Opinion
Civil No. 99-1086 (JRT/FLN).
January 23, 2002
Gary T. LaFleur, BABCOCK, NEILSON, MANNELLA, LAFLEUR, KLINT, Anoka, Minnesota, for plaintiff.
Scott S. Payzant, OPPENHEIMER WOLFF DONNELLY LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER FOR JUDGMENT
Plaintiff L.D. Todd Taylor ("Taylor") brings this suit for employment discrimination against RM Manufacturing ("RM"), his former employer, and Mike Ruotsinoja ("Ruotsinoja"), his former supervisor at RM. Count One of Taylor's Amended Complaint alleges a hostile work environment and race discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. § 363.03, and alleges that Ruotsinoja aided and abetted RM in this discrimination. Count Two alleges race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2001e et seq. Count Four alleges assault and battery against Ruotsinoja. Ruotsinoja has also made a counterclaim, alleging assault and battery against Taylor.
Count Three of Taylor's complaint was dismissed by t his Court. See Taylor v. RM Mfg. Co., Civ. No. 99-1086, slip. op. at 12 (D.Minn. Mar. 31, 2001).
This matter came before the Court for trial on October 30, 2001. Based on the entire record and proceedings, the testimony at trial, and the arguments of counsel, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. All of the Findings of Fact set forth herein are undisputed or have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
2. To the extent that the Court's Conclusions of Law include what may be considered Findings of Fact, they are incorporated herein by reference.
3. Taylor is a former employee of RM. He was hired by RM as a temporary employee in October, 1994. In October, 1995, RM hired Taylor as a full-time employee. At all times that Taylor was employed at RM, he worked as a packer in the shipping department. Taylor is African-American.
4. RM is a private contract manufacturer of precision sheet metal parts. Jerome Bofferding is the president and sole shareholder of RM.
5. Ruotsinoja is the Foreman of Shipping at RM. He has worked for RM since 1983, except for during a period in 1988 and 1989. Ruotsinoja began his career at RM as a packer in the shipping department. In 1994, RM promoted Ruotsinoja to a lead position in the shipping department. Ruotsinoja was promoted to his current position in 1997. Ruotsinoja is Caucasian.
6. Ruotsinoja was Taylor's direct supervisor at RM. In this capacity, Ruotsinoja's job was to ensure that Taylor and other employees completed their work properly and timely.
7. Ruotsinoja's direct supervisor at RM is the plant manager, Dave Abraham ("Abraham"). Abraham has worked at RM for thirty years. Abraham is responsible for the majority of hiring and firing at RM.
8. The RM Policy Book has a section entitled "Rules of Conduct." This section provides that assaulting fellow employees, fighting, or provoking a fight on company premises will make an employee "subject to disciplinary action, including discharge."
9. On September 24, 1998, Taylor and Ruotsinoja were at work at RM. Ruotsinoja approached Taylor's workstation, and said that Taylor had made a mistake in packing a box. An argument between the two men ensued. At first, the argument was only verbal. Some shoving took place between the men. During this altercation, Ruotsinoja was struck in the face, causing his nose to bleed.
10. Immediately after the altercation, Abraham, the plant manager, was walking toward the shipping area and saw Ruotsinoja with blood on his face. Abraham asked Ruotsinoja what happened, and Ruotsinoja responded that Taylor hit him in the nose.
11. Abraham instructed Taylor to sit in the lunch room while Abraham investigated the situation. Abraham then spoke with several other RM employees about the incident. Abraham then informed Taylor that he was fired for striking Ruotsinoja.
12. Taylor was immediately terminated from RM for violating the company's policy against fighting and assault. Ruotsinoja was not disciplined for the incident.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Discrimination Claims
Taylor has brought his discrimination claims under both Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The Court analyzes these claims — made in Counts One and Two of the Amended Complaint — under Title VII case law. See Mems v. City of St. Paul, 224 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir. 2000); Chock v. Northwest Airlines, 113 F.3d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 1997).
A. Hostile Work Environment
Title VII prohibits discriminatory harassment that is so severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of employment and creates a hostile working environment. Mems, 224 F.3d at 738 (quoting Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1999)); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998). For Taylor to succeed in his claim that he suffered such an environment, he must establish that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) there was a causal nexus between his membership in the protected group and the harassment; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) RM knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action. Mems, 224 F.3d at 738.
A number of factors should be considered in determining whether harassment is "severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment." Carter, 173 F.3d at 701. These include the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, whether it is physically threatening or merely an offensive utterance, whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance, the physical proximity to the harasser, and the presence or absence of other people. Id. at 702. Sporadic comments or isolated racial slurs are not necessarily sufficient to demonstrate a hostile working environment. Id.; Powell v. Missouri State Highway Trans. Dept., 822 F.2d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 1987).
Taylor is an African-American, and clearly belongs to a protected group. Taylor alleged that Ruotsinoja harassed him by using derogatory names and calling him stupid. The Court finds that Taylor has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that these episodes of harassment occurred. Nor has Taylor pointed to any specific racial epithets by Ruotsinoja or any supervisor at RM. In fact, many witnesses testified that they had never heard Ruotsinoja use any racial epithets. See White Dep. at 19; Roberts Dep. at 17; Johnson Dep. at 16; Neal Dep. at 13; Pitchford Dep. at 14-15.
Darren McGuire, the only witness who did suggest that he heard Ruotsinoja use racial epithets, was unable to recall anything specific:
Q: Did you ever actually hear [Ruotsinoja] use racial slurs, racial epithets?
A: I believe I have, yes.
Q: What have you heard him say?
A: It's been awhile It's — it's been awhile.
Q: Anything specific come to mind that you can recall?
A: No, nothing right offhand. I can't — I can't really think of anything right now.
McGuire Dep. at 9-10.
Even if Taylor had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Ruotsinoja made derogatory racial comments, Taylor has not shown that such comments were more than few or sporadic. See, e.g., Carter, 173 F.3d at 701-02 ("Sporadic or casual comments are unlikely to support a hostile environment claim."). More importantly, Taylor has not demonstrated the required causal nexus between this alleged harassment and the fact that he is African-American. In fact, testimony suggested that Ruotsinoja had trouble getting along with both blacks and whites. Several witnesses testified that they discerned no racial prejudice in the way Ruotsinoja or other supervisors at RM treated black and white employees. See White Dep. at 24; Pitchford Dep. at 14; Neal Dep. at 13-14; Johnson Dep. at 19; Roberts Dep. at 15; Norton Dep. at 26. Taylor has also failed to present evidence that RM knew or should have known of any racial harassment. Taylor testified at trial that although he had met with plant manager Dave Abraham several times about Ruotsinoja's "attitude," he never told Abraham that he believed the problem was racial. Thus, based on these factors, the Court concludes that Taylor has not satisfied the requirements for a hostile work environment.
Harold Nelson, a former RM employee who is African-American, testified as follows:
Q: Did [Ruotsinoja] treat black men here at RM and interact with black men here at RM differently than he did white guys?
A: Well, no, he didn't — I don't think nobody that he got along with that I — let's put it kind of blunt. Not a likable guy, so it's just that. This is both ways, not black and white. Not really a likable guy.
Nelson Dep. at 26-27.
B. Disparate Treatment
To prevail on his discrimination claim, Taylor must prove that he was treated differently because of his race. Because Taylor does not allege any direct evidence of discrimination, his claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 436 (8th Cir. 1998) (explaining "direct evidence"). See also Chock, 113 F.3d at 863 (holding that claims made under both the MHRA and Title VII are subject to McDonnell Douglas analysis).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2001). The prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, and the burden then shifts to the employer, who must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. If the employer can do so, the presumption disappears and the plaintiff must prove that the employer's reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
In order to state a prima facie case of discrimination, Taylor must demonstrate that: (1) he is within a protected group; (2) he was qualified to perform his job; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) others who are similarly situated, but who are not members of the protected class, were treated more favorably. Clearwater v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 166, 231 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2000). First, as an African-American, Taylor is within a protected group. Second, the evidence shows that Taylor was qualified to be a packer at RM. Testimony at trial demonstrated that Taylor's job evaluations rated him as at least a "satisfactory" employee. Third, Taylor has clearly suffered an adverse employment action — he was fired.
Finally, Taylor must show that other RM employees who are not African-American were treated more favorably. Taylor has presented evidence showing that other employees were treated more favorably than he in matters such as mode of dress, preference for overtime, and receiving permission to clean up before the shift ended. However, the evidence presented at trial showed that the employees who received better treatment were both white and black. In fact, the evidence tends to show that Taylor alone was singled out for worse treatment in a workforce that was, according to RM's president, forty to forty-five percent non-white. For example, Taylor testified at trial that some of the workers who received overtime instead of him were, in fact, black. Taylor also testified that he alone was forced to work right up to quitting time, while all the other workers, including many black employees, were allowed to clean up early. This undermines Taylor's claims that he was treated worse because of his race. Therefore, the Court concludes that Taylor has not made out a prima facie case of discrimination.
Taylor's co-worker, Reggie White, also noted that most of the workers in the shipping department were African American. See White Dep. at 28, lines 1-4, 6-12.
Even if Taylor had been able to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, he still would not prevail under the burden-shifting process of McDonnell Douglas. If Taylor established a prima facie case, the burden would then shift to defendants to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Taylor. Cronquist, 237 F.3d at 924. RM states that it fired Taylor because he assaulted Ruotsinoja, which violated company rules of conduct. Some evidence supports the claim that Taylor instigated the altercation, while other evidence supports the claim that Ruotsinoja instigated it. The Court need not resolve this question; no matter who actually struck who, the Court need only address whether Abraham, acting on behalf of RM, believed that Taylor instigated the fight and fired him for that reason alone. Abraham's testimony at trial supported that claim. Therefore, the Court finds that defendants have articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Taylor's firing. See Ward v. Proctor Gamble Paper Prod. Co., 111 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 1997) ("It is beyond question that an employee's striking of a fellow employee is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for dismissal.").
The Court next analyzes whether Taylor has met his burden of proving that RM's asserted reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. See Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1332 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The plaintiff retains at all times the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the adverse employment action was motivated by intentional discrimination."). Taylor notes that he was disciplined for the altercation but Ruotsinoja was not; he claims that this disparate treatment shows that RM's reason for firing him is mere pretext. Instances of disparate treatment can support a claim of pretext, but Taylor must prove that he and Ruotsinoja were "similarly situated in all relevant respects." Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Employees are similarly situated when they are involved in or accused of the same offense and are disciplined in different ways." Id.
The Court finds that Taylor has not proved that RM's explanation was pretext. First, Taylor and Ruotsinoja were not similarly situated; Ruotsinoja was a supervisor with an apparently unblemished work record, while Taylor was an employee with at least one previous "write-up" for poor performance. See Ward, 111 F.3d at 560 (finding that parties who did not hold the same position and did not share similar employment records were not similarly situated); Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994). Second, Ruotsinoja and Taylor were not accused of the same offense. Abraham believed that Taylor hit Ruotsinoja. Taylor has not presented evidence to show that Abraham believed otherwise, or that he fired Taylor for some other reason. Given Abraham's apparent good faith belief that Taylor was culpable but Ruotsinoja had done nothing wrong, it was reasonable to discipline the two men differently.
Even if Abraham was ultimately wrong about who started the altercation, it does not change the Court's ultimate conclusion that Taylor has not proven discrimination. Defendants, through Abraham, have given an "honest explanation" of why Taylor was fired. See Wilking v. County of Ramsey, 153 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). Because RM has articulated a lawful reason for discharging Taylor, the Court should not decide whether that reason was "wise, fair, or even correct," so long as it truly was the reason for Taylor's termination. Id. (citation omitted).
The Court determines that Taylor has not met his burdens, and has not proven that he was fired based because of his race. Accordingly, judgment on Counts One and Two will be entered for defendants.
Because the Court has not found any discriminatory conduct by RM, it follows that Taylor's claim against Ruotsinoja for aiding and abetting under the MHRA is moot. Where there has been no discrimination, there is nothing to aid or abet. See Zelewski v. American Fed. Sav. Bank, 811 F. Supp. 456, 464 (D.Minn. 1993).
II. Taylor's Assault and Battery Claim
Taylor alleges that Ruotsinoja struck him in the chest with a metal part, knocking him off a pallet. "An assault is an unlawful threat to do bodily harm to another with present ability to carry the threat into effect." Dahlin v. Fraser, 288 N.W. 851, 852 (Minn. 1939); Pierce v. Rainbow Foods Group, Inc., 158 F. Supp.2d 969, 973 (D.Minn. 2001). A battery occurs when a person intentionally causes harmful or offensive contact with another, or causes an imminent apprehension of such contact. See Schumann v. McGinn, 240 N.W.2d 525, 529 n. 4 (Minn. 1976) (quoting Restatement 2d of Torts § 18 (1965)).
Taylor has pointed to little evidence that Ruotsinoja threatened bodily harm, or that Ruotsinoja caused harmful or offensive contact. Although some witnesses testified that Ruotsinoja pushed or shoved Taylor, Taylor has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that this contact, if it occurred, fulfills the requirements for assault and battery. Therefore, the Court will enter judgment for Ruotsinoja on Count Four.
See Neal Dep. at 10; McGuire Dep. at 13; White Dep. at 14.
III. Ruotsinoja's Assault and Battery Counterclaim
Ruotsinoja alleges that Taylor, after being told he was packing parts incorrectly, swore at Ruotsinoja, hit his hand with a twelve-inch long metal part, then punched Ruotsinoja in the nose with a closed fist. Ruotsinoja alleges that his nose was broken in three places. Some witnesses testified that Taylor appeared to hit Ruotsinoja intentionally. See, e.g., Neal Dep. at 10. Other witnesses, however, testified that that Taylor hit Ruotsinoja accidentally. See, e.g., White Dep. at 15. Naturally, Taylor and Ruotsinoja themselves present different accounts of the incident. Ruotsinoja has presented no medical reports or other evidence to corroborate his testimony about alleged injuries. The Court determines that Ruotsinoja has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Taylor intended to hit him or cause him injury. Accordingly, judgment will be entered for Taylor on the counterclaim.
IV. Attorneys' Fees
Defendants, as the prevailing parties on the Title VII discrimination claims, seek reasonable attorneys' fees from Taylor. A prevailing Title VII defendant is entitled to receive attorneys' fees from the plaintiff only when the "court finds that [plaintiff's] claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); Marquart v. Lodge 837, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Aerospace Workers, 26 F.3d 842, 849 (8th Cir. 1994). In the present case, the Court cannot find that Taylor's discrimination claims were frivolous or unreasonable. Therefore, defendants are not entitled to receive attorneys' fees from Taylor.
ORDER
Based on the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Judgment is entered for defendants and against plaintiff as to Count One of plaintiff's Amended Complaint [Docket No. 7].
2. Judgment is entered for defendants and against plaintiff as to Count Two of plaintiff's Amended Complaint [Docket No. 7].
3. Judgment is entered for defendants and against plaintiff as to Count Four of plaintiff's Amended Complaint [Docket No. 7].
4. Judgment is entered for plaintiff and against defendant as to defendant Mike Ruotsinoja's Counterclaim [Docket No. 2].
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.