Opinion
CV174021090
05-11-2017
Jennifer Taylor v. Anna Thompson
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE APPLICANT'S REQUEST FOR A CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER
Elpedio N. Vitale, J.
The applicant, Jennifer Taylor, seeks a civil protection order against the respondent, Anna Thompson, pursuant to C.G.S. § 46b-16a. Insofar as relevant to this application, that statute provides that " any person who has been the victim of stalking, as described in Sections 53a-181a, 53a-181d and 53a-181e may make an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section . . ."
On May 8, 2017, the court heard testimony and received exhibits into evidence. The respondent Anna Thompson was represented by counsel, and the applicant Jennifer Taylor was self-represented. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court heard arguments from the applicant and respondent.
In reaching its conclusions, the court has fairly and impartially considered all of the evidence received at the hearing, evaluated the credibility of the witnesses; assessed the weight, if any, to be given specific evidence and measured the probative force of conflicting evidence; reviewed all exhibits, relevant statutes, and case law; and has drawn such inferences from the evidence, or facts established by the evidence, that it deems reasonable and logical.
To the extent it is necessary to further amplify, the court's credibility determinations for each witness were made, inter alia, on the basis of the conduct, demeanor, and attitude of the witnesses as well as all of the other factors relevant for each witness with respect to the credibility evaluation. See Lapointe v. Commissioner of Corrections, 316 Conn. 225, 268-71, 112 A.3d 1 (2015). Additionally, any other evidence on the record not specifically mentioned in this decision that would support a contrary conclusion, whether said evidence was contested or uncontested by the parties, was considered and rejected by the court. See State v. Edmonds, 323 Conn. 34, 145 A.3d 861 (2016).
" [I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party . . . [T]he courts adhere to this rule to ensure that [self-represented] litigants receive a full and fair opportunity to be heard, regardless of their lack of legal education and experience." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 569, 877 A.2d 761, (2005).
The applicant (" Taylor") and respondent (" Thompson") are familiar with each other because of a relationship that formed by virtue of the applicant's business. Ms. Taylor is a teacher who owns a studio she described as providing yoga training, as well as training in the so-called " circus arts, " such as the trapeze. Ms. Thompson is a former student who attended classes at the applicant Taylor's studio. On or about October 29, 2016, Ms. Thompson became involved in a dispute with a fellow student at the studio. This dispute culminated in Ms. Taylor discontinuing Ms. Thompson's ability to participate in classes at the studio. According to Ms. Taylor, Ms. Thompson did not receive the news of her inability to continue at the studio well, and thereafter, Ms. Taylor described the ensuing several months as replete with numerous, abusive, and unwanted e-mails, text messages, and facebook postings from Ms. Thompson. Ms. Taylor indicated that since October 2016, she has received approximately 2, 360 abusive and unwanted e-mails from Ms. Thompson. Applicant's Exhibit One, an e-mail authored by the respondent Ms. Thompson, Ms. Thompson acknowledges at one point that she " turned her anger toward [Ms. Taylor] via e-mails" and that " [she] wrote too many e-mails." Ms. Taylor first " blocked" Ms. Thompson from access her cell phone, then her e-mail account, and finally her facebook account.
Ms. Taylor finally notified the police regarding the unwanted contact, but no police action was taken. Some of the messages received by Ms. Taylor from Ms. Thompson included threats of self-harm by Ms. Thompson that Ms. Thompson indicated would be carried out on Ms. Taylor's property. A threat of self-harm occurred on Easter Sunday, and prompted a 911 call by Ms. Taylor to report the threat. Ms. Thompson indicated to Ms. Taylor that she would carry out her threat of self-harm at the " Sanctuary, " a forty-eight-acre land trust in East Haddam. Ms. Taylor is the executive director of the " Santuary."
Both Ms. Taylor, and her fiancé e, Justin Good, have urged Ms. Thompson to seek professional help. Respondent's Exhibit C is a letter from a mental health professional documenting that Ms. Thompson is currently receiving treatment.
Of particular concern to Ms. Taylor were recent instances of Ms. Thompson physically appearing at her home and place of business in the evening. Ms. Taylor contacted police. Ms. Thompson left a handwritten note in Ms. Taylor's home mailbox on one occasion, which was introduced into evidence as applicant's Exhibit Six. Coupled with the foregoing episodes of voluminous unwanted and abusive e-mails and text messages, as well as Ms. Thompson's references to self-harm, the unwanted appearances by Ms. Thompson have caused Ms. Taylor to fear for her physical safety. The respondent argues that the contact and communications between Ms. Taylor and herself were the product of a long standing relationship and ascribes a more benign import to the foregoing conduct. She also points to the fact that she has engaged a mental health professional to address certain issues related to the breakdown of her relationship with Ms. Taylor and some of the other students at the studio.
The court has considered the evidence in view of C.G.S. § 46b-16a, as well as Fiona C. v. Kevin L., 166 Conn.App. 844, 143 A.3d 604 (2016); Stacy B. v. Robert S., 165 Conn.App. 374, 140 A.3d 1004 (2016); and Kayla M. v. Greene, 163 Conn.App. 493, 136 A.3d 1 (2016), which describe the elements necessary to establish the imposition of a civil protection order.
The language in Fiona C., supra, suggests that, although the course of conduct alleged must be directed to a specific person, the court did not view the gap in time between the incidents alleged to be necessarily fatal to the applicant's claims. " [A]n applicant for a civil protection order on the basis of stalking is required to prove only that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a defendant stalked, and will continue to stalk, as described in § § 53a-181a, 53a-181d or 53a-181e." Fiona C., supra at 850.
Stalking in the second degree under § 53a-181d(b)(1) includes the following elements: (1) that the respondent acted knowingly, (2) that the respondent engaged in a course of conduct directed at the victim, and (3) that such conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her physical safety or for the physical safety of a third person. Kayla M. v. Greene, supra, at 505.
The behavior by the respondent fits within the definition of stalking in the second degree, in violation of § 53a-181d. The relevant language provides that the applicant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent committed " two or more acts including, but not limited to, acts in which a person . . . by any action, method, device of means (1) . . . lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, harrasses, [or] communicates with [her]." [Emphasis added.] An additional element of stalking in the second degree obligates the applicant to demonstrate that the respondent embarked in this course of conduct, directed at the applicant, knowing that such behavior " would cause a reasonable person to fear for such person's physical safety . . ." The court in Kayla M. v. Greene supra, observed as follows:
The court observes parenthetically that C.G.S. § 53a-183 proscribes harassing conduct of sending mail, not content of mail. See e.g., State v. Nowacki, 155 Conn.App. 758, 782, 111 A.3d 911 (2015).
Fear is objectively reasonable if " a reasonable person under the existing circumstances would fear for his or her physical safety." To establish a stalking violation, [p]roof of verbal threats or harassing gestures is not essential . . . [D]efendants' obsessive behaviors, even in the absence of threats of physical violence, [may] reasonably [cause] their victims to fear for their physical safety. (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
Unlike a criminal prosecution for stalking in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181d(b)(1), in which the state must prove all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, an applicant for a civil protection order on the basis of stalking pursuant to § 46b-16a must prove only that there are " reasonable grounds to believe" that every element is met and that such conduct will continue. See General Statutes § 46b-16a(b). In determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that stalking occurred, it is instructive that, in the criminal context, " [t]he phrase 'reasonable grounds to believe' is synonymous with probable cause." State v. Velasco, 248 Conn. 183, 189, 728 A.2d 493 (1999). " While probable cause requires more than mere suspicion . . . the line between mere suspicion and probable cause necessarily must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in light of the particular situation and with account taken of all the circumstances . . . The existence of probable cause does not turn on whether the defendant could have been convicted on the same available evidence . . . In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 506.
It is incumbent upon the applicant to establish that the respondent's conduct was perpetrated knowing that a reasonable person in the applicant's situation would " fear for her physical safety."
" A person acts 'knowingly' with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exists . . ." General Statutes § 53a-3(12). " [K]nowingly ordinarily means with awareness . . . and . . . knows means to have cognizance, consciousness, or awareness . . . Because it is practically impossible to know what someone is thinking or intending at any given moment, absent an outright declaration of intent, a person's state of mind is usually proved by circumstantial evidence . . . and is, except in rare cases, a question of fact . . . Intention is a mental process which, of necessity, must be proven either by the statements or the actions of the person whose conduct is be examined . . . State v. Torres, 111 Conn.App. 575, 581-82, 960 A.2d 573 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 907, 964 A.2d 543 (2009). The court concludes that the applicant has proven this element of stalking.
After a hearing, the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent Anna Thompson has committed stalking, in the second degree, in violation of C.G.S. § 53a-181d(b)(1). Kayla M. v. Greene, 163 Conn.App. 493, 505-07, 136 A.3d 1 (2016). The court further finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent Thompson will continue to commit such acts or acts designed to intimidate or retaliate against the applicant Jennifer Taylor.
For the foregoing reasons, the application for a civil protection order pursuant to C.G.S. § 46b-16a(a) is granted as follows: the respondent shall not assault, threaten, abuse, harass, follow, interfere with, or stalk the applicant. The respondent shall stay away from the applicant's home or wherever she shall reside. The respondent shall stay away from the applicant's place of business and the " Sanctuary." The respondent shall not contact applicant in any manner, including by written, electronic or telephone contact, and shall not contact her home, place of business, or the " Sanctuary." The respondent shall not be in possession of any firearms. If the respondent is in possession of any firearms, they are ordered to be turned over to the police immediately, along with any permits. The order of protection shall be in effect for one year, unless extended by the court after a hearing. Violation of a civil protection order is a Class D felony and entering or remaining in any building or premises in violation of a civil protection order is a Class A misdeamnor.