Opinion
No. 01-04-00629-CR
Opinion issued February 17, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 268th District Court, Fort Bend County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 38,716.
Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices HIGLEY and BLAND.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant, Michael Taylor, of aggravated sexual assault, and the court sentenced him to confinement for 10 years. In addressing appellant's two issues, we determine (1) whether the trial court "erred in requiring appellant to enter a plea for himself in front of [the] jury" and (2) whether the trial court properly refused to grant a mistrial. We affirm.
Background
Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as appellant's attorney on the ground that appellant had filed, pro se, various documents with the trial court in which appellant contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction over him. The motion to withdraw stated that appellant had directed defense counsel to proceed solely on these documents as appellant's only defense. Defense counsel informed the court that he could not do so in good conscience. Counsel further informed the trial court that appellant did not want defense counsel to continue representing him. The motion concluded, "There is an irreversible conflict between Defendant and Counsel." The trial court heard the motion to withdraw in a pre-trial hearing. As part of the hearing, the court allowed appellant to present his pro se argument, as stated in "his paperwork," that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him. The trial court concluded that it had jurisdiction and also denied defense counsel's motion to withdraw. After the jury was sworn in this case, but before they entered, the following exchange occurred:THE COURT: Is there any matter we need to take up before I bring the jury in?
[Defense counsel]: Yes, sir, just one second. Your Honor, I have conferred with [appellant], and he has asked to be arraigned in front of the jury and will not enter a plea, but his answer to me has been that he will continue to stand on his paperwork that he has submitted. I would ask the Court to have the prosecutor read the indictment and the Court to inform the jury that a plea of not guilty has been entered for the defendant, without having him to make that response before the jury.
THE COURT: Your request is denied, but I'll think about it.
[Defense counsel]: Okay.The jury was then brought in and the State read the indictment. At that point, the record reflects the following:
THE COURT: To the allegations in the indictment, how does the defendant plea? You will need to stand and I will need to get an answer from you. Stand up, Mr. Taylor.
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor —
THE COURT: Stand on your feet when you address the Court. Stand him up, bailiff.
THE BAILIFF: Stand up, stand up.
[Defense counsel]: We move for a mistrial, Your Honor.
THE BAILIFF: Face the Judge — get up.
THE DEFENDANT: I will stand on my paperwork, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The defendant refusing to enter a plea, the Court will enter a plea of not guilty for him. You may be seated. You may proceed with your opening statement.
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, due to the inflammatory nature of this arraignment, we move for a mistrial. It prejudices this jury, and we would ask for a mistrial.
THE COURT: Your request is denied.
Entry of Not Guilty Plea
In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court "erred in requiring appellant to enter a plea for himself in front of [the] jury." Pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.01, which governs the order of proceedings in a jury trial, a plea of not guilty, if made, is made after the indictment is read. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.01(a)(2) (Vernon 2004-2005). A not-guilty plea may be made by either the defendant or his counsel. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 27.16(a) (Vernon 1989). Article 27.16(a) also provides, "If the defendant refuses to plead, the plea of not guilty shall be entered for him by the court." Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals recently recognized, "[A]rticle [27.16(a)] gives the trial court a duty in the absence of action by the defendant." Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 343 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Appellant cites no authority holding that the trial court has a duty to enter a defendant's not-guilty plea on his behalf based on a request made before the indictment has been read and before the defendant has an opportunity to make his own plea. To the contrary, the trial court in this case followed the statutorily-mandated order of proceedings. The court gave appellant the opportunity to enter a not-guilty plea after the indictment had been read. Given the pre-trial proceedings pertaining to the motion to withdraw, in which a potential conflict between appellant and his defense counsel were addressed, the trial court likely believed that the most cautious course of action would be to give appellant the opportunity to enter his own plea. When appellant gave a non-responsive answer, the trial court then followed the statutory mandate of entering the non-guilty plea on appellant's behalf. Appellant implies that the trial judge had some ill motive in denying defense counsel's request to enter the non-guilty plea on appellant's behalf without giving appellant the opportunity to enter his own plea. Specifically, appellant contends that the trial judge strove to discredit appellant. Appellant asserts that the trial judge knew that he would be non-responsive when asked for a plea and that the jury would view such non-responsiveness negatively. Despite the seriousness of the accusations, appellant has failed to provide any support in the record for attributing improper motives to the trial judge, and the record on its face certainly supplies none. We overrule appellant's first issue.Mistrial
In his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court "erred" in requesting the bailiff to stand appellant up when addressing the court. Appellant contends that the trial judge knew that appellant would rebel and refuse to stand. Appellant asserts that the trial court "precipitated a confrontation," which resulted in appellant's rights being prejudiced. We construe this issue broadly to include a challenge by appellant to the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial. We review a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Mistrial is an extreme remedy for prejudicial events occurring during the trial process. Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). We begin by noting that a trial judge, as the guardian of the court in which he or she presides, is charged with enforcing the rules of decorum and protecting the dignity of the proceedings. In this regard, the trial judge in this case was within his authority when he required appellant to stand as would be expected of any party addressing the court. When appellant refused to stand, the trial judge was equally entitled to enforce this rule of decorum. As discussed above, appellant has failed to cite any portion of the record supporting his accusations that the trial judge purposefully conducted the proceeding in a manner designed intentionally to prejudice appellant. Notably, appellant expects us to overlook his role in what occurred during the arraignment. We will not. Texas courts have long refused to permit an accused to profit by his own misconduct to achieve a mistrial. See Chamberlain v. State, 453 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970) (concluding trial court appropriately denied motion for mistrial after defendant scuffled with sheriff's deputies in front of jury). The Court of Criminal Appeals in Chamberlain recognized that, if a defendant was allowed to profit from his own misconduct, "the attempted administration of justice would be reduced to a mockery." Id. The court further reasoned:If a witness or a defendant is not satisfied with the rules or if he thinks they are unfair and unconstitutional, he has a right to test them in the appell[ate] courts and this does not include the right to fight the officers in the courtroom or otherwise disrupt the proceedings. The rules of procedure, like our substantive law, apply to everyone; those who violate them should know that they must suffer the consequences, especially those who would like to disrupt the orderly administration of justice and eventually destroy our judicial system.Id. We agree with the Chamberlain court's reasoning and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for mistrial. We overrule appellant's second issue.