Opinion
C. A. 3:24-3005-SAL-PJG
07-09-2024
Kimberly Taylor, Plaintiff, v. Dillard's Inc.; Heather H. Lagasse; Raymond Stockley; Angela Bower, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Kimberly Taylor, proceeding pro se, brings this employment discrimination action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that Defendants Heather H. Lagasse, Raymond Stockley, and Angela Bower should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
In a contemporaneous order, the court authorized the issuance and service of process against Defendant Dillard's Inc.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. She claims she was demoted and terminated from her job working a retail store of Defendant Dillard's Inc. after she took medical leave for her sinuses and after she complained to management about a hostile work environment and harassment from her white manager. She also claims her treatment was due to being the second-highest paid employee in the store. She claims she was discriminated and retaliated against based on her race (African-American), color (Black), age (about 55), and disability (sinuses). Plaintiff brings this action against Dillard's Inc. and other employees or managers also working for Dillard's Inc.-Heather H. Lagasse, Raymond Stockley, and Angela Bower.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. However, these statutes do not provide for individual liability against other employees in causes of action brought against employers. See Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that there is no individual liability under Title VII); see also Jones v. Sternheimer, 387 Fed.Appx. 366 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA do not provide for causes of action against individuals). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a Title VII, ADA, or ADEA claim upon which relief can be granted against the individual defendants.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that Defendants Heather H. Lagasse, Raymond Stockley, and Angela Bower be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).