foreclose Plaintiff's theory of liability because it is at best persuasive authority. Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended (May 18, 2000) (“[P]roposed regulations carry no more weight than a position advanced on brief.” (quoting Estate of Howard v. Commissioner, 910 F.2d 634, 637 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (Rymer, J., dissenting))).

In the Ninth Circuit, "proposed regulations carry no more weight than a position advanced on brief." Tedori v. United States , 211 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). If the proposed rule were to become final, it would be entitled to deference by this Court under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), but such is not the case here.

In the Ninth Circuit, “proposed regulations carry no more weight than a position advanced on brief.” Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). The proposed rule purports to interpret the statutory language of the Clean Water Act.

These cases, however, do not reach a Chevron analysis. See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Maxwell–Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 654 (9th Cir.2009) (suit by Medi–Cal providers and recipients seeking to enjoin the state Medicaid director from implementing rate reductions, in which the Ninth Circuit clarified that Orthopaedic II remained valid after Sanchez, and cited Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586–88, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) for the proposition that deference to an agency opinion expressed in the course of litigation is limited to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations); Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir.2000) (suit by taxpayers challenging the denial of an interest deduction, in which the Ninth Circuit concluded that proposed regulations carry no more weight than a position advanced in a brief). The Secretary argues that even an implicit agency policy is entitled to Chevron deference if Congress has clearly delegated authority to the agency to interpret the relevant statute—that the more express the delegation of authority, the less formal the agency's policy must be. The Secretary asserts that Congress has expressly delegated to her the broad discretion to determine whether state Medicaid plans comply with the requirements of federal law.

It is the shareholders who have a tax obligation, either in the form of a deemed distribution or an actual distribution at the time of the distribution. See e.g., Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 489-490 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining IC-DISC and payments to IC-DISC shareholders); Thomas Intern. Ltd. v. United States, 773 F.2d 300, 301 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Instead, part of the DISC's earnings are taxed to its shareholder(s) as constructive dividends and the remainder is taxed only when actually distributed"); Hellwig, 2011 WL 821090, *5 (" the DISC's shareholders are currently taxed on a portion of the DISC's earnings in the form of a deemed distribution.").

It is the shareholders who have a tax obligation, either in the form of a deemed distribution or an actual distribution at the time of the distribution. See e.g., Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 489-490 (9th Cir. 2000)(explaining IC-DISC and payments to IC-DISC shareholders); Thomas Intern. Ltd. v. United States, 773 F.2d 300, 301 (Fed.Cir. 1985)("Instead, part of the DISC's earnings are taxed to its shareholder(s) as constructive dividends and the remainder is taxed only when actually distributed"); Hellwig, 2011 WL 821090, *5 (" the DISC's shareholders are currently taxed on a portion of the DISC's earnings in the form of a deemed distribution.").

Kikalos v. Commissioner, 190 F.3d at 797; McDonnell v. United States, 180 F.3d at 723; Allen v. United States, 173 F.3d at 536 (describing the term “properly allocable” as “manifestly ambiguous”); Redlark v. Commissioner, 141 F.3d at 940 (describing as “untenable” the “assertion that the words, ‘properly allocable’, unambiguously specify that interest on business-related personal income tax deficiencies should be deductible”); Miller v. United States, 65 F.3d at 690 (describing Congress's failure to “define what constitutes business interest” as “an implicit legislative delegation of authority to the Commissioner to clarify whether income tax deficiency interest is ‘properly allocable to a trade or business.” ’); see also Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 493 (9th Cir.2000) (stating “ ‘the common and ordinary meaning’ of the statutory phrase ‘properly allocable to a trade or business' is not at all plain”). We conclude that section 163(h)(2)(A) is silent or ambiguous.

The court is mindful of established rules of administrative law which provide that proposed regulations have no legal effect and are not entitled to deference. See, e.g., Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 2001). The court is also mindful of established rules of construction that caution against relying on the views of a legislature to interpret the meaning of a law written by a previous legislature.

That this quoted language does not mention a duty to monitor and manage Indian landowner leases is inapposite to finding such a duty. First, as the plaintiffs point out, the language quoted is from a proposed rulemaking that was never adopted, and is thus entitled to no deference. Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing In re AppleTree Mkts, Inc., 19 F.3d 969, 973 (5th Cir. 1994) ("proposed regulations are entitled to no deference until final"); LeCroy Research Sys. Corp. v. Comm'r, 751 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Proposed regulations are suggestions made for comment; they modify nothing")). While similarities between the proposed and adopted versions exist, differences are present. Explanation in the final rule promulgated on January 22, 2001 states that the BIA, in response to comments following the proposed rulemaking notice, "strengthened the provisions for the BIA's enforcement of leases and permits on trust and restricted lands."

Nor are these principles different simply because the IRS allows a proposed regulation to linger, unadopted, over a long period of time.See, e.g., Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 2000); Matter of Appletree Markets, Inc., 19 F.3d 969, 973 (5th Cir. 1994); Oakley v. City of Longmont, 890 F.2d 1128, 1130 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990); LeCroy Research Systems Corp. v. United States, 751 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1984); Zinniel v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 357, 369 (1987), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1989); see also 1 Mertens at § 3:38.See, e.g., Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 525, 529 n. 13 (1991); Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 108, 118 (1983), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Blackfeet Nat'l Bank v. Rubin, 890 F. Supp. 48, 52-54 (D.D.C. 1995) ("[P]roposed regulations do not purport to regulate current conduct by the parties . . . [and] do not have the status of law or require anyone to comply with them in any matter."), aff'd, 67 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Estate of Leavitt v. Comm'r, 1988 WL 8227, at * 18 (Tax Ct. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1989) ("Proposed regulations are only preliminary proposals; they are