Opinion
12-08-2023
Torrance TAYLOR v. BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION, CITY OF MEMPHIS RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Chancery Court for Shelby County, No. CH-20-0911-1
ORDER
PER CURIAM
PER CURIAM
Torrance Taylor is a former officer with the City of Memphis Police Department. In July 2016, Taylor reportedly injured his left knee while detaining a suspect. Taylor retired and applied for line-of-duty disability benefits, which the City’s Pension Ordinance provides for certain injuries that are "the direct and proximate result of" a work incident.
All three physicians offering medical opinions on Taylor’s application concluded that Taylor’s disability is primarily a result of two pre-existing chronic knee conditions rather than the July 2016 work incident. Relying on this medical testimony, the City denied Taylor’s request for line-of-duty benefits. On appeal, an Administrative Law Judge for the City’s Pension Board credited the medical testimony and upheld the City’s decision. Applying the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act’s deferential standard of review, the Shelby County Chancery Court affirmed the ALJ’s determination. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals, however, reversed the Chancery Court’s judgment and awarded Taylor the requested benefits. The panel majority concluded that the ALJ’s findings were not supported by substantial and material evidence and were arbitrary and capricious. The Pension Board seeks this Court’s review.
Upon consideration of the Pension Board’s application for permission to appeal, Taylor’s answer, and the record before us, we are convinced that the ALJ’s findings must be upheld under the UAPA’s deferential standard of review. The panel majority’s reversal of the ALJ’s findings is premised on an impermissible reweighing of the evidence, which the UAPA expressly prohibits. Accordingly, we grant the Pension Board’s application, reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment, and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Torrance Taylor retired from the Memphis Police Department after reportedly suffering a fall while detaining a suspect on July 23, 2016. An MRI of Taylor’s left knee after the July 2016 incident revealed both a medial meniscus tear and a torn ACL. Taylor applied for line-of-duty benefits, which are available if an employee suffers:
A physical or mental condition arising as the direct and proximate result of an accident … while in the actual performance of duties for the city at some definite time and place … which totally and permanently prevents him or her from engaging in the duties for which he or she was employed by the city.
City of Memphis Code of Ordinances § 25-1(27). "The determination of the line-of-duty disability of a participant shall be made on medical evidence by at least two qualified physicians …." Id.
In compliance with the applicable ordinance, two independent physicians, Dr. Jeffrey Dlabach and Dr. Michael Hood, reviewed Taylor’s medical records and physically examined him. Both physicians provided reports to the Pension Board finding Taylor permanently and totally disabled from performing his duties as a police officer given instability in his left knee. Both physicians, however, also found that Taylor’s disability is not primarily (i.e., more than 50%) a result of his employment as a police officer, including the July 2016 falling incident. Rather, both opined that Taylor’s disability primarily results from two chronic knee conditions that predate the July 2016 incident. In support, Drs. Hood and Dlabach stated that a medial meniscus tear and an ACL abnormality had already appeared on previous MRIs after, Taylor suffered an off-duty motorcycle accident in 2006.
Taylor’s own treating physician, Dr. Harold Knight, also concluded that Taylor’s alleged disability is not primarily a result of his work. In fact, in Dr. Knight’s opinion, Taylor is not totally disabled.
Based on these three medical opinions, the City awarded Taylor ordinary disability retirement benefits but denied Taylor’s request for line-of-duty disability benefits. The City concluded that Taylor is ineligible for line-of-duty benefits given the uniform medical findings that Taylor’s employment (including the July 2016 incident) was not the primary cause of his claimed disability.
Taylor appealed the denial of his application for line-of-duty benefits to an Administrative Law Judge for the City of Memphis Pension Board. The ALJ conducted a hearing and upheld the denial. The ALJ found that Taylor’s disability is not "the direct and proximate result" of the July 2016 work incident given the medical testimony uniformly concluding that Taylor’s disability is primarily caused by two chronic pre-existing injuries.
Taylor filed a petition for judicial review under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act in the Shelby County Chancery Court. The Chancery Court held a hearing and issued an order upholding the ALJ’s findings. The Chancery Court determined that the ALJ’s findings survive review under the UAPA because they are supported by "substantial and material evidence" and are not "arbitrary and capricious."
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. The panel majority acknowledges the narrow standard of review applicable under the UAPA. Nevertheless, the majority determines that certain medical records "detract from the weight of the physicians’ accounts" that Taylor’s injuries predate the July 2016 incident. Additionally, the majority concludes that, even if substantial and material evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that Taylor had pre-existing injuries, the ALJ committed a "clear error of judgment" in finding that the 2016 injury did not aggravate those pre-existing injuries and therefore "direct[ly] and proximate[ly]" cause Taylor’s disability.
Judge Usman dissented. In his view, the panel majority engaged "in a reweighing of the evidence that exceeds the scope of this court’s authority" under the UAPA. We agree with Judge Usman and therefore reverse.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1–3] The UAPA mandates a "narrow and deferential" standard for judicial review of administrative decisions. StarLink Logistics Inc. v. ACC, LLC, 494 S.W.3d 659, 668 (Tenn. 2016). To survive review under the UAPA, an administrative decision generally only needs to be supported by "substantial and material evidence." Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5). Substantial and material evidence, we have explained, "is less than a preponderance of the evidence," but "more than a scintilla or glimmer of evidence." StarLink Logistics, 494 S.W.3d at 669 (quotations omitted). In other words, "substantial evidence" is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a rational conclusion and to furnish a reasonably sound factual basis for the decision being reviewed. McClellan v. Bd. of Regents of State Univ., 921 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tenn. 1996); S. Ry. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 682 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Tenn. 1984).
"In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5)(A)(ii).
[4,5] Although an administrative decision with adequate evidentiary support can still be invalidated under the UAPA as arbitrary and capricious, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(4), the decision must "amount[] to a clear error in judgment," Moss v. Shelby Cnty. Civil Serv. Merit Bd., 665 S.W.3d 433, 441 (Tenn. 2023). An administrative decision constitutes "a clear error in judgment" if it "is not based on any course of reasoning or exercise of judgment, or disregards the facts or circumstances of the ease without some basis that would lead a reasonable person to reach the same conclusion." Id. (quotations and ellipsis omitted). If there is room for two opinions, an administrative decision adopting one of them is not arbitrary or capricious—even if the reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion. StarLink Logistics, 494 S.W.3d at 670.
ANALYSIS
[6] The ALJ’s findings in this case satisfy the UAPA’s narrow legal standard. The ALJ found that Taylor’s disability is not "the direct and proximate result" of the July 2016 work incident given medical testimony uniformly concluding that Taylor’s disability is primarily caused by two chronic pre-existing injuries. This medical testimony comfortably passes the UAPA’s substantial-evidence test. Moreover, the ALJ’s reasoning in crediting that testimony does not exhibit the type of "clear error in judgment" necessary to establish arbitrary-and-capricious decisionmaking. A reasonable person could accept the medical testimony and find that Taylor’s, disability is not "the direct and proximate" result of a work-related injury.
The panel majority provides three grounds for reversing the ALJ’s findings, none of which is legally sufficient to displace the ALJ’s findings and reverse the Chancery Court’s judgment. At most, these arguments merely detract from the weight of the physician testimony on which the ALJ’s findings are based. The arguments fall far short of showing that the ALJ’s findings lack substantial and material supporting evidence or reflect arbitrary-and-eapricious decisionmaking.
I.
The panel majority first criticizes the physician testimony underlying the ALJ’s finding that Taylor’s left ACL and medial meniscus injuries date back to his 2006 off-duty motorcycle injury. The panel majority, however, does not dispute that Taylor’s medial meniscus tear is expressly documented in medical records from 2006. Specifically, the medial meniscus tear is noted in a diagnostic report from an October 2006 MRI and also in medical notes from November 2006. Thus, the administrative record fully supports the physicians’ findings that Taylor’s medial meniscus tear dates back to 2006.
[7] The panel majority focuses on Taylor’s other disabling injury, i.e., the ACL tear. The majority emphasizes that there is no document in the record from 2006 expressly identifying the tear. The physicians’ opinions, however, do not appear to be based entirely on a review of Taylor’s paper records. Rather, as Judge Usman notes, the record suggests that Drs. Dlabach and Hood both personally reviewed Taylor’s MRI films from 2006 in formulating their opinions regarding the origins of Taylor’s ACL injury. At the very least, the ALJ reasonably could read the record this way, and courts must accept reasonable inferences from the record in evaluating whether a decision is supported by substantial and material evidence. See, e.g., Long v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct., 435 S.W.3d 174, 181 (Tenn. 2014) (explaining that reviewing courts "must accept" an administrative body’s reasonable inferences from the record under the UAPA); Wayne Cnty. v. Tenn. Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that substantial evidence can also include "inferences reasonably drawn from direct evidence"). Consequently, the lack of a paper record specifically documenting Taylor’s ACL tear in 2006 does not mean the physicians lacked a reasonable evidentiary basis for their opinions.
The panel majority also points to an MRI report from August 2006 stating that various parts of Taylor’s left knee, including his ACL, were "unremarkable" at the time, But that record expressly cautions that it was, the result of a "[l]imited exam due to patient’s motion and low field magnet." The report does, in fact, appear incomplete—it separately indicates that the medial menisci were "unremarkable," even though as noted above the October 2006 MRI report and medical records specifically document Taylor’s medial meniscus tear. The August 2006 MRI report also fails to document the "extensive edema in the intercondylar notch" appearing on the October 2006 MRI report. And although the October 2006 MRI report states that Taylor’s ACL "appears intact," its finding that there was "of course extensive edema in the intercondylar notch" reasonably supports the physicians’ findings that Taylor’s ACL injury dates back to 2006.
Ultimately, however, any inconsistency between the physicians’ findings and Taylor’s medical records would simply detract from the weight of the physicians’ accounts. They would not show that the ALJ’s findings lacked substantial and material supporting evidence. The ALJ’s findings are fully supported by the opinions of three physicians who personally examined Taylor and his medical records and concluded that Taylor’s injuries occurred in 2006. A reasonable person could credit the physician testimony on this administrative record as to the primary causes of Taylor’s disability.
II.
The panel majority next argues that the ALJ did not expressly consider the fact that Taylor suffered left-knee injuries after an on-duty car accident in 2012, which might make him eligible for line-of-duty benefits. But that theory is immaterial to the ALJ’s findings and the medical testimony on which they are based. Again, Drs. Dlabach and Hood both expressly found that the injuries primarily causing Taylor’s disability date back to his 2006 off-duty motorcycle accident. Dr. Dlabach also specifically testified that Taylor’s left-knee injuries were already chronic by 2012. Because the ALJ reasonably credited these findings, it is immaterial that Taylor suffered an on-the-job injury in 2012.
III.
Finally, the panel majority concludes that, even if Taylor did have pre-existing left-knee injuries dating back to 2006, the July 2016 incident was a distinct "direct and proximate" cause of his disability, rendering the ALJ’s findings "arbitrary and capricious." This theory has some factual support in deposition testimony from Dr. Hood, who found that even though the July 2016 incident was not the primary cause of Taylor’s disability, that incident was "the primary cause for [Taylor’s] increasing symptoms for his chronic condition"—namely, Taylor’s left-knee instability—and those "increased symptoms" prevent him from performing his job.
We need not—and do hot—decide whether a disability can be considered "the direct and proximate result" of a work incident under the line-of-duty ordinance if the incident aggravates a pre-existing injury. Even assuming that such an aggregation theory were viable, Dr. Hood’s testimony would not establish that the ALJ engaged in arbitrary-and-capricious decisionmaking. Rather, as Judge Usman recognized, the ALJ’s findings are equally supported by Dr. Dlabach’s competing testimony on this issue. In particular, when asked if the July 2016 incident could have led to Taylor’s "increase in symptoms" arid disabling "instability," Dr. Dlabach testified it was "unlikely" because "[t]he instability is chronic" and results from the pre-existing injuries and the loss of muscle mass as we age. In other words, Dr. Dlabach simply "do[es] not relate [Taylor’s disability] to the work injury" in July 2016. In his view, Taylor’s instability would have happened even absent the July 2016 incident.
[8] At most, the administrative record reveals competing factual theories regarding whether Taylor’s disability is "the direct and proximate result" of Taylor’s July 2016 incident. Because an equally valid competing factual theory is not legally sufficient to render an administrative decision arbitrary and capricious under the UAPA, the panel majority mistakenly reversed the ALJ’s findings on this ground. See, e.g., Moss, 665 S.W.3d at 441 ("If there is room for two opinions, a decision is not arbitrary or capricious if it is made honestly, and upon due consideration, even though a reviewing court thinks a different conclusion might have been reached." (alterations omitted) (quoting StarLink Logistics Inc., 494 S.W.3d at 670)).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, upon consideration of the Pension Board’s application for permission to appeal, Taylor’s answer, and the record before us, the application is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the trial court's judgment is reinstated. The case is remanded to the trial court for any further necessary proceedings consistent with this Order. The costs of this appeal are taxed to the plaintiff, Torrance Taylor, for which execution may issue if necessary.
This order is designated for publication pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 4.