Opinion
22-14007-CIV-CANN/MCCABE
05-24-2023
MARCUS L. TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. DUSTIN CAMPBELL, Defendant.
ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [ECF No. 56] AND CLOSING CASE
AILEEN M. CANNON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Ryon M. McCabe on April 27, 2023 [ECF No. 56]. On February 9, 2023, Defendant Dustin Campbell filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings seeking dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [ECF No. 45]. On March 24, 2023, this Court referred Defendant's Motion to Magistrate Judge McCabe for a Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 50]. Plaintiff filed untimely Objections to the Report [ECF No. 60], which the Court in its discretion elects to consider in this instance. Upon full review, and for the reasons stated in the Report along with an update on Plaintiff's state-court proceeding as indicated herein, the Court ACCEPTS the Report [ECF No. 56]. Defendant's Motion [ECF No. 45] is GRANTED IN PART, and Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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A district court may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate judge's report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Those portions of the report and recommendation to which objections are made are accorded de novo review if those objections “pinpoint the specific findings that the party disagrees with.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). Any portions of the report and recommendation to which no specific objections are made are reviewed only for clear error. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.”); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Most circuits agree that in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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As the Report indicates, this case is governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Pursuant to that decision, “in order to recover damages for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486-87. In other words, a civil rights action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated, regardless of the nature of the relief sought or the target of the suit. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
Plaintiff appears to argue that he can overcome the Heck bar [see ECF No. 60 pp. 9-10], but his objection merely rehashes his position that he was a victim of malicious prosecution, and the state court records (of which this Court and the Report take judicial notice) confirm that no invalidation of his conviction has taken place within the meaning of Heck. Plaintiff filed a belated appeal to Florida's Sixth District Court of Appeal, which resulted recently in a remand to the Highlands County Circuit Court for an evidentiary hearing limited to the question whether Plaintiff communicated to his trial counsel that he wanted to appeal his judgment and sentence rendered in the VOP case. See State v. Taylor, Case No. 2010-CF-001160, Order of Limited Remand (Fla. Dist. Ct. Apr. 19, 2023). Plaintiff's case thus remains pending in the state system; there has been no reversal on direct appeal, no order of expungement by executive order, no declaration of invalidity by a competent state tribunal, and no federal case questioning the validity of his state conviction. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
Therefore, after conducting a de novo review of the Report and the record, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge McCabe's recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint without prejudice under Heck. See Petersen v. Overstreet, 819 Fed.Appx. 778, 779 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[C]ases barred by Heck . . . are typically dismissed without prejudice ....”); see also Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Because [plaintiff's] convictions have not been invalidated, his Bivens damages claims are not ripe. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing [plaintiff's] claims.”).
This determination should come as no surprise to Plaintiff, as the malicious prosecution claim he raises here has been dismissed under Heck in at least two other cases. See Taylor v. Campbell, 21-CV-14228, ECF No. 11 pp. 5-7 (S.D. Fla. July 1, 2021); Taylor v. Castillo, 22-CV-14118, ECF No. 13 p. 5 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2022).
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Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The Court ACCEPTS Magistrate Judge McCabe's recommendation [ECF No. 56] to DISMISS the Amended Complaint without prejudice under Heck.
2. Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 45] is GRANTED IN PART in accordance with this Order.
3. The Clerk is instructed to CLOSE the case.
DONE AND ORDERED.