Opinion
Civil Action 3:21-cv-00754
03-06-2023
ANGELA TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI,[1]Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
(SAPORITO, M.J.)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(MARIANI, J.)
The plaintiff, Angela Taylor, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying a claim for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”).
This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge to prepare a report and recommended disposition pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons expressed herein, we recommend that the final decision of the Commissioner be vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
I. Background
On November 14, 2018, Taylor protectively filed an application for disability insurance benefits, asserting a disability onset date of May 15, 2018, which she later amended to January 1, 2019. Her application was initially denied by state agency reviewers on March 11, 2019. The plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing. While that request remained pending, her application was referred for informal remand and once again denied upon reconsideration on June 12, 2019.
A hearing was subsequently held on December 17, 2019, before an administrative law judge, Lawrence J. Neary (the “ALJ”). In addition to the plaintiff herself, the ALJ received testimony from Taylor's daughter, Amanda Van Arsdale, and an impartial vocational expert, Brian Bierley. At the request of plaintiff's counsel, a supplemental hearing to receive additional testimony from Bierley was held before the same ALJ on September 30, 2020. The plaintiff was represented by counsel at both hearings.
On October 9, 2020, the ALJ denied Taylor's application for benefits in a written decision. The ALJ followed the familiar five-step sequential evaluation process in determining that Taylor was not disabled under the Act. See generally Myers v. Berryhill, 373 F.Supp.3d 528, 534 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (describing the five-step sequential evaluation process). At step one, the ALJ found that Taylor had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. At step two, the ALJ found that Taylor had the severe impairments of: fibromyalgia; osteoarthritis of the cervical spine, bilateral hands, and, by history, bilateral knees, lumbar spine, and bilateral feet; lower extremity polyneuropathy; and obesity. At step three, the ALJ found that Taylor did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (eff. Apr. 1, 2018).
We note that the agency's list of musculoskeletal disorders was extensively revised effective April 2, 2021, after this plaintiff's application for disability and disability benefits was adjudicated by the agency. See generally Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Musculoskeletal Disorders, 85 Fed.Reg. 78164 (Dec. 3, 2020) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1).
Between steps three and four of the sequential-evaluation process, the ALJ assessed Taylor's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). See generally Myers, 373 F.Supp.3d at 534 n.4 (defining RFC). After evaluating the relevant evidence of record, the ALJ found that Taylor had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b),with the following limitations:
The Social Security regulations define “light work” as a job that “involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighting up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
[The claimant can] stand and/or walk a total of four hours in an eight-hour workday; only occasionally climb ramps or stairs but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no crouching, but occasional stoop[ing], kneel[ing], or crawl[ing]; and no exposure to hazards, such as machinery and heights.
(Tr. 24.)
In making these factual findings regarding Taylor's RFC, the ALJ considered her symptoms and the extent to which they could reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence of record. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (revised Oct. 25, 2017). The ALJ also considered and articulated how persuasive he found the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings of record. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c.
At step four, based on this RFC and on testimony by the vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that Taylor was unable to perform her past relevant work as a plant manager, as actually or generally performed.
At step five, the ALJ concluded that Taylor was capable of performing other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Based on her age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded that Taylor was capable of performing the requirements of several representative occupations, such as office clerk (DOT # 216.482-010), secretary (DOT # 201.362-030), or quality control supervisor (DOT # 559.134-010). Based on this finding, the ALJ concluded that Taylor was not disabled for Social Security purposes.
The plaintiff sought further administrative review of her claims by the Appeals Council, but her request was denied on March 12, 2021, making the ALJ's October 2020 decision the final decision of the Commissioner subject to judicial review by this court.
Taylor timely filed her complaint in this court on April 6, 2021. The Commissioner has filed an answer to the complaint, together with a certified copy of the administrative record. Both parties have filed their briefs, and this matter is now ripe for decision.
II. Discussion
Under the Social Security Act, the question before this court is not whether the claimant is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that he or she is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence five); Myers, 373 F.Supp.3d at 533 (describing standard of judicial review for social security disability insurance benefits administrative decisions).
Taylor asserts on appeal that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because: (1) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate prior administrative findings, including a purported conflict between the medical opinions non-examining state agency medical consultants, Michael J. Brown DO and Deborah Wafer MD; (2) the ALJ failed to properly incorporate an occasional balancing limitation into his RFC determination, despite broad support for such a limit-or a more restrictive one-across all of the medical opinions considered in this case; (3) the ALJ erred in finding the plaintiff's mental impairments non-severe and in failing to incorporate any mental functional limitations into her RFC; and (4) the ALJ failed to properly consider Taylor's subjective allegations regarding her symptoms, as well lay testimony by her daughter, Amanda Van Arsdale, concerning her symptoms.
These include the medical opinions of: the two state agency medical consultants, Dr. Brown and Dr. Wafer; the plaintiff's treating rheumatology provider, Monica Brown-Luke CRNP; and a consultative examining medical provider, Karenna Hammon CRNP.
Finding this last issue dispositive of this appeal and recommending a remand to properly address the lay testimony provided by the claimant's daughter, we do not reach the other issues. “A remand may produce different results on plaintiff's application, making discussion of the remaining claims moot.” Upshur v. Colvin, 200 F.Supp.3d 503, 513 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
The plaintiff contends that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ erred in his evaluation of Taylor's symptoms, including statements or testimony by Taylor and her daughter, Amanda Van Arsdale. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(i) (“Symptoms means your own description of your physical or mental impairment.”).
Standing alone, a claimant's allegation of pain or other symptoms is not enough to establish an impairment or disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); Prokopick v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 272 Fed. App'x 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Under the regulations, an ALJ may not base a finding of disability solely on a claimant's statements about disabling pain ....”). “An ALJ is permitted to reject a claimant's subjective testimony as long as he or she provides sufficient reasons for doing so.” Prokopick, 272 Fed. App'x at 199 (citing Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999)).
When evaluating a claimant's subjective allegations of pain or other symptoms, an ALJ utilizes a two-step process. Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *2 (revised Oct. 25, 2017). First, the ALJ must determine whether there is a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. Id. at *3; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). A claimant cannot be found to be “disabled based on alleged symptoms alone.” Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *4.
Once the ALJ has found that a medically determinable impairment has been established, the ALJ must then evaluate the claimant's allegations about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of his or her symptoms against the evidence of record. Id. This evaluation requires the ALJ to consider “the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence; an individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms; statements and other information provided by medical sources and other persons; and any other relevant evidence in the individual's case record.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to consider or address Van Arsdale's testimony whatsoever in his decision. Van Arsdale testified at the plaintiff's December 17, 2019, administrative hearing. (Tr. 70-73.) She testified that, although she did not live with her mother, she saw her “[p]robably five out of seven days a week.” (Tr. 70.) Van Arsdale helped Taylor with “housework, laundry, vacuum, whatever chores she needs done,” as well as cooking and “outside work,” because Taylor was not able to do these tasks. (Tr. 71.) Van Arsdale explained that Taylor was “physically limited with her strength and with her . . . overall mobility.” (Id.) Van Arsdale testified that her mother was unable to “even lift a gallon of milk out of the refrigerator anymore without having problems,” and that Van Arsdale had to help her open bottles. (Tr. 73.) In addition to her mother's physical impairments, Van Arsdale testified that Taylor had cognitive issues as well, which she first noticed a few years prior, and which had grown “more severe lately,” and were now “pretty bad.” (Tr. 71.) Van Arsdale explained that Taylor “has a lot of trouble remembering things. She has a lot of trouble comprehending things.” (Tr. 72.) As an example, Van Arsdale testified: “So, every Sunday we go to church together and Sunday evening she called me and said I haven't seen you all day. I said, mom, we went to church this morning like we always do. And, she kind of paused and she was like, oh, that's right.” (Id.) Van Arsdale continued: “[I]t's just progressively getting worse as time goes on. I actually question if she has dementia. I work in healthcare, so I work with a lot of people with dementia. I see a lot of similarities in my mom versus our dementia patients.” (Id.) Van Arsdale further explained that she tried to attend all of her mother's doctor appointments with her, and she helped her mother with daily medications as well, helping Taylor organize the medications in a pill box and calling her daily to check that Taylor was taking her medications as directed. (Tr. 72-73.) In addition, Van Arsdale submitted a written statement describing this deterioration in her mother's strength, mobility, and cognitive abilities in greater detail. (Tr. 823-25.) None of this was referenced-much less substantively discussed-in the ALJ's written decision.
The Commissioner suggests in her brief that the ALJ did substantively address Van Arsdale's statements and testimony, citing to a passage in which the ALJ wrote that “statements on issues reserved to the Commissioner-including but not limited to . . . non-medical third-party witness statements . . . -are inherently neither valuable nor persuasive to the issue of whether a claimant is disabled ....Therefore, no analysis about how such evidence is considered is provided.” (Tr. 28.) But the witness statements and testimony at issue here do not concern issues reserved to the Commissioner, but rather the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Taylor's symptoms. This cursory mischaracterization and dismissal of Van Arsdale's statements and testimony does not satisfy the ALJ's obligation to substantively address this evidence, as discussed below. See Shoemaker v. Colvin, Case No. 1:14-cv-02049-SHR-GBC, 2015 WL 9690310, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2015) (“[M]erely mentioning these [witness] claims is insufficient.”), report & recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 107962 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2016); see also Hendry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 3:16-cv-08851 (PAZ), 2018 WL 4616111, at *15 & n.12 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2018); Richards v. Colvin, 223 F.Supp.3d 296, 306 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
Third Circuit precedent has long required an ALJ to consider all relevant evidence, including non-medical evidence. See Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983)). “Although the ALJ need not discuss all evidence presented, lay testimony as to a claimant's symptoms is competent evidence which the ALJ must take into account unless he expressly determines to disregard such testimony, in which case, he must give reasons germane to each witness.” Gorecki v. Massanari, 197 F.Supp.2d 154, 159 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (citing Van Horn, 717 F.2d at 873; see also Burnett, 220 F.3d at 122 (“Although allegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must be consistent with objective medical evidence, the ALJ must still explain why he is rejecting the testimony.”) (citation omitted); Hendry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 3:16-cv-08851 (PAZ), 2018 WL 4616111, at *15 & n.12 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2018). Put simply, where the testimony of other witnesses is offered to bolster the claimant's credibility, the Third Circuit “expect[s] the ALJ to address the testimony of such additional witnesses.” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 122; see also Richards v. Colvin, 223 F.Supp.3d 296, 306 (M.D. Pa. 2016); Shoemaker v. Colvin, Case No. 1:14-cv-02049-SHR-GBC, 2015 WL 9690310, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2015), report & recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 107962 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2016). This is consistent with the agency's regulations and policy guidance concerning symptom evaluation. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7.
Here, Van Arsdale's statements and testimony were consistent with the plaintiff's own statements and testimony and with the medical opinion of her rheumatology nurse practitioner, and thus Van Arsdale's statements and testimony are competent evidence that the ALJ was required to address in his decision. The failure to do so is reversible error, and the ALJ here failed to discuss this witness testimony at all. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 122 (citing Van Horn, 717 F.2d at 873); Gorecki, 197 F.Supp.2d at 160; see also Hendry, 2018 WL 4616111, at *15 (“Remand is warranted because the Court cannot meaningfully review this aspect of the ALJ's decision.”).
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, we are unable to conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that the plaintiff was not disabled.
III. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Commissioner's finding that Taylor was not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we recommend that the Commissioner's decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits be vacated and the case be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this report and recommendation.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated March 6, 2023. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.