Opinion
C. A. 1:21-4036-MGL-PJG
06-13-2022
Anissaa Moeya Taylor, Plaintiff, v. Joshua R. Himes, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, Anissaa Moeya Taylor, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against South Carolina Highway Patrol Officer Joshua Himes. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendant's motion to dismiss Taylor's Complaint as being barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (ECF No. 8.) Taylor filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 16), and the defendant replied (ECF No. 17). Having reviewed the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the court finds that the defendant's motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
This matter arises from the defendant patrol officer's arrest of the plaintiff on June 8, 2018. At the jail, the plaintiff was booked for a violation of South Carolina's open container prohibition. See S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-110. She spent the night in jail and was released the next day. A county magistrate ultimately dismissed the charge on December 13, 2018. The plaintiff filed this action asserting unspecified causes of action against Defendant Himes for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standard
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
B. Statute of Limitations Defense
The defendant correctly argues that any Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest or imprisonment is barred under Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). Apparently conceding this, the plaintiff contends that her constitutional claim is one based on malicious prosecution. This type of claim was recently addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Thompson v. Clark, 142 S.Ct. 1332 (2022).
In Thompson, the Supreme Court expressly recognized for the first time that a § 1983 claim can lie for so-called “malicious prosecution” when a law enforcement officer wrongfully initiates criminal proceedings without probable cause. Id. at 1337-38. Precedent holds that a Fourth Amendment claim based on malicious prosecution does not accrue until the prosecution ends. See McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149, 2160 (2019); Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012). The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim in South Carolina is three years. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989); Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]o determine the timely filing of a § 1983 claim, courts borrow the statute of limitations from the most analogous state-law cause of action. For § 1983 suits, that cause of action is a personal-injury suit.”) (internal citations omitted); Brannon v. Blanton, C/A No. 9:15-2434-CMC, 2016 WL 4232886, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2016) (“[T]he statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in South Carolina is three years, regardless of the underlying allegations of the § 1983 claim.”); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5). The Complaint was filed on December 13, 2021, exactly three years after the charges against the plaintiff were dismissed. Accordingly, the plaintiff argues, her constitutional claim based on malicious prosecution is timely.
See id. at 1341 (Alito, J., dissenting) (observing that “this Court has never held that the Fourth Amendment houses a malicious-prosecution claim”).
Courts in the Fourth Circuit previously held that the prosecution must end with some indication of innocence. See, e.g., Salley v. Myers, 971 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2020), abrogated by Thompson, 142 S.Ct. 1332. In Thompson, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff need only show that the prosecution ended without a conviction, regardless of any affirmative indica of innocence. Thompson, 142 S.Ct. at 1341.
In turn, the defendant argues that the facts alleged can plausibly support claims only for false arrest or imprisonment, not malicious prosecution. Here, the Complaint expressly alleges that the defendant “maliciously instituted and continued criminal proceedings” without probable cause and that the charges were terminated in her favor. (Compl. ¶¶ 11-12, ECF No. 1 at 3-4.) The facts in the Complaint, taken as true, establish that the defendant arrested the plaintiff without a warrant and caused her to be detained for one night in jail based on a citation unsupported by probable cause. See McDonough, 139 S.Ct. at 2160 (stating that the injury caused by a classic malicious prosecution likewise first occurs as soon as legal process is brought to bear on a defendant, yet the claims does not accrue until the prosecution is terminated) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)). Taylor could not have immediately brought that claim. See McDonough, 139 S.Ct. at 2156; Thompson, 142 S.Ct. at 1341 (holding that one element of a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment is that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction). Based on the facts alleged in the Complaint, the court cannot say that Taylor's claim based on Himes's alleged wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause is time barred.
The defendant's reliance on Manuel v. Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2018), on remand from 137 S.Ct. 911 (2017), is unavailing, as that case has apparently been superseded by the United States Supreme Court's decisions expressly holding that Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims do not accrue until the prosecution ends without a conviction. See McDonough, 139 S.Ct. at 2160; Thompson, 142 S.Ct. at 1341.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, any claim based on a Fourth Amendment violation for false arrest or imprisonment should be dismissed as time barred. The defendant's motion to dismiss based on untimeliness should be denied as to the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).