Opinion
No. C00-1010
July 24, 2001
ORDER
This matter comes before the court pursuant to Defendant Farmland Foods, Inc.'s March 1, 2001 motion for summary judgment (docket number 15). The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is granted.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff Samuel Taylor began working for FDL Foods, Inc. ("FDL") on June 9, 1983 at its Dubuque, Iowa pork processing plant. On July 1, 1996, Farmland Foods, Inc. ("Farmland") became the employer at the Dubuque plant. Farmland's pork processing operation involved challenging working conditions in which some jobs were more physically demanding and/or gruesome than others. The plant was mechanized and refrigerated. Many areas were cold and noisy. High production standards and high employee absenteeism exacerbated the stressful conditions. On any given day, between 25 and 30 employees in the hog kill department alone failed to show up for work. To fill the hog kill department, the supervisor would move workers from their "home base" to hog kill. Workers were needed in hog kill on a daily basis to cover for absent employees.
Taylor initially worked on the second shift in the smoked meats department of the plant. Taylor performed a variety of jobs within the smoked meats department. Taylor enjoyed working in smoked meats because the jobs were relatively easy. Occasionally, due to operational needs, FDL or Farmland laid Taylor off to other departments where he worked as a temporary employee. On other occasions, elimination of a second shift line in the smoked meats department due to a slowdown in production resulted in Taylor's reassignment to a first shift job within that department. During his employment, Taylor performed various production line activities in the smoked meats department and the hog kill department.
During Taylor's tenure at the plant, Kyle Whited was the plant manager, Jerry Miller was a supervisor in smoked meats, "Peanuts" Diaz-Ramirez was an assistant supervisor in hog kill, and Dick Hoefer was a supervisor in hog kill.
For a period of time immediately prior to the week of April 6, 1998, Taylor's job in the hog kill department involved vacuuming hog backs. Taylor viewed this vacuuming job as desirable, relative to the more unpleasant or physically demanding hog kill jobs. On April 6, 1998, another employee in the hog kill department with more seniority than Taylor, Mike Agnitsch, presented a doctor's note restricting him to light duty. Farmland assigned him to the vacuuming job. The following day, Farmland again assigned Agnitsch to hog vacuuming. Taylor complained to assistant supervisor "Peanuts" Diaz-Ramirez that he deserved the vacuuming position. Taylor then demanded to immediately speak to supervisor Dick Hoefer or he would quit. Diaz-Ramirez responded that Hoefer was in a meeting but that when Hoefer returned, Taylor could speak with him. When Hoefer returned, Diaz-Ramirez personally took Taylor's job on the line and told Taylor: "Mr. Hoefer is in the office, go see him now." Taylor did not do so. Rather, he went to the Personnel Department and resigned. Taylor explained in writing that he was quitting because "supervision didn't try to work according to the [union] contract." A personnel representative specifically asked Taylor to think over his decision. Taylor did not pursue any other form of internal redress within the company even though he had successfully done so in the past, including while employed in hog kill. In July 1996, Taylor had complained of discrimination but did not pursue a complaint in court.
His complaint was filed in federal court on April 4, 2000. Count I of Taylor's complaint alleges race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Count II alleges harassment; and Count III alleges retaliation. He complains about many events going back to the 1980s. He only worked a few days in the two years preceding the filing of this case.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if, after examining all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kegel v. Runnels, 793 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1986). Once the movant has properly supported its motion, the nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the nonmovant must show that, on an element essential to [its] case and on which [it] will bear the burden of proof at trial, there are genuine issues of material fact." Noll v. Petrovsky, 828 F.2d 461, 462 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Although "direct proof is not required to create a jury question, . . . to avoid summary judgment, 'the facts and circumstances relied upon must attain the dignity of substantial evidence and must not be such as merely to create a suspicion.'" Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Impro Prod., Inc. v. Herrick, 715 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir. 1983)). In applying these standards, the court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Krause v. Perryman, 827 F.2d 346, 350 (8th Cir. 1987).
In the context of employment discrimination cases, summary judgment should be used sparingly. Hardin v. Hussman, 45 F.3d 262, 264 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). "'Because discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant.'" Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1994)). In applying these standards, the court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Krause, 827 F.2d at 350.
III. Statute of Limitations A. Section 1981 Claims
First, Farmland argues that most of the events comprising Taylor's claims fall outside the two-year statute of limitations period applicable to a Section 1981 claim. Iowa's two-year statute of limitations governing personal injury actions applies to Taylor's Section 1981 claims. Iowa Code § 614.1(2) (2000); see Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 (1984). This action was filed on April 4, 2000; therefore, Farmland argues it is entitled to summary judgment on all of Taylor's claims except his claims of discriminatory job assignments in the hog kill department on April 6 and 7, 1998, and retaliatory and discriminatory constructive discharge on April 7, 1998. Taylor argues that he can recover for acts reaching back to October 9, 1997, which is 180 days from the date he filed his original charge on April 7, 1998 under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) and Chapter 216 of the Iowa Code.
Taylor, however, has not alleged a violation of Title VII or Iowa Code Chapter 216 in his complaint. Taylor's complaint only alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) requires a pleading to set forth in its claim for relief "a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends . . . ." The complaint alleges a violation of Section 1981 and does not allege violations of Title VII or the Iowa Code; therefore, the court will consider Taylor's claim only in the context of Section 1981 and its two-year statute of limitation.
In paragraph 87 of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts, Taylor states that his claims arise under Section 1981 and Title VII, and cites his complaint for this assertion. The complaint, however, alleges only violations of Section 1981 and never states that any of his claims arise under Title VII.
B. Continuing Violation Doctrine
Taylor argues that all of the events he complains about constituted a "continuing violation" and therefore are not time-barred. The Eighth Circuit recently clarified the continuing violation doctrine's applicability to Section 1981. In Madison v. IBP, Inc., Nos. 99-2853, 99-2859, 2001 WL 704432 (8th Cir. June 25, 2001), the court stated:
In the Eighth Circuit plaintiffs may only recover damages on their federal employment discrimination claims for acts committed during the statute of limitations period, even if there was a continuing violation. This means that the damages recovery period for federal employment discrimination claims in this circuit is the same as the period in which a plaintiff must file her claim . . . .Id. at *13 (citation omitted). The court continued:
"The rationale for the Eighth Circuit rule is that it 'strikes a reasonable balance between permitting redress of an ongoing wrong and imposing liability for conduct long past.'"Id. (quoting Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1995)).
IV. Racial Discrimination
Count I of Taylor's complaint alleges racial discrimination. Taylor's racial discrimination claim is analyzed under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 890 (1973). In order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate four elements:
"(1) that he was within a protected class; (2) that he was qualified to perform h[i]s job; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that members of other racial groups were treated more favorably." Clearwater v. Independent School ddDistrict Number 166, 231 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2000). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, "the burden then shifts to the employer to identify a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action." Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000). After the employer identifies a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge, the employer then has the burden "to show that the articulated reason was a pretext."Id.
A. Taylor's Prima Facie Case
First, Taylor is an African-American and is therefore a member of a protected class. Second, the parties do not dispute that Taylor was qualified to perform his job. Third, Taylor must show a factual dispute regarding whether "he was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside [his] protected class." Palesch v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, 233 F.3d 560, 568 (8th Cir. 2000). Taylor "has the burden of demonstrating that there were individuals similarly situated in all relevant aspects to h[im] by a preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, the individuals used for comparison must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing factors." Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Taylor compares himself to Mike Agnitsch. When Agnitsch presented a doctor's note restricting him to light duty, Farmland assigned him to the vacuuming job. Farmland contends that Agnitsch had more seniority and therefore it was proper to assign him to this position, while Taylor contends that Agnitsch could have performed other jobs consistent with the lifting restriction.
See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 74-77.
B. Adverse Employment Action
Farmland argues that Taylor cannot show he suffered from any adverse employment action within the statutory time period. It claims that Taylor was simply temporarily shifted from one job on the hog kill line to another to accommodate another employee's need for light duty. "An adverse employment action is exhibited by a material employment disadvantage, such as a change in salary, benefits, or responsibilities."Bradley v. Widnall, 232 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2000). "Changes in duties or working conditions that cause no materially significant disadvantage . . . are insufficient to establish the adverse conduct required to make a prima facie case." Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit has stated:
The clear trend of authority is to hold that a " purely lateral transfer, that is, a transfer that does not involve a demotion in form or substance, cannot rise to the level of a materially adverse employment action." A transfer involving only minor changes in working conditions and no reduction in pay or benefits will not constitute an adverse employment action, "otherwise every trivial personnel action that an irritable employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit."Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (quotingWilliams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996)) (emphasis in original) (alterations omitted).
According to Taylor, the following events — all involving his assignment to jobs within the hog kill department — occurred during the two-year statutory period: on Monday, April 6, 1998, Mike Agnitsch, a temporary employee from the smoked meats department who was assigned to hog kill, presented a doctor's excuse for light duty with a lifting restriction of less than fifteen pounds. Dick Hoefer, Taylor's supervisor, instructed Taylor that he could not do the vacuuming job and was needed to perform the pans job. Hoefer assigned Agnitsch to the vacuuming job and placed Taylor on the kidney job. Taylor was upset regarding the assignment and complained to the assistant supervisor, "Peanuts" Diaz-Ramirez. Taylor requested to speak with Dick Hoefer. Diaz-Ramirez told Taylor that Hoefer was at a meeting and when Hoefer returned Taylor could speak with him. Taylor resigned, cleared out his locker and attempted to speak with Kyle Whited, but Whited was not there.
See Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 212-230.
The events regarding Taylor's assignments in the hog kill division on April 6 and 7, 1998 do not rise to the level of a material employment disadvantage and therefore do not constitute an adverse employment action. While some of the jobs in the hog kill division were perceived by Taylor as being more desirable than other jobs, his assignment to the kidney job instead of the vacuuming job was not an adverse employment action. Taylor argues that the actions of managerial employees Dick Sherman, Jerry Miller, Dick Hoefer, and Kyle Whited over the course of Taylor's employment interfered with his ability to do his job and these actions culminated in his constructive discharge on April 7, 1998. However, in Madison, the Eighth Circuit made it clear that plaintiffs may only recover for claims during the limitations period. Madison, 2001 WL 704432, at *13. Therefore, because no violation occurred within the statutory time period, the conduct of supervisors prior to April 4, 1998 is irrelevant and Taylor has not established his prima facie case.
C. Constructive Discharge
In addition, Taylor cannot show that he was constructively discharged. "Constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes an employee's work environment so intolerable that resignation is the employee's only plausible alternative." Williams v. City of Kansas City, 223 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2000). "An employee has an obligation not to assume the worst and jump to conclusions too quickly." Id. at 754 (quotations omitted). "An objective standard is employed to determine whether an employee was constructively discharged. . . . If an employee quits without giving h[is] employer a reasonable chance to work out the problem, the employee is not constructively discharged." Bergstrom-Ek v. Best Oil Co., 153 F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir. 1998). When an employee has "an avenue of redress within the company and fail[s] to use it," a constructive discharge has not occurred. Howard v. Burns Bros., 149 F.3d 835, 842 (8th Cir. 1998).
On April 7, 1998, Taylor requested to speak with Dick Hoefer and stated if he was not given the chance to talk to him, he would quit. Peanuts Diaz-Ramirez told him Hoefer was in a meeting and Taylor could speak to him when he returned. Taylor attempted to speak to Kyle Whited, but Whited was not in his office. The incidents which occurred after April 4, 1998 do not rise to the level of a constructive discharge. Taylor was told he could speak to Hoefer when he returned from his meeting. Taylor resigned before giving Farmland any opportunity to address the alleged discriminatory treatment from which he suffered on April 6 and 7. Because Taylor's resignation was not a constructive discharge, it cannot be considered an adverse employment action.
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts ¶ 228.
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts ¶ 229.
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts ¶ 230.
D. Farmland's Reason for Transferring Taylor and Evidence of Pretext
Even if Taylor could establish the prima facie elements of his claim, Farmland has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for transferring him within the hog kill department on April 6 and 7, 1998. Farmland moved Taylor in order to accommodate the medical restrictions of Mike Agnitsch.
Taylor must show "sufficient admissible evidence from which a rational factfinder could find that the [employer]'s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was either untrue or not the real reason, and that intentional discrimination was the real reason." Lang, 107 F.3d at 1311. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), the Supreme Court addressed the quantum of evidence necessary to create a jury question at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. It held that
The Reeves case involved an age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and arose in the context of a judgment as a matter of law following a trial on the merits. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 138-39. The Court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to the plaintiff's age discrimination claim. Id. at 140. Furthermore, the Court made it clear that its McDonnell Douglas analysis under the Reeves case also applies to motions for summary judgment. See id. at 150.
"a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Id. at 148. This statement in Reeves made clear that additional, independent evidence of discriminatory animus is not always required to support an inference of discrimination, and that evidence supporting the plaintiff's prima facie case and exposing as pretextual the employer's reason for an adverse employment action should be considered, along with any other evidence that may exist, in determining whether an inference of discrimination has been raised.Fisher v. Pharmacia Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 922 (8th Cir. 2000). Taylor has not presented sufficient evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude Farmland's action was a pretext for discrimination. Because of this, Farmland is entitled to summary judgment on Taylor's racial discrimination claim.
V. Racial Harassment
Count II of Taylor's complaint alleges hostile work environment racial harassment. To establish a prima facie case of racial harassment, Taylor "must show (1) he belonged to a protected group; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based upon race; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of his employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action." Ross v. Douglass County, Nebraska, 234 F.3d 391, 395-96 (8th Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted). In order to establish a racial harassment claim that is not time-barred by the statute of limitations, Taylor must "show that after [April 4, 1998], he was a victim of intimidation, ridicule, and insult on account of his race that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment." Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co., 171 F.3d 574, 579 (8th Cir. 1999).
A. Consideration of Conduct Prior to April 1998
Taylor argues that the court is " required to consider all evidence of harassing conduct during all periods of employment" under Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 572 (8th Cir. 1997). InKimzey, the court stated:
Plaintiff's Brief at 20 n. 6.
In a hostile work environment claim, evidence concerning all circumstances of the complainant's employment must be considered, including the frequency of the offending conduct, its severity, whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interfered with work performance. Incidents which occurred outside the filing period also may be admissible as relevant background to later discriminatory acts.Id. at 573 (citations omitted). In Van Steenburgh v. Rival Co., 171 F.3d 1155, 1159 (8th Cir. 1999), which is also cited by Taylor, the court stated that "[a]n incident within the limitation period need not satisfy the definition of [racial] harassment . . . when viewed in isolation. Rather, the jury must be capable of perceiving the incident as 'discriminatory' in light of all the prior incidents of [racial] harassment." Id. (citations omitted). Taylor is correct in asserting that a hostile environment claim is not discrete in nature but part of an on-going work-place environment. See id. However, the Gipson court instructs that a plaintiff must show that "he was a victim of intimidation, ridicule, and insult on account of his race that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment" within the statutory period. Gipson, 171 F.3d at 579. Kimzey and Van Steenburgh do not change the Gipson holding: incidents outside the statutory period are relevant background and may be considered to place acts occurring within the statutory period into context. Pursuant toMadison, 2001 WL 704332, however, they are not actionable.
All of Taylor's complaints on April 6 and 7, 1998 involve his assignments in the hog kill division. Specifically, he was reassigned from the vacuuming job to the pans job. Taylor cites numerous incidents beginning in 1983 as evidence of on-going harassment; however, incidents occurring prior to November 21, 1991 cannot be considered. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1989), the Supreme Court held that Section 1981 applied only to the formation of employment contracts and not to on-going discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted to correct what Congress believed was an erroneous ruling in Patterson. Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1054 (8th Cir. 1997). The 1991 Act applied to the "'making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts . . . .'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)). Subsequently, however, the Court held that the 1991 Act did not apply retroactively to conduct occurring before the November 21, 1991 effective date of the Act. Id. 1054-55 (citing Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994)). Therefore, incidents occurring before November 21, 1991 cannot be considered.
B. Hostile Environment Complaints
All the hostile environment complaints that Taylor alleges occurred between November 1991 and mid-1996 involve Dick Sherman and alleged discriminatory treatment in the smoked meats department. Taylor alleges that Sherman often singled him out and treated him differently than white employees.
The only allegedly discriminatory treatment which is of the same type that occurred on April 6 and 7, 1998 occurred in 1997 when Taylor was also assigned to the hog kill department. During this time period, Taylor complained to Dick Hoefer, his supervisor, that he had been given a more difficult job than two less senior employees who did not have their home base in hog kill. During this time period, Taylor also complained to Kyle Whited, the plant manager, regarding other allegedly discriminatory treatment. After complaining to Whited, the job assignment which Taylor believed was discriminatory was remedied.
See Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts ¶ 177.
See Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 183-84.
See Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 192-200.
See Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts ¶ 201.
Using the 1997 events in the hog kill division and the alleged discriminatory treatment of Dick Sherman to place the April 6 and 7, 1998 events in context, the question becomes whether Taylor can "show that after [April 4, 1998], he was a victim of intimidation, ridicule, and insult on account of his race that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment." Gipson, 171 F.3d at 579. The mere change from one job assignment to another assignment within the hog kill division is insufficient to establish a hostile environment claim.
VI. Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Taylor must establish:
(1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between his protected conduct and the adverse employment action. Kiel v. Select Artificals, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999). As discussed supra, Taylor cannot show that he suffered an adverse employment action during the statutory period. For this reason and because there can be no claim of constructive discharge, his retaliation claim must fail.
IT IS ORDERED
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk shall enter judgment for the defendant.