Opinion
A149953
01-23-2017
In re D.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. T.D., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SOLANO COUNTY, Respondent; SOLANO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Solano County Super. Ct. No. J43102) MEMORANDUM OPINION
We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1(1), (3). The factual circumstances underlying Mother's claims are summarized in our prior decision, In re D.M. (Oct. 25, 2016, No. A147229) [nonpub.], 2016 Cal.App. Lexis 8141, and in Mother's petition and the response of the Solano County Department of Health and Social Services (the Department).
Petitioner T.D. (Mother) files a petition for an extraordinary writ seeking review of the court order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and a permanent plan for 10-year-old D.M. D.M. was the subject of a dependency petition filed in August 2015, which alleged Mother had failed to provide adequate medical care and treatment for D.M.'s serious and chronic medical condition and that Mother left D.M. home alone and unsupervised. D.M. was found to be a dependent of the court and reunification services were granted to Mother. On November 7, 2016, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing for February 28, 2017.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise identified.
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in terminating reunification services because there was not substantial evidence that reasonable services had been provided to her. We deny the writ petition on the merits.
We review the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were offered under the substantial evidence test. (Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1346.) "[O]ur sole task on review is to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided or offered. [Citations.]" (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762). " 'When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing evidence, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value—to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971 (Alvin R.).)
The purpose of reunification efforts is to "eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child. This furthers the goal of preservation of family, whenever possible. [Citation.]" (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478.) However, it is also the "intent of the Legislature, especially with regard to young children, . . . that the dependency process proceed with deliberate speed and without undue delay. [Citations.]" (Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.)
Mother's reunification plan and services were focused on treating her substance abuse, providing mental health treatment, and developing her parenting skills to meet D.M.'s physical, emotional, medical, and educational needs.
In arguing her reunification services were not adequate, Mother focuses on a single aspect of the proposed reunification program: the failure to perform a psychological evaluation. She contends that there was an ongoing court order for a psychological evaluation but no efforts were made to schedule it. The purpose of the evaluation was to guide the Department in seeking appropriate mental health care for Mother. Mother had already been diagnosed with various mental health problems since as early as age 16. She is alleged to have suffered from polysubstance abuse and a personality disorder, as well as posttraumatic stress disorder and anxiety. Although it is possible a psychological evaluation might have uncovered other or different issues or given more guidance to potential therapists, we cannot conclude the failure to perform such an assessment rendered the reunification services inadequate, given the numerous mental health services offered Mother. If Mother had taken advantage of any of the referrals, she could have obtained both mental health treatment and additional evaluation and diagnosis.
The Department notes in its response that neither Mother nor her counsel raised this issue before the juvenile court. It is, however, the Department's duty to provide reasonable services, even absent a request from the parent. To the extent Mother complains about the adequacy of the services provided, "[a] parent is 'not required to complain about the lack of reunification services as a prerequisite to the department fulfilling its statutory obligations.' [Citation.]" (Melinda K. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158.) Thus, a parent does not forfeit the issue by failing to raise it in the juvenile court. (Ibid.) Further, a contention that a required finding is not supported by substantial evidence is not waived by the failure to raise it in the juvenile court. (In re P.C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 279, 287-288.) --------
"The 'adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [agency's] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.' [Citation.] To support a finding reasonable services were offered or provided, 'the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .' [Citation.]" (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1426 (Tracy J.).) "In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances." (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547; see also Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 972 ["Reunification services need not be perfect."].)
The social worker's repeated efforts to connect Mother with both substance abuse and mental health services distinguish this case from In re K.C. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 323, 329 (K.C.) cited by Mother. In K.C., the appellate court found the social services agency had not provided sufficient assistance to a parent in obtaining a psychotropic medication evaluation. The agency's only attempt to secure the medication was to send the parent to a public clinic. The parent was rejected on three separate visits, and the agency did not help the parent obtain other services. (Ibid.)
Here, in both the six- and 12-month status reports, the Department documented that Mother had been "very difficult to communicate with during this reporting period and in turn, it has been difficult to try and provide her services." The social worker documented her numerous attempts to contact mother: three times in September 2015, once in October 2015, six times in November 2015, twice in both December 2015 and January 2016, five times in February 2016, five times in March 2016, four times in April 2016, seven times in May 2016, twice in June 2016, six times in July 2016, and four times in August 2016. The social worker successfully contacted Mother on only three occasions during the 12-month period, so she was forced to make unannounced visits during Mother's visitation with D.M.
Mother was referred to the Solano County Department of Mental Health Services but did not follow through with the referral. Mother expressed a desire to use Rectory for Women in San Pablo, so the social worker contacted them. Mother completed the intake assessment but never joined the program. The social worker offered inpatient treatment programs and contact information for Access Mental Health on six occasions and even offered to provide transportation to an assessment at Center Point Treatment Center in San Rafael. She also referred Mother to the Behavioral Health Assessment team, but Mother did not engage with these services. In addition, the social worker requested Mother submit to drug testing 10 times during the reporting period and Mother missed all 10 tests.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Department made reasonable efforts to provide Mother with reunification services. Mother's resistance limited the Department's ability to provide her with the services she needed for reunification. (See In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 417-418 [parent's resistance to participating in services supported conclusion agency made a good faith effort to provide services under the circumstances].)
Reunification services are voluntary and cannot be forced on an unwilling parent. (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233.) A social worker is not required to " 'take the parent by the hand and escort him or her to and through classes or counseling sessions.' " (Ibid.) The Department took reasonable steps to guide Mother to appropriate mental health treatment, but Mother refused to take advantage of what was offered to her. The failure of the Department to successfully perform a psychological evaluation on Mother did not render the reunification services inadequate and was of limited significance given Mother's failure to engage in substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, and other aspects of her case plan.
The petition for writ of mandate is denied on the merits. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(C); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) The request for a stay is denied. Our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
/s/_________
RUVOLO, P. J. We concur: /s/_________
RIVERA, J. /s/_________
STREETER, J.