Opinion
24A-CR-1086
09-18-2024
Steven A. Taylor, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Brandon E. Murphy Cannon Bruns &Murphy Muncie, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Kathy Bradley Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Jay Circuit Court The Honorable Brian D. Hutchison, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 38C01-2302-CM-21
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Brandon E. Murphy Cannon Bruns &Murphy Muncie, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Kathy Bradley Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Weissmann, Judge.
[¶1] Steven Taylor alleges for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in trying him in absentia on his two misdemeanor charges. Because Taylor presents no compelling argument that an error occurred, we affirm.
Facts
[¶2] In October 2023, Taylor appeared with his counsel for his bench trial. The parties agreed to a short continuance to allow the case to be transferred from superior court to circuit court.
[¶3] When Taylor failed to appear for his rescheduled trial, his attorney advised the court that Taylor was aware of the trial date because "Isa gave him actual notice in the hallway." Tr. Vol. II, p. 14. Counsel did not object when the State subsequently moved to proceed in absentia. After the trial, the court issued a warrant for Taylor's arrest and he was apprehended five months later. Taylor never contacted the court before his trial or in the months prior to his arrest.
Isa's full name and role with the court, if any, are not identified in the record or by the parties.
[¶4] Following his arrest, the trial court denied Taylor's request for bond by citing his failure to appear for his trial. Only then did Taylor explain: "That was a miscalculation on my calendar." Id. at 33. He did not offer further justification for his absence, either that day or at his subsequent sentencing hearing. Taylor also failed to complain to the trial court about being tried in absentia.
Discussion and Decision
[¶5] We first note that Taylor has waived his claim. See Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004) ("[A] party may not present an argument or issue on appeal unless the party raised that argument or issue before the trial court."). Though he was not present at trial, Taylor was represented by counsel who did not object to the State's motion to proceed in absentia or to the trial court's decision to do so. See Bex v. State, 952 N.E.2d 347, 354 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) ("[A] defendant who consents to representation by counsel consents to his counsel's decisions on trial strategy."). Taylor himself also never claimed he lacked notice of his trial date nor complained about being tried in absentia, though he had the opportunity to do so at both the hearing following his arrest and his sentencing hearing.
[¶6] Waiver notwithstanding, Taylor's claim fails. Criminal defendants have a right to be present during all stages of their trial. Jackson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ind. 2007) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13). However, defendants can be tried in absentia when the trial court finds they knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to be present. Brown v. State, 839 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005). Waiver may be presumed upon showing the defendant knew of the scheduled trial date but failed to appear. Id. The defendant can then offer an explanation for their absence to rebut that presumption. Id.
[¶7] We review Taylor's claim that he did not waive his right to be present for abuse of discretion. Calvert v. State, 14 N.E.3d 818, 821 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014). "A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court misapplies the law." Id.
[¶8] Taylor argues there is no evidence showing he was aware of the rescheduled trial date. But the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, shows otherwise.
[¶9] Taylor's attorney advised the trial court that Taylor was given "actual notice" of the trial date. Tr. Vol. II, p. 14; see generally Tanksley v. State, 144 N.E.3d 824, 826-28 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (holding counsel's remarks were a judicial admission that could not later be disputed). Taylor's actions were also inconsistent with his claimed lack of notice. His explanation of making a "miscalculation on [his] calendar" implies that he indeed was given a date but merely recorded it incorrectly. Tr. Vol. II, p. 33. And this excuse came five months after his trial, following his arrest. Taylor never reached out to the court or his attorney to sort out any questions about his trial date or raise issues of notice. See Jackson, 868 N.E.2d at 498 (finding voluntary waiver based, in part, on defendant's failure to contact court).
[¶10] Taylor's belated excuse and his unexplained lack of communication fail to rebut the presumption that his waiver was knowing and voluntary. See Smith v. State, 160 N.E.3d 1152, 1155 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (finding voluntary waiver despite defendant's explanation that illness caused his absence, which was not raised until after he was arrested). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by trying him in absentia. We affirm.
Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.