Opinion
No. M2008-01579-COA-R3-CV.
Assigned on Briefs April 28, 2009.
Filed September 9, 2009.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County; No. 55342; Robert Corlew, Judge.
Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed.
C. Michael Lawson, Esq., Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Steve Taylor and Melissa Miles.
Patrick Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Steve Harris d/b/a Automotive Design.
Richard H. Dinkins, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Patricia J. Cottrell, P. J. M.S. and Frank G. Clement, Jr., J. joined.
OPINION
Purchasers of a vehicle instituted action against the vehicle's seller and previous owners alleging violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Circuit Court entered judgment for the purchasers and awarded $7,500.00 in attorney's fees. Purchasers appeal the amount of the attorney's fees award. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. Background
On April 28, 2008, the trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, Steve Taylor and Melissa Miles, finding that defendant, Steve Harris d/b/a Automotive Design, had liability under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act because he knew or should have known that his repair work to the vehicle subsequently purchased by plaintiffs did not meet the industry standard and that, as a result of his actions, the value of the plaintiffs' automobile was diminished. The trial court awarded plaintiffs $4,500.00, the actual cost of the repairs at the time it was first determined repairs were necessary. The trial court did not award treble damages having found "insufficient proof to show that the defendant `willfully or knowingly' violated the Act." Finally, the trial court awarded reasonable attorney's fees.
Parties will be referred to according to their designation in the trial court.
On May 14, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees in which plaintiffs' counsel sought an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $17,250.00 based on 57.5 hours of work expended in litigation of this case. Defendant opposed the motion contending that the hourly rate of $300.00 per hour was too high for the nature of the lawsuit.
Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order awarding attorney's fees in the amount of $7,500.00. Plaintiffs appeal asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $7,500.00 in attorney's fees instead of the requested amount of $17,250.00.
II. Analysis
The only issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in its award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erroneously "used in its reasoning for the reduction the disparity between the amount of the fees requested by counsel and the amount of the verdict."
In its order, the trial court explained the basis for its determination of the amount of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded thusly:
After hearing argument of counsel for both the Plaintiffs and the Defendant, the Court considered the factors listed Supreme Court Rule 8, D.R. 2-106, the guidelines delineated in Conners v. Conners, 594 S.W.2d 672 (Tenn. 1980) and the fact that the amount requested in attorney fees significantly exceeds the amount of the verdict in this case. After consideration of these factors, the Court does not allow the amount of fees requested ($17,250.00) and finds that a fee of $7,500.00 is a reasonable fee to be awarded to counsel for Plaintiff.
Under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, the prevailing party is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys fees. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109(e)(1). The determination of reasonable attorneys' fees is necessarily a discretionary inquiry by the trial court. Keith v. Howerton, 165 S.W.3d 248, 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); Krug v. Krug, 838 S.W.2d 197, 205 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Connors v. Conners, 594 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Tenn. 1980). An appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court; consequently, absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court's ruling "will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to propriety of the decision made." Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001). A trial court abuses its discretion when it either "applie[s] an incorrect legal standard, or reache[s] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that cause[s] an injustice to the party complaining." Id.
The Tennessee Supreme Court has directed that when determining reasonable attorney's fees the trial courts should consider the factors set forth in Connors v. Conners and, when appropriate, the guidelines listed in Supreme Court Rule 8, RPC 1.5. Conners v. Conners, 594 S.W.2d at 676. The Connors factors include:
1. The time devoted to performing the legal service.
2. The time limitations imposed by the circumstances.
3. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
4. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
5. The amount involved and the results obtained.
6. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer performing the legal service.
Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 lists similar criteria, though not identical to the Connors guidelines.
The Rule provides:
The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(9) prior advertisements or statements by the lawyer with respect to the fees the lawyer charges; and
(10) whether the fee agreement is in writing.
Tenn. S.Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.5.
Tennessee courts have also held that the policy considerations applicable to an award of counsel fees under the federal civil rights statutes are applicable to cases arising under the Consumer Protection Act. See, e.g., Keith v. Howerton, 165 S.W.3d 248, 253 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). In determining a reasonable counsel fee, the court in Keith noted:
The Hensley Court opined that no "precise formula" exists for determining a reasonable fee, but it also specifically rejected a "mathematical approach" that simply compares the number of issues on which the plaintiff prevailed to the total number of issues overall in dispute. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 n. 11, 103 S. Ct. 1933. Also, if only a partial or limited success is achieved, a fee determined by the calculation of hours multiplied by an hourly rate could be excessive. Id. At 434-436, 103 S.Ct. 1933.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983).
165 S.W. 3d 252.
Ultimately, the reasonableness of an attorney's fee depends on the particular circumstances of the individual case, as considered in light of the relevant guidelines. Keith v. Howerton, 165 S.W.3d at 251; White v. McBride, 937 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tenn. 1996). "The amount of time expended, and the hourly rate commonly charged by attorneys for doing similar work in the community, while important, are not the only, or even the controlling, factors to be considered." United Medical Corp. of Tennessee, Inc. v. Hohenwald Bank and Trust Co., 703 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tenn. 1986). "A fee is excessive if `after review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.'" Fell v. Rambo, 36 S.W.3d 837, 852 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Tenn. S.Ct. R. 8, DR 2-106(B)); In re Davis's Estate, 719 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court incorrectly based its fee award on the proportionality between the amount of the fee requested and the amount of damages and submit that the full amount requested should be awarded. In support of the application for fees, counsel submitted his affidavit, in which he stated that he had been engaged to represent the plaintiffs at his standard hourly rate. The application also included the affidavits of two attorneys in Middle Tennessee, who both opined that the number of hours expended by plaintiffs' counsel was reasonable and that "[t]he total fee of $17,250 is also a reasonable amount of money for this type of representation in my professional opinion." Absent from the application was proof that the requested rate of $300.00 per hour was reasonable or customarily charged in Rutherford County for cases of this type, an exposition of the "novelty and difficulty" of any issues in the case, or whether such issues would call for particular legal skill.
We do not agree with plaintiffs' counsel that the total amount requested, $17,250.00, based on his standard hourly rate of $300.00 multiplied by the number of hours expended, should be the basis of the award. It is incumbent upon the trial court to determine a "reasonable" award, considering the various factors it is mandated to consider as well as the facts of the particular case. The trial court here determined that $7,500.00 in attorney's fees was reasonable under the circumstances of this case and explained that it made its determination after consideration of all of the Conners and Tenn. S.Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.5 factors, including the amount involved and the results obtained.
In our review of the record we give deference to the trial court, who is in a better position to assess the legal and factual issues involved and is familiar with the customary fees awarded in similar cases in Rutherford County. These are matters customarily left to the discretion of the trial judge because the judge, of course, is familiar with the facts of the case and the manner in which it was litigated. The "amount involved and results obtained" is one of the factors that the court is directed to consider pursuant to Connors and Tenn. S.Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.5. Unlike the court in Keith, the record here does not show that a "proportionality rationale" guided the trial court; neither does the record show that the trial court failed to properly consider the various factors.
While we agree with courts that have emphasized the importance of fully compensating attorneys for the time spent representing clients in consumer protection cases where there is often only a relatively small potential of damages, see Keith v. Howerton, 165 S.W.3d at 253, and that attorneys are "entitled to the reasonable, agreed-upon compensation without regard to the actual benefit the services might have been to the client," Fell v. Rambo, 36 S.W.3d 837, 852 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), the fee awarded must be reasonable in light of the circumstances of the case. We do not find in our review of the record that the trial court's award of $7,500.00, or $130.00 per hour, was unreasonable or an abuse of discretion in this case.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs of the appeal are taxed to the plaintiffs, Steve Taylor and Melissa Miles.