Opinion
01 Civ. 2566 (RWS) —
November 19, 2001
WARREN TAYLOR, Gowanda Correctional Facility, Gowanda, NY, Petitioner Pro Se.
HONORABLE ROBERT T. JOHNSON, District Attorney, Bronx County, Bronx, NY, By: NANCY D. KILLIAN, ESQ., Assistant District Attorney, Of Counsel, Attorney for Respondent.
OPINION
Warren Taylor ("Petitioner" or "Taylor") has petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his September 1996 conviction for manslaughter in the First Degree following a jury trial in Supreme Court, Bronx County. The Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), on the ground that it is time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). For the reasons set forth below, Respondent's motion is granted and the petition is dismissed.
Background
Taylor was convicted of Manslaughter in the First Degree in New York Supreme Court, Bronx County, on September 11, 1996. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction on direct appeal on November 6, 1997, People v. Taylor, 244 A.D.2d 152 (1st Dept. 1997), and Taylor's application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied on January 13, 1998. People v. Taylor, 91 N.Y.2d 898 (1998).
In papers dated April 23, 1998, Taylor filed a motion in the Appellate Division alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim on direct appeal of ineffective trial counsel. This motion was denied on July 16, 1998. People v. Taylor, 252 A.D.2d 999 (1st Dept. 1998).
Eight months later, in papers dated March 26, 1999, Taylor moved the trial court, pursuant to NYCPL § 440.10, to vacate his judgment of conviction on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On February 23, 2000, this motion was denied on state procedural grounds. After Taylor received permission to file a late application for leave to appeal the denial of his NYCPL § 440 motion pursuant to NYPL § 460.15, the Appellate Division denied him leave to appeal the NYCPL § 440 motion on July 6, 2000.
Taylor's instant petition, signed and dated February 1, 2001, was received by the Pro Se Office of the Southern District of New York on February 7, 2001. See Petition at 2, 7. The petition raises four claims: (1) Taylor was denied a fair trial when the trial court did not sanction the People for late disclosure of discovery material; (2) the evidence of guilt was legally insufficient; (3) Taylor was entitled to a circumstantial evidence charge; and (4) a belt was improperly admitted into evidence. Id. at 5-6. Respondents moved for dismissal of Taylor's petition on August 9, 2001, arguing that his petition is time-barred by the one-year limitation period set forth by AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). On August 28, Taylor filed an amendment to his petition, adding a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Discussion
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244, as amended by AEDPA, an inmate generally must file a Section 2254 habeas corpus petition within one year of the date that his conviction becomes final or the facts giving rise to his claim could have been discovered. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Second Circuit has held that for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244, a state conviction becomes final when the time to seek certiorari to the United States Supreme Court has expired, which is 90 days after the date direct review of the case has been completed by the highest court in the relevant state. See Williams v. Artuz, 237 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).
The one-year limitations period under AEDPA is tolled while "a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). If utilized, this tolling provision "excludes time during which properly filed state relief applications are pending," but it does not restart the statute of limitations clock. See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000).
Applying these rules to the facts of this case, Taylor's petition is time-barred. Taylor's conviction became final on April 13, 1998, the last date upon which he could have sought certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Ten days later, on April 23, 1998, Taylor filed his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel motion, at which point the limitations period was tolled. The limitations clock began running again on July 16, 1998, when that motion was denied. Taylor then waited another 253 days, until March 26, 1999, before filing his NYCPL § 440 motion. The limitations period was tolled again from March 26, 1999 until July 6, 2000, when the Appellate Division denied Taylor leave to appeal. At that point, Taylor had 102 days left to file his federal habeas petition. But Taylor did not file the instant petition until 210 days later, on February 1, 2001. Thus, even after factoring in the tolling provision, Taylor failed to meet the statutory limitations period established under AEDPA.
The Second Circuit has held that the one-year limitations period is subject to equitable tolling upon a petitioner's showing that extraordinary or unusual circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time. See Smith, 208 F.3d at 17. To succeed, the petitioner must "demonstrate a causal relationship between the extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of his filing." Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000). In the instant petition, Taylor claims that time spent in a "special housing unit" from March 19, 1999 through December 22, 1999 kept him from accessing legal materials. He also claims he had difficulty receiving the Appellate Division's July 6, 2000 certificate denying leave to appeal due to his transfer to another correctional facility in December 2000.
The reasons Taylor provides for his failure to comply with the filing deadline do not rise to the level of extraordinary circumstances required to equitably toll the time limitation. First, administrative difficulties associated with correctional procedures such as transfers and lock-downs do not generally constitute circumstances under which equitable tolling is granted. See Saldana v. Artuz, 99 Civ. 5089, 2000 WL 1346855 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2000). "Prisoners familiar with the routine restrictions of prison life must take such matters into account when calculating when to file a federal petition." Atkins v. Harris, 98 Civ. 3188, 1999 WL 13729 at *2 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 7, 1999). Moreover, there is no causal link between either of the reasons given by Taylor and his failure to meet the statutory deadline. Even assuming he had no access to legal materials from March 19, 1999 through December 22, 1999, Taylor received the benefit of AEDPA's tolling provision for all but the first week of that period, given that his NYCPL § 440 motion was pending. As of July 6, 2000, Taylor had less than four months left to file his petition, but he failed to do so. The transfer to a different correctional facility could not have presented any difficulties for Taylor since it occurred on December 15, 2000, well after the limitations clock had run out. In sum, Taylor presents no extraordinary circumstances that justify an equitable tolling of AEDPA's one-year deadline.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's motion to dismiss Taylor's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted. Accordingly, Taylor's petition is denied. As the Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; see also United States v. Perez, 129 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 1997); Lozada v. United States, 107 F.3d 1011 (2d Cir. 1997). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
It is so ordered.