The law is clear that where, as here, there are no permissible deductions from the security deposit, the entire deposit plus interest must be returned within thirty days after the end of the tenancy, and the failure to do so entitles the tenant to treble damages and attorney's fees. In Taylor v. Beaudry, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 971 N.E.2d 313 (2012) ( Taylor II ) -- recounting our earlier decision in the same case, Taylor v. Beaudry, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 914 N.E.2d 931 (2009) ( Taylor I ) -- we said: "the cause of action under G. L. c. 186, ยง 15B(7), for failure to return a security deposit to a tenant as required by ยง 15B(6)(e ) arises when the landlord โfails to return to the tenant the security deposit ... within thirty days after termination of the tenancy.โ " Taylor II, supra at 107, 971 N.E.2d 313, quoting Taylor I, supra at 415-416, 914 N.E.2d 931, quoting ยง 15B (6) (e ).
The law is clear that where, as here, there are no permissible deductions from the security deposit, the entire deposit plus interest must be returned within thirty days after the end of the tenancy, and the failure to do so entitles the tenant to treble damages and attorney's fees. In Taylor v. Beaudry, 82 Mass.App.Ct. 105 (2012) (Taylor II) - recounting our earlier decision in the same case, Taylor v. Beaudry, 75 Mass.App.Ct. 411 (2009) (Taylor I) - we said: "the cause of action under G. L. c. 186, ยง 15B(7), for failure to return a security deposit to a tenant as required by ยง 15B(6) (e) arises when the landlord 'fails to return to the tenant the security deposit . . . within thirty days after termination of the tenancy.'" Taylor II, supra at 107, quoting Taylor I, supra at 415-416, quoting ยง 15B (6) (e).
Nonetheless, certain Massachusetts courts view the history differently and suggest that the Legislature's significant interest in compliance with Section 15B's requirements warrants a broad application of its penalty provision. SeeTaylor v. Beaudry, 82 Mass.App.Ct. 105, 971 N.E.2d 313, 318 (2012) (Taylor II) ("[T]he Legislature thought the deterrent effect of [these] suits ... was necessary to ensure all landlords return security deposits on time and in full compliance with the statute."). As previously mentioned, the SJC has not provided guidance on these provisions of the Security Deposit Law in 33 years.
That there was evidence to support the plaintiffs' position does not undercut the judge's findings. 'Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.' Taylor v. Beaudry, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 118 (2012) (citation omitted). The judge was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and his reasons for rejecting Weygand's agreement with Dion as comparable to that of Audette were supported by the record.
Whether the ruling on the motion to dismiss improperly limited the scope of the plaintiff's recovery is not before us, as the plaintiff did not cross-appeal. See Taylor v. Beaudry, 82 Mass.App.Ct. 105, 112 (2012) ("in the absence of a cross appeal an appellee may not obtain a decree more favorable than the one issued below").
However much Decoulos may disagree with the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Kitras, it is binding on him and the Superior Court correctly applied the doctrine of stare decisis. Taylor v. Beaudry, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 112 n.8 (2012). Decoulos relies on Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010) (plurality opinion) to support his proposition that the Kitras decision constituted a judicial taking; however, this reliance is misplaced.
However much Decoulos may disagree with the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Kitras, it is binding on him and the Superior Court correctly applied the doctrine of stare decisis. Taylor v. Beaudry, 82 Mass.App.Ct. 105, 112 n.8 (2012). Decoulos relies on Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010) (plurality opinion) to support his proposition that the Kitras decision constituted a judicial taking; however, this reliance is misplaced.
In the absence of an adequate record, "no reasonable basis exists for the court to review, much less disturb, the judge's findings." Taylor v. Beaudry, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 118 (2012). The plaintiffs argue that "[t]he Applicants never submitted evidence to the Board that proves that the proposed [rural density development] is consistent with the Town's Village Centers Plan."
Were we to rule that the immunity statutes did not apply to the Wage Act, this would provide the plaintiffs more encompassing relief than they obtained in Superior Court (the denial of Crawford's motion for summary judgment based on there being facts in dispute), a result that typically cannot occur in the absence of a cross appeal. Cf. Taylor v. Beaudry, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 112, 971 N.E.2d 313 (2012) ("It is blackletter law that in the absence of a cross appeal an appellee may not obtain a decree more favorable than the one issued below"). Appeal dismissed.
See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 666 (1998) (comparing "[t]he authority of the trial judge under rule 25[b][2]" to that of Supreme Judicial Court under G. L. c. 278, ยง 33E [emphasis supplied]); Commonwealth v. Almeida, 452 Mass. 601, 613 (2008) (rule 25[b][2] "authorizes a trial judge to reduce a verdict despite the presence of sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict" [emphasis supplied]). Even if Taylor v. Beaudry, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 105 (2012), was applicable (it is not), we see nothing in the judgments "that so unfairly punishes [the defendant] as to cause justice to miscarry." Id. at 114 (Brown, J., dissenting).