Opinion
CASE NO. 2018-T-0100
05-28-2019
GUDONAVON J. TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. BRANDESHAWN HARRIS, WARDEN, Respondent.
Gudonavon J. Taylor, pro se, PID: A627-232, Trumbull Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 901, 5701 Burnett Road, Leavittsburg, OH 44430 (Petitioner). Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, State Office Tower, 30 East Broad Street, 16th Floor, Columbus, OH 43215-3428 (For Respondent).
OPINION Original Action for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Judgment: Petition Dismissed. Gudonavon J. Taylor, pro se, PID: A627-232, Trumbull Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 901, 5701 Burnett Road, Leavittsburg, OH 44430 (Petitioner). Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, State Office Tower, 30 East Broad Street, 16th Floor, Columbus, OH 43215-3428 (For Respondent). PER CURIAM.
{¶1} On November 21, 2018, petitioner, Gudonavon J. Taylor ("Taylor"), filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he is an inmate unlawfully restrained of liberty at the Trumbull Correctional Institution. On December 4, 2018, this court issued an alternative writ, ordering respondent to file an answer or dispositive motion in response. The answer or dispositive motion was due within 15 days of the order. Respondent failed to respond. In the meantime, petitioner filed a motion to proceed to judgment and an application for default judgment.
{¶2} On March 15, 2019, this court issued a Judgment Entry ordering respondent to show cause why this court should not enter default judgment in favor of petitioner within 10 days. Respondent failed to answer or otherwise respond to the order. Therefore, we proceed to judgment and hereby dismiss the petition.
{¶3} Taylor's petition states two causes of action. First, he states that the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him for failing to make the required statutory findings under R.C. 2152.12 and Juv.R. 30. Second, Taylor argues that Ohio's mandatory-transfer statute is unconstitutional. Therefore, Taylor alleges that he is being held illegally against his will, his conviction should be vacated and deemed void, and he should be immediately released from confinement. History
{¶4} On April 7, 2008, Taylor was indicted on three counts of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) and 2903.02(B); two counts of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and 2903.11(A)(1); one count of discharging a firearm on or near prohibited premises, in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3)(C)(4); and one count of having weapons under disability, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), each with a three-year firearm specification. The facts in the matter are stated in State v. Taylor, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23990, 2013-Ohio-186, and do not need to be restated for purposes of this action.
{¶5} Following a jury trial on all charges except having weapons while under disability, Taylor was found guilty of each offense and specification. Following a bench trial on the remaining charge, Taylor was found guilty by the trial judge of having weapons while under disability. The court sentenced Taylor to an aggregate prison term of 41 years to life.
{¶6} Taylor first appealed his conviction and sentence to the Second District on April 19, 2010. The Second District affirmed the conviction, and the Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over an appeal. State v. Taylor, 135 Ohio St.3d 1459, 2013-Ohio-2285. Next, the Second District granted a motion to reopen App.R. 26(B), but then reaffirmed the conviction. State v. Taylor, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23990, 2014-Ohio-3647, appeal not accepted, 141 Ohio St.3d 1490, 2015-Ohio-842. Three years after the Second District court reaffirmed Taylor's conviction, Taylor filed a pro se "Motion to Vacate Unlawful Sentence," the denial of which was also affirmed on appeal. State v. Taylor, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27879, 2018-Ohio-4628.
{¶7} Taylor also filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the Southern District of Ohio, which was denied in case No. 3-16-CV-398. According to that court, Taylor reported that he filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus under R.C. 2725.01, et seq., on March 14, 2016, in the Ohio Twelfth District Court of Appeals, raising the same claims he made in the federal petition. The federal court claimed that the state petition was reportedly dismissed May 19, 2016, and not appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court; however, this court has no record of that action.
{¶8} Taylor filed an affidavit of civil actions of the previous five years, as required by law, which vaguely identifies the state habeas claim. The affidavit states as follows:
I, Gudonavon J. Taylor, state and depose that to the best of my knowledge, I have filed six civil actions in the previous five years. I have filed a civil suit against my appellate counsel for legal malpractice in 2013. P.J. ConBoy filed a state habeas corpus and federal habeas corpus on my behalf in 2016. I filed a motion to vacate unlawful sentence in 2017. I filed a motion to correct allied offenses and a motion for resentencing in 2018.Law and Analysis
{¶9} A writ of habeas corpus may only be granted if the petitioner establishes that either (1) the sentencing court in his underlying criminal proceeding lacked jurisdiction to convict him, or (2) he is still being held in prison although he has already served his entire sentence. State ex rel. Vinson v. Gansheimer, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2007-A-0042, 2007-Ohio-5205, ¶6. "Furthermore, it is well settled under Ohio law that an inmate is not entitled to the issuance of the writ when there exists an alternative legal remedy through which he could obtain the identical relief sought under the habeas corpus claim." Id.; see also Cornell v. Schotten, 69 Ohio St.3d 466, 467 (1994) (habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for other forms of action, such as a direct appeal or postconviction relief petition). "'A proceeding in habeas corpus is not an appeal from a criminal conviction; it is a distinct collateral attack on the petitioner's continued confinement.'" State v. Smith, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2008-CA-104, 2009-Ohio-6597, ¶5, quoting Bar Assoc. of Greater Cleveland v. Steele, 65 Ohio St.2d 1, 2 (1981).
{¶10} Taylor's first cause of action asserts that his convictions are void because the juvenile court failed to make the required findings pursuant to R.C. 2152.12 and Juv.R. 30. He cites the following language from the order:
[T]he motion to relinquish jurisdiction should be and is hereby granted, and this case and the said Gudonavon Taylor are hereby transferred to the General Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Ohio, for criminal prosecution as an adult pursuant to Sections 2152.10(A)(1)(a) and 2152.12(A)(1)(a) of the Ohio Revised Code.
{¶11} Based solely on this excerpt, Taylor asserts that the court failed to make the required findings and therefore did not have subject matter jurisdiction.
{¶12} At the time of Taylor's transfer, R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a) provided, in pertinent part:
After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child for committing an act that would be aggravated murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, or attempted murder if committed by an adult, the juvenile court at a hearing shall transfer the case if the child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of the act charged and there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged. The juvenile court also shall transfer the case at a hearing if the child was fourteen or fifteen years of age at the time of the act charged, if section 2152.10 of the Revised Code provides that the child is eligible for mandatory transfer, and if there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged.
{¶13} Further, Juv.R. 30(G) states: "The order of transfer shall state the reasons for transfer." Taylor's argument fails because he has presented the court with only the last paragraph of the transfer order. The language preceding the cited section shows that the juvenile court clearly met the requirements of the statute:
This matter came on to be heard by the Court on the 11th day of March 2008 upon the Motion of the State of Ohio that this Court relinquish jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 2152.10(A)(1)(a) and 2152.12(A)(1)(a) of the Ohio Revised Code.Petitioner's Exhibit B-2 (emphasis added). Therefore, Taylor was given a hearing and all of the requirements for transfer were met.
The Court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the said Gudonovan Taylor committed the acts alleged in the above-captioned case, to wit: count one, murder, in violation of Section 2903.02(A) O.R.C.; and count two, murder as a proximate result of the commission of felonious assault, in violation of Section 2903.02(B) O.R.C.
The Court further finds that there is probable cause to believe that the said Gudonovan Taylor did use a firearm in the commission of count two, murder as a proximate result of the commission of felonious assault.
Further, this Court finds that written notice was given as required by the Ohio Revised Code Section 2152.12(G), and/or that any defect in notice has been waived; that all parties necessary were present; and that the child was represented by an attorney, Anthony VanNoy, who was present. Further, this Court finds that the above child is more than fourteen years of age, to wit: seventeen years of age, his date of birth being May 21; 1990, and that the acts alleged would be felonies if committed by an adult.
{¶14} Taylor's first cause of action is without merit.
{¶15} Taylor's second cause of action asserts that Ohio's mandatory-transfer statute is unconstitutional.
{¶16} In the present matter, there are several reasons not to reach the constitutional challenge made by Taylor.
{¶17} First, Taylor's affidavit listing civil actions and appeals fails to comply with the statutory requirements. Under R.C. 2969.25:
(A) At the time that an inmate commences a civil action or appeal against a government entity or employee, the inmate shall file with the court an affidavit that contains a description of each civil action or appeal of a civil action that the inmate has filed in the previous five years in any state or federal court. The affidavit shall include all of the following for each of those civil actions or appeals:
(1) A brief description of the nature of the civil action or appeal;
(2) The case name, case number, and the court in which the civil action or appeal was brought;
(3) The name of each party to the civil action or appeal;
(4) The outcome of the civil action or appeal, including whether the court dismissed the civil action or appeal as frivolous or malicious under state or federal law or rule of court, whether the court made an award against the inmate or the inmate's counsel of record for frivolous conduct under section 2323.51 of the Revised Code, another statute, or a rule of court, and, if the court so dismissed the action or appeal or made an award of that nature, the date of the final order affirming the dismissal or award.
{¶18} "Failure to file an affidavit listing each civil action filed in the previous five years is cause for dismissal of the petition." Richards v. Tate, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 01-BA-51, 2002 WL 152292, *3 (Jan. 29, 2002), citing State ex rel. Zanders v. Ohio Parole Bd., 82 Ohio St.3d 421 (1998). Taylor's affidavit fails to give descriptions of the nature of his civil actions and appeals, omits filings, omits the case numbers and courts where the actions or appeals were brought, omits the names of parties to actions and appeals, and does not disclose the outcome of any actions filed. "'The requirements of R.C. 2969.25 are mandatory, and failure to comply with them subjects an inmate's action to dismissal.'" Turner v. Coulson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2015-L-052, 2015-Ohio-3416, ¶4, quoting State ex rel. White v. Bechtel, 99 Ohio St.3d 11, 2003-Ohio-2262, ¶5.
{¶19} Further, we conclude that the instant petition is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. "[H]abeas corpus actions are typically exempt from res judicata because '"[c]onventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake."'" State ex. rel. Childs v. Lazaroff, 90 Ohio St.3d 519, 520 (2001), quoting Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 63 (1990) quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
{¶20} "Nevertheless, in Hudlin v. Alexander (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 153, 155-156, 586 N.E.2d 86, 87, after noting the foregoing statement from Natl. Amusements, we held that res judicata is applicable to successive habeas corpus petitions because habeas corpus petitioners have the right to appeal adverse judgments in habeas corpus cases." Id., citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 479 (1991) ("As appellate review became available from a decision in habeas refusing to discharge the prisoner, courts began to question the continuing validity of the common-law rule allowing endless successive [habeas corpus] petitions"). "We have since consistently applied res judicata to bar petitioners from filing successive habeas corpus petitions." Id. (citations omitted).
{¶21} Taylor previously filed a federal habeas corpus action and a state habeas corpus action—which is identified in his affidavit of filings without giving a summary or identifying the disposition of the case—in which he could have raised his second cause of action. See Freeman v. Tate, 65 Ohio St.3d 440, 441 (1992) ("In this case, the record demonstrates that appellant has previously filed at least one habeas corpus action * * * in which [his successive habeas corpus claim] could have been raised.").
{¶22} Based on the foregoing, res judicata bars Taylor from filing this successive habeas corpus petition.
{¶23} Taylor's second cause of action is without merit.
{¶24} Based on the foregoing, Taylor's petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed. CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J., MARY JANE TRAPP, J., concur.