Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-2228-GTV
July 3, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Steven Taylor, appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendant, Cramer, Inc. ("Cramer"), discriminated against him based on his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). The matter is before the court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 23). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The requirement of a "genuine" issue of fact means that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of fact is "material" if it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. Id. Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This burden may be met by showing that there is a lack of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325. Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact left for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. "[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id. "Any evidence tending to show triable issues will be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 34 F.3d 968, 972 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
The District of Kansas Local Rules require that the party opposing a motion for summary judgment set forth a concise statement of material facts to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. D. Kan. Rule 56.1(b)(1). The Local Rules also require that any additional facts relied upon by the opposing party be supported by references to the record. D. Kan. Rule 56.1(b)(2). Plaintiff has not complied with D. Kan. Rule 56.1 in this case. Despite this, the court recognizes that Plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant requires it to construe Plaintiff's response more liberally than it might construe a response filed by a licensed attorney. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Overton v. United States, 925 F.2d 1282 (10th Cir. 1990) for the proposition that liberal construal of pro se pleadings includes review of summary judgment briefs). For that reason, and because the court does not believe that Defendant will be unduly prejudiced by a liberal construal of Plaintiff's response, the court will endeavor to relate the facts advanced by Plaintiff to the extent that it considers them relevant to the motion for summary judgment.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an African-American male, was employed by Defendant from February 16, 1999, until his discharge on January 11, 2001. During Plaintiff's period of employment with Defendant, Defendant had an Employee Code of Conduct Handbook ("Handbook") which outlined its discipline policy. Under the policy, employees would receive either an "A," "B," or "C" ticket for certain negative behaviors. Receipt of an "A" ticket typically resulted in six months of probation; receipt of a "B" ticket typically resulted in twelve months of probation; and receipt of a "C" ticket resulted in discharge. The Handbook explained that although the ticketing system provided general guidance with respect to discipline, each case would be judged based upon the individual circumstances.
On November 3, 1999, Plaintiff was placed on twelve months of probation after receiving a "B" ticket for allegedly shooting a staple gun at another employee. Plaintiff denies that he ever shot staples at anyone during his employment with Defendant.
On January 8, 2001, Plaintiff and a co-worker, Lee Franklin, also an African-American, became involved in a workplace confrontation in which heated words were purportedly exchanged. At the conclusion of the confrontation, Mr. Franklin allegedly left Defendant's premises threatening to "go get a gun" and return to shoot Plaintiff. Defendant suspended both employees pending an investigation into the incident.
On January 9, 2001, Linda Collins, Defendant's Human Resources Department Manager, and David Osbourne, a Local Union Representative, interviewed at least thirteen employees, including Plaintiff and Mr. Franklin, regarding the confrontation that occurred the previous day. Several of the employees interviewed stated that they had heard both Plaintiff and Mr. Franklin use threatening and offensive language in the workplace and that the feud between the two men had been ongoing for several months. In addition, two of the employees, Betty Choate and Faye Devosha, stated in their interviews that Plaintiff had previously made sexually inappropriate comments or engaged in sexually inappropriate conduct in the workplace. Plaintiff denies that he engaged in any such activity.
On January 11, 2001, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's and Mr. Franklin's employment. In a letter dated January 12, 2001, to John Wiseman, a Local Union Representative, Gary Rubin, Defendant's Vice President of Finance, gave the following reasons for Plaintiff's discharge:
It is our opinion that Steve Taylor is guilty of threatening others in the company and [of] using foul, derogatory language that constituted harassment of Mr. Franklin. This is a violation of Team Points 2 and 5. Our investigation also uncovered other instances of sexual harassment by Mr. Taylor. Based on this pattern of behavior and Mr. Taylor's previous instances of inappropriate behavior while he has been an employee of Cramer (e.g., harassment of other employees by shooting staples at them) we believe that termination is appropriate.
Team point 2 in the Handbook provides that an employee may not "[t]hreaten others in the company or use obscene, foul or derogatory language." According to the Handbook, a violation of Team point 2 may subject an employee to a "B" or "C" ticket. Team point 5 states that an employee may not "[m]ake false or vicious statements concerning others in the company." Violation of Team point 5 may result in receipt of an "A," "B," or "C" ticket.
On May 11, 2001, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that Defendant discharged him based on his race. In his Complaint, as well as in the Pretrial Order filed in this case, Plaintiff complains only that his white supervisor, Mr. Rubin, accepted as true the sexual harassment allegations advanced by Ms. Choate without giving Plaintiff an opportunity to defend himself and without conducting an investigation into the allegations. Plaintiff states in his Complaint and the Pretrial Order that he "believes" that Mr. Rubin did this because of Plaintiff's race. Plaintiff stipulates in the Pretrial Order that "[his] race was not a factor considered by [Defendant] in determining whether discipline should be imposed on [him] or the appropriate level of discipline."
III. DISCUSSION
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of, among other things, the employee's race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the court applies the three-step, burden-shifting analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to offer evidence suggesting a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff. Id. Once the defendant articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the ultimate burden reverts to the plaintiff to demonstrate an issue of material fact as to whether the proffered reason is pretextual. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993) (citation omitted).
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff's claim fails because he cannot establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. Citing EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 1992), Defendant contends that Plaintiff must show that: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was discharged for violating a work rule; and (3) similarly situated non-minority employees were treated differently. According to Defendant, Plaintiff cannot show that similarly situated non-minority employees were treated differently in this case. Unfortunately, the test upon which Defendant relies is incorrect. In Kendrick v. Penske Transportation Services, Inc., the Tenth Circuit specifically addressed the prima facie case elements articulated in Flasher and held that a plaintiff is no longer required to present evidence that similarly situated non-minority employees were treated differently. 220 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1138 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also Thompson v. KN Energy, Inc., 177 F. Supp.2d 1238, 1257 n. 12 (D.Kan. 2001) (acknowledging that the former prima facie burden requiring the plaintiff to show that similarly situated employees were treated differently is now errant). Rather, a plaintiff must now show that: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his job; (3) despite his qualifications, he was discharged; and (4) the job was not eliminated after his discharge. Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1229 (citing Perry, 199 F.3d at 1138).
Here, Defendant has not addressed the proper elements of Plaintiff's prima facie case under Kendrick. As a result, the court assumes for purposes of this opinion that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge and proceeds directly to the final two steps of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
Assuming that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment. Defendant contends that it discharged Plaintiff because of the confrontation between Plaintiff and Mr. Franklin. Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's conduct violated Defendant's written work rules prohibiting: (1) using threatening, obscene, foul or derogatory language to another employee; and (2) making vicious or false statements concerning another employee. In addition, Defendant states that it considered Plaintiff's short tenure with the company, as well as the information Defendant gained during its investigation of the incident between Plaintiff and Mr. Franklin regarding Plaintiff's allegedly inappropriate sexual comments and conduct. Although Mr. Rubin's January 12, 2001, letter to Mr. Wisemen regarding the reasons for Plaintiff's discharge also mentions the November 1999 staple gun incident, Defendant states that it did not take that incident into account to enhance Plaintiff's punishment in this case. Because Defendant need only explain its actions "in terms that are not facially prohibited by Title VII," the court concludes that Defendant has met its burden to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff's discharge. Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1317 (citations omitted).
Because Defendant has provided a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for discharging Plaintiff, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's explanation is pretextual. Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Pretext can be established if the plaintiff shows either "that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or . . . that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (citation omitted). "[A] plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Reeves. v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
Plaintiff has not carried his burden to establish pretext in this case. Most importantly, Plaintiff stipulates in the Pretrial Order that "[his] race was not a factor considered by [Defendant] in determining whether discipline should be imposed on [him] or the appropriate level of discipline." Plaintiff's admission in the Pretrial Order that there existed no nexus between Defendant's decision to discharge him and his race is fatal to his claim. See, e.g., Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming grant of summary judgment to employer when the plaintiff could not demonstrate that her supervisor's race-related comments had any nexus to the supervisor's decision to discharge her).
Despite this stipulation, the court has endeavored to discover any other argument Plaintiff raises relating to pretext. The only other formal contention that Plaintiff makes in this case that is in any way related to his race is the allegation in his Complaint and the Pretrial Order that he "believes" that Mr. Rubin's purported unconditional acceptance of Ms. Choate's sexual harassment allegations against him without giving him an opportunity to defend himself and without conducting an investigation into the allegations was because of his race. In addition, although Plaintiff's summary judgment response is somewhat difficult to decipher, it appears that he also contends that Defendant falsely accused him of the staple gun shooting incident in 1999 and that, despite earlier indications of volatility from Mr. Franklin, Defendant intentionally kept Mr. Franklin employed "so he could do what everyone of [Plaintiff's] accusers wanted to do and `that is murder [him].'" Plaintiff does not allege that either of these actions were taken because of Plaintiff's race. Even if he had alleged that the actions were taken because of his race, however, he has not produced any competent evidence to support any of the allegations. His mere "belief," no matter how strongly held, that any of these actions were based on his race is insufficient to avoid summary judgment. Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A., 60 F.3d 1486, 1491 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[M]ere conjecture that [an] employer's explanation is a pretext for intentional discrimination is an insufficient basis for denial of summary judgment.") (quoting Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 772 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In sum, after thoroughly examining the record and construing the pleadings liberally due to Plaintiff's pro se status, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact about the pretextual nature of Defendant's proffered explanation for Plaintiff's discharge. Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's Title VII claim.
The court notes that Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the final and binding arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement between Defendant and Plaintiff's union, the United Steelworkers of America. Given the court's conclusion that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas, the court need not address Defendant's second argument.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 23) is granted.
The case is closed.
Copies of this order shall be transmitted to pro se plaintiff Steven Taylor and counsel of record for Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.