Opinion
Case No. 20010196-CA.
Filed June 6, 2002. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Fourth District, Provo Department, The Honorable Anthony W. Schofield.
Jeffrey B. Brown, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.
John Reisser, Grace, Idaho, and Ralph J. Marsh, Jennifer E. Decker, Daniel W. Anderson, and Sara E. Bouley, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Appellants appeal the district court's 1998 Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. Specifically, they challenge the court's legal conclusion that their claims are precluded under the doctrine of election of remedies ("First Challenge"). Further, Appellants challenge the district court's conclusion, in its 2001 Order, that "the sheriff's sale of the subject property held on February 10, 2000 was a valid and enforceable sale" ("Second Challenge"). They also attempt to raise issues as to: (1) whether "action taken by [Appellants] change[d or could change] the forged deed from void to valid," (2) "[w]hat effect . . . the foreclosure of the trust deed . . . [had] upon the title to the real property and upon the interests of [A]ppellants in [that] property," (3) the extent of Lydia Epley's interest in the property at various times, and (4) whether the forged deed was void (collectively, "Remaining Issues").
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, in reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, "`we consider only whether [it] correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed.'" In so doing, we view all facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, ¶ 7, 42 P.3d 379 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Appellants provide no meaningful legal analysis to support their Second Challenge. Instead, they merely argue that the forged deed was void and thus failed to pass title. Accordingly, they have not adequately briefed this argument, and we decline to address it. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ¶ 17, 16 P.3d 1233; State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998).
We first address Appellants' First Challenge, that the district court erred in concluding that their claims are precluded under the doctrine of election of remedies. The doctrine of election of remedies is "a `technical rule of procedure and its purpose is . . . to prevent double redress for a single wrong. Said doctrine presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedies, and knowledgeable selection of one thereof.'"Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059, 1061-62 (Utah Ct.App. 1995) (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). This doctrine applies as a bar only where the two actions are inconsistent, generally based upon incompatible facts; the doctrine does not operate as an estoppel where the two or more remedies are given to redress the same wrong and are consistent. Where the remedies afforded are inconsistent, it is the election of one that bars the other; but where they are consistent, it is the satisfaction that operates as a bar.
Farmers Merchs. Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045, 1049 (1955). Appellants make much of the fact that they have not yet obtained full satisfaction against Epley. Accordingly, they argue that they are not barred by the election of remedies doctrine. However, only "where [the remedies] are consistent . . . is [it] the satisfaction that operates as a bar." Id. Thus, we discuss whether the remedy Appellants have already received is consistent with the one they seek against Appellees.
The district court concluded that the "damages remedy [already received] was based on the existence of the trust deed as an actual encumbrance on the property" and stated, "This remedy was impliedly premised on the continuing validity of the trust deed." Now Appellants seek a remedy against Appellees by arguing that the trust deed was invalid. But the district court concluded that "[i]nvalidation of the trust deed is inconsistent with the theory upon which [Appellants] have already received damages — that the property has decreased in . . . value by the existence of a valid trust deed."
Appellants further argue that the remedy they obtained against Epley was "obtained as a sanction for her failure to comply with discovery requests [and] . . . for her fraudulent conduct, and were not based upon loss of any property interest." However, this "argument that the doctrine of election of remedies does not bar recovery . . . seems to be based upon semantics." Brigham City Sand Gravel v. Machinery Ctr., Inc., 613 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah 1980). We agree with the district court that this argument "is unpersuasive." Indeed, Appellant Yvonne Taylor stated in her Affidavit in Support of Damages and Punitive Damages Against Defendants Lydia Inez Carrillo Epley and John Reisser, that "[a]s a result of the actions of . . . Epley and . . . Reisser, plaintiffs have been damaged in the amount of $55,000.00" — the identical amount for which Epley fraudulently "encumbered" the property. (Emphasis added.) Taylor also stated that "plaintiffs run the risk of losing their interest in the real property," and that unless no foreclosure occurred, it was "likely that plaintiffs would lose the real property." Thus, Appellants cannot now claim that the damages awarded them were merely to "sanction [Epley's] failure to comply with discovery requests" or that they were "not based upon loss of any property interest." Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that the two actions are inconsistent, and that the doctrine of election of remedies precludes Appellants' claims against Appellees.
In light of this determination, we conclude that Appellants' Remaining Issues are moot. "Ordinarily `we will not adjudicate issues when the underlying case is moot. A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.'" Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ¶ 16. Because the doctrine of election of remedies applies, Appellants' cannot further pursue any rights to the property. Accordingly, their Remaining Issues are moot. Further, even if election of remedies did not apply, their Remaining Issues would be dismissed as moot because they failed to obtain a stay of execution of the foreclosure sale, which the district court concluded was valid and enforceable. See Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 721-22 (Utah 1996). Utah's "strong judicial policy against giving advisory opinions dictates that courts refrain from adjudicating moot questions." Id. at 720. In light of our conclusion that Appellants' Remaining Issues are moot, we decline to address them.
In addition, we note that Appellants do not challenge the district court's denial of their motions "to alter, amend or clarify the terms of the Order granting . . . summary judgment," but instead attempt to have this court "alter, amend or clarify" where the district court refused to do so. Thus, Appellants' purported "appeal from . . . subsequent refusals of the [district] court to alter, amend or clarify," in effect requests that we render an advisory opinion in an attempt to circumvent the effects of the district court's Order Granting Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment.
We note that Appellants' Second Challenge is also moot for this reason.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, and James Z. Davis, Judge.