Opinion
No. 00-CV-72292-DT
January 29, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER ON REMAND DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This matter is before the Court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Eric W. Taylor, ("petitioner"), presently confined at the Southern Michigan Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons stated below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus shall be denied.
I. Background
Petitioner originally filed an application for writ of habeas corpus with this Court on May 19, 2000. In his pro se application, petitioner challenged his conviction on one count of second degree murder, M.C.L.A. 750.317; M.S.A. 28.549, one count of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, M.C.L.A. 750.84; M.S.A. 28.279; one count of carrying a concealed weapon, M.C.L.A. 750.227; M.S.A. 28.424; and one count of felony-firearm. M.C.L.A. 750.227b; M.S.A. 28.424(2). Petitioner raised the following four claims for relief:
Petitioner was incarcerated at the Michigan Reformatory in Ionia, Michigan when he originally filed this petition.
I. Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus must be granted because the trial court, in denying petitioner's request to instruct the jury on his theory of self-defense, which was timely and supported by the evidence, deprived petitioner of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
II. Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus must be granted because the trial court, in denying petitioner's request to instruct the jury on his theory of imperfect self-defense, which was timely and supported by the evidence, deprived petitioner of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
III. Petitioner's writ should be granted where the trial court, by improperly preventing his counsel from adducing evidence of the victim's character as to violence through testimony of prior acts of carrying and brandishing a gun, violated his constitutional right to present a defense.
IV. Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus should be granted where two substitute judges presided over the trial after the evidence had been concluded and the jury had been instructed but before a verdict had been rendered and additional instructions had to be given to the jury, thus depriving petitioner of a fair and impartial jury trial and his due process rights.
On May 31, 2001, this Court granted petitioner a writ of habeas corpus on his first two claims, finding that the state trial court had violated petitioner's federal constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury on the defenses of self-defense and imperfect self-defense. Taylor v. Withrow, 154 F. Supp.2d 1037 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Because this Court granted petitioner habeas relief on his first two claims, this Court believed that it was unnecessary to address petitioner's two remaining claims. Id. at 1047.
On March 28, 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed this Court's grant of the writ and remanded the matter to this Court for further proceedings. Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846 (6th Cir. 2002); reh. den. June 5, 2002; cert. den. 123 S.Ct. 490 (2002). On remand, this Court will dissolve the writ with respect to the first two claims for which habeas relief had originally been granted. The Court will also address petitioner's two remaining claims.
This Court adopts the statement of facts from petitioner's case as recited in its original opinion and order granting habeas relief. Taylor v. Withrow, 154 F. Supp.2d at 1039-1041. These facts were essentially adopted by the Sixth Circuit in its opinion as well. Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d at 849-850.
II. Standard of Review
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.
III. Discussion
A. Claim #3. The trial court's exclusion of evidence that the victim carried a firearm.
In his third claim, petitioner contends that the trial court erred in not allowing the defense to introduce evidence that the victim had carried and brandished a weapon on past occasions, arguing that this evidence was relevant to support petitioner's claim that he had shot the victim in self-defense.
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected this claim for the same reason that it rejected petitioner's first two claims, namely, that petitioner's theory had been that he shot the victim accidentally and not in self-defense. Because petitioner testified that the gun went off accidentally during a struggle with two other people, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that evidence of the victim's character was irrelevant. People v. Taylor, 187231, *2 (Mich.Ct.App. July 18, 1997).
Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he also has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of the due process of law. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (the rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses on one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process). Defendants have a Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses that are both material and favorable. Taylor v. Singletary, 122 F.3d 1390, 1394 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing to United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982)).
Petitioner's third claim must be rejected for the same reason that the Sixth Circuit reversed this Court's decision to grant habeas relief to petitioner on his first two claims. In reversing this Court, the Sixth Circuit held that the state trial court's ruling that there was no evidence of justified self-defense, and its consequent refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense and imperfect self-defense, did not involve either an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, where petitioner testified at trial that he pulled the gun as a defensive act but did not intentionally shoot the victim to defend himself, testifying instead that the gun discharged accidentally. Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d at 852-854.
This Court is required to follow the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Taylor v. Withrow, supra and therefore concludes that it was neither an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts for the state trial court to refuse to admit evidence concerning the victim's propensity or character for carrying weapons where petitioner's defense at trial was that his gun discharged accidentally during a struggle. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
B. Claim #4. The substitution of judges claim.
In his fourth claim, petitioner contends that his right to a fair trial was violated when two substitute judges presided over jury deliberations after the evidence had been presented and the jury had been instructed, in violation of M.C.R. 6.440(A).
Violations of state law and procedure which do not infringe specific federal constitutional protections are not cognizable claims under Section 2254. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
In this case, there is no allegation that either of the substitute judges did anything to violate petitioner's rights. The mere fact that there were substitute judges during deliberations does not raise a federal constitutional question. While petitioner claims that the absence of the original judge deprived him of a better instruction on second-degree murder, the Sixth Circuit rejected the need to instruct on self-defense. Therefore, there was no constitutional deprivation. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
IV. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the writ of habeas corpus originally granted on May 31, 2001 by this Court is DISSOLVED and the remaining claims contained in the petition for writ of habeas corpus are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.