Opinion
C. A. 9:23-3435-RMG-MHC
08-30-2023
Santana Taylor, Plaintiff, v. Amanda Leviner, Magistrate Judge, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
This a civil action filed by Plaintiff Santana Taylor, a pretrial detainee. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
This case was originally filed by Plaintiff and another pretrial detainee, Dea'Shawn Harrison (Harrison), in case number 9:23-1116-RMG-MHC (23-1116). On July 17, 2023, the Court issued an Order (ECF No. 1) directing the Clerk of Court to terminate Plaintiff as a plaintiff in case number 23-1116, assign a separate civil action number to Plaintiff, and file the complaint in the other action as the Complaint in this action.
Thus, Harrison is now the sole plaintiff in case number 23-1116 and Plaintiff is the sole plaintiff in this case.
In an Order (ECF No. 4) dated July 25, 2023, Plaintiff was directed to provide certain documents to bring his case into proper form. Plaintiff was also notified of pleading deficiencies and given the opportunity to amend his Complaint. See ECF No. 4. The time for Plaintiff to bring his case into proper form has passed, and Plaintiff has failed to bring his case into proper form and has not filed an amended complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Dorchester County Detention Center (DCDC). Records from Dorchester County indicate Plaintiff has pending charges for possession of a weapon during a violent crime (case number 2023A18102000008, indictment number 0000GS18), kidnapping (case number 2023A18102000009, indictment number 0000GS18), and domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature (case number K308853, indictment number 0000GS18). See Dorchester County First Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Dorchester/ PublicIndex/PISearchaspx (last visited August 22, 2023).
This Court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n. 1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869, at * 2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records).
Plaintiff asserts he brings claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) against federal officials. However, he only named a state official as the Defendant, such that it instead appears that Plaintiff is bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. See ECF No. 2 at 15. Plaintiff asserts that the alleged incidents occurred on January 3, 2023. Id. at 4.
It is unclear, but Plaintiff appears to be complaining that he is detained at the DCDC on pending criminal charges. He asserts he wishes to exercise his “First Amendment Right” to petition to be freed from incarceration and to have his constitutional rights upheld. ECF No. 2 at 6. Plaintiff appears to be attempting to raise an issue about a warrant and bond (or lack thereof) as to his criminal charges. See id. at 7-10.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se Complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
This action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons discussed below.
A. Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff names Judge Amanda Leviner (Judge Leviner), a state magistrate judge, as the Defendant in this action. However, Judge Leviner is subject to summary dismissal because, based upon the facts alleged, she is entitled to judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351-64 (1978); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (a suit by South Carolina inmate against two Virginia magistrates); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (“It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions.”); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (immunity presents a threshold question which should be resolved before discovery is even allowed). Further, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action [s]he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. Judicial immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (holding that “immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly”). Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11.
B. Sovereign Citizen
Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert claims that are based on “sovereign-citizen” type theories, such claims are subject to summary dismissal as they are frivolous. See Smalls v. Sterling, No. 2:16-4005-RMG, 2017 WL 1957471, at *1 (D.S.C. May 11, 2017); Gaskins v. South Carolina, No. 2:15-CV-2589-DCN, 2015 WL 6464440, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2015) (collecting cases); see also Mitchell v. Vesely, No. 5:17-CV-325-OC-30PRL, 2017 WL 11049094, *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2017) (“While Plaintiff does not state that he is a ‘sovereign citizen,' his arguments are similar to the ‘sovereign citizen' arguments that courts have routinely rejected as frivolous.”). So-called sovereign citizens argue that, though they are born and reside in the United States, they are their own sovereigns and are not United States citizens. Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed.Cl. 279, 282 (2011). Examples of grounds claimed for this belief include: The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), maritime and admiralty law, the idea of strawman trusts, a “redemption theory,” and Bible verses. See, e.g., United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2015) (describing the “redemption theory” as a “sovereign citizen-type view which ... holds that the federal government went bankrupt when it abandoned the gold standard in 1933 and began converting the physical bodies of its citizens into assets against which it could sell bonds. A tenet of this view is that knowledgeable citizens can redeem these assets and, through manipulating them in various imagined accounts, use them to their advantage.”); Mason v. Anderson, No. H-15-2952, 2016 WL 4398680, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2016) (rejecting sovereign citizen's claim, grounded in the UCC, maritime and admiralty law, strawman trusts, and Bible verses, that he was not subject to the laws of the State of Texas). Sovereign citizens often attempt to use these arguments to “avoid paying taxes, extinguish debts, and derail criminal proceedings.” Gravatt, 100 Fed.Cl. at 282; see also U.S. v. Delatorre, No. 03 CR 90, 2008 WL 312647, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2008). Plaintiff cannot claim to be a sovereign independent of governmental authority while simultaneously asking the judicial system to grant him recourse. See, e.g., Mason v. Anderson, 2016 WL 4398680, at *2.
Plaintiff refers to the UCC and a strawman, and mentions allegedly being allowed to exercise his “Soveriegn [sic] Power[.]” See ECF No. 2 at 5, 7, 9-10.
C. No Viable Request for Relief
Finally, this action is subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. In the “Relief” section of the Complaint, Plaintiff nonsensically states that he seeks “relief with the act of recourse.” ECF No. 2 at 17. Were this Court to find that Plaintiff's rights have been violated, but order no remedy, it would, in effect, be rendering an advisory opinion; such action is barred by Article III of the Constitution. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975); see also Bowler v. Young, 55 Fed.Appx. 187, 188 (4th Cir. 2003); Norvell v. Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co., 519 F.2d 370, 375 (10th Cir. 1975) (federal courts do not render advisory opinions).
To the extent Plaintiff may be requesting release from custody as to his pending criminal charges, such a remedy is not available in a civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-488 (1973) (attacking the length or duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus).
D. Failure to Bring Case Into Proper Form
Additionally, it should be noted that Plaintiff has failed to bring this case into proper form. In the Court's Order dated July 25, 2023, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to bring his case into proper form by (1) paying the $350.00 filing fee or, if he is indigent, completing and signing an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit (Form AO-240), (2) completing a summons form listing the named Defendant, and (3) completing and signing a Form USM-285 for Defendant. Plaintiff was warned that failure to provide the necessary information within the timetable set forth in the Order would subject the case to dismissal. See ECF No. 4.
The time to bring this case into proper form has now lapsed, and Plaintiff has failed to provide the required items to bring his case into proper form and has failed to contact the court in any way. Thus, in the alternative, it is recommended that this action be dismissed in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 41. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95-96 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that district court's dismissal following an explicit and reasonable warning was not an abuse of discretion).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process.
See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend ... the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).