infringement within this District. Plaintiff alleges further that it owns a valid United States patent for a "Coin Token Canister and Ejection Mechanism." See First Amended Complaint at ¶ 12. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Seoul has willfully violated this exclusive patent by "making, using, selling and/or offering for sale their coin/token changer products." See id. at ¶ 13. In light of these allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint is sufficient to give notice to Defendant Seoul and to allow it to answer and formulate a defense. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for a default judgment on the issue of liability.
Plaintiff has failed to indicate exactly which claims it alleges Defendant Seoul infringed. Nevertheless, courts will only hold that a complaint is not sufficiently well-pled in narrow, exceptional circumstances, such as when the complaint contains "allegations which are contrary to facts of which the court will take judicial notice, or which are not susceptible of proof by legitimate evidence, or which are contrary to uncontroverted material in the file of the case." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified on other grounds, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973). Plaintiff's complaint contains no contrary allegations, and the record in this case is largely non-existent. Therefore, these deficiencies are an insufficient basis for the Court to deny Plaintiff's motion for a default judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully considering the file in this matter and the parties' submissions, as well as the applicable law, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion for a default judgment against Defendant Seoul Information Industrial, Inc., is GRANTED with respect to the issue of liability; and the Court further
ORDERS that this case is remanded to Magistrate Judge Gustave J. DiBianco to set a discovery schedule.
At the conclusion of discovery, Plaintiff shall file a motion for entry of a default judgment on the issue of damages, with service of the motion on Defendant Seoul, within thirty days of the end of the discovery period. Assuming that there is no opposition to that motion, the Court will review Plaintiff's submissions and make a determination whether it can decide the motion based upon Plaintiff's written submissions or will need to schedule a hearing on the matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.